Anton Livaja anton
  • Joined on 2023-08-06
anton pushed to feat/tamper-proofing-chain-of-custody at public/docs 2024-12-05 23:21:38 +00:00
fa73b09cc0 update across multiple docs
anton opened issue public/docs#15 2024-12-05 22:57:27 +00:00
Create SOL/Ronin specific playbook
anton commented on pull request public/docs#10 2024-12-05 21:41:37 +00:00
WIP: expand documents to support playbooks for managing specific digital assets

What if it said "Follow a playbook" instead of "coin playbook"?

anton commented on pull request public/docs#10 2024-12-05 21:13:58 +00:00
WIP: expand documents to support playbooks for managing specific digital assets

I also consider different sized plastic beads to be superior to all other filler because:

  • beans are more uniformly colored so they are not as easy to distinguish
  • confetti gets flattened and…
anton commented on pull request public/docs#10 2024-12-05 21:02:35 +00:00
WIP: expand documents to support playbooks for managing specific digital assets

Linked to the tamper proofing methods docs and added examples of adequate beads and vacuum sealer.

anton commented on issue public/docs#13 2024-12-05 20:48:36 +00:00
Define high level threat model levels

Going to keep the doc in a "simple" form for now, with the intention of circling back and making it more general down the road.

anton pushed to feat/tamper-proofing-chain-of-custody at public/docs 2024-12-05 20:47:11 +00:00
36a64ca6f3 refactor and clean up threat model doc
anton commented on issue public/docs#12 2024-12-05 20:43:44 +00:00
Define roles for system participants

@scjudd basically the whole body of documents depends on roles. This document is meant to specify what these roles are in a more clear manner, and this doc will be linked to by a number of other…

anton commented on issue public/docs#3 2024-12-05 20:41:39 +00:00
Define Chain-Of-Custody Standards

@scjudd

  1. It's essentially done
  2. It's to be reviewed by another team member to ensure that it's not missing anything
anton commented on issue public/docs#13 2024-12-04 22:51:57 +00:00
Define high level threat model levels

Going to integrate the CCSS documentation with our threat model and reorganize information. The goal is to have different "aspects" such as "entropy generation", and then all levels specified for…

anton pushed to feat/tamper-proofing-chain-of-custody at public/docs 2024-12-04 21:02:02 +00:00
1e9d21dcdd add high level threat model initial draft
e43c65c3e8 add references to tamper proofing doc
Compare 2 commits »
anton opened issue public/docs#14 2024-12-04 20:32:17 +00:00
Add references for different attack types in the high level threat model
anton opened issue public/keyfork#55 2024-12-04 13:53:25 +00:00
Implement support for hardware RNG device(s)
anton commented on issue public/docs#13 2024-12-02 17:29:12 +00:00
Define high level threat model levels

This document should be replicated, updated and used as the high level threat model, which can be linked to, and links to other documents such as "tamper proofing methods", "chain of custody",…

anton opened issue public/docs#13 2024-12-02 17:28:27 +00:00
Define high level threat model levels
anton pushed to feat/tamper-proofing-chain-of-custody at public/docs 2024-12-01 19:43:38 +00:00
930017285b many updates
anton opened issue public/docs#12 2024-12-01 14:38:18 +00:00
Define roles for system participants
anton pushed to feat/tamper-proofing-chain-of-custody at public/docs 2024-12-01 00:39:59 +00:00
f4424b55af update one time use procurement and location and reusable laptop
anton commented on issue public/docs#6 2024-11-29 16:51:54 +00:00
Develop processes for different device usage

There is a challenge with SOL transactions because they are only valid for 250 blocks from the hash which was used to generate the tx. Solana processes 2.5 blocks a second, which means we have a…

anton commented on issue public/docs#8 2024-11-29 16:20:41 +00:00
Define types of non Root Entropy ceremony flows

Currently working on the fixed location tamper evident path. This is the happy path, and the most secure one. The flow will differ primarily in terms of the location, hardware and tamper evidence.