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Merge pull request #282 from TheBlueMatt/2021-02-redo-fuzz 

Reduce cryptography usage in --cfg=fuzzing
This commit is contained in:
Andrew Poelstra 2021-06-09 15:01:52 +00:00 committed by GitHub
parent 65a2b4f3cb 79119e8123
commit bb25ed4715
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GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
3 changed files with 505 additions and 77 deletions
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secp256k1-sys/src/lib.rs
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@ -275,38 +275,9 @@ extern "C" {
pub static secp256k1_context_no_precomp: *const Context;
// Contexts
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_size")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(flags: c_uint) -> size_t;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_create")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_create(prealloc: *mut c_void, flags: c_uint) -> *mut Context;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_destroy")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_destroy(cx: *mut Context);
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_clone_size")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone_size(cx: *const Context) -> size_t;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_clone")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone(cx: *const Context, prealloc: *mut c_void) -> *mut Context;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_randomize")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_randomize(cx: *mut Context,
seed32: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int;
// Pubkeys
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_ec_pubkey_parse")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(cx: *const Context, pk: *mut PublicKey,
input: *const c_uchar, in_len: size_t)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_ec_pubkey_serialize")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(cx: *const Context, output: *mut c_uchar,
out_len: *mut size_t, pk: *const PublicKey,
compressed: c_uint)
-> c_int;
// Signatures
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_ecdsa_signature_parse_der")]
pub fn secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(cx: *const Context, sig: *mut Signature,
@ -338,6 +309,7 @@ extern "C" {
in_sig: *const Signature)
-> c_int;
// Secret Keys
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_ec_seckey_verify")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(cx: *const Context,
sk: *const c_uchar) -> c_int;
@ -376,6 +348,38 @@ extern "C" {
sk: *mut c_uchar,
tweak: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int;
}
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
extern "C" {
// Contexts
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_size")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(flags: c_uint) -> size_t;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_create")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_create(prealloc: *mut c_void, flags: c_uint) -> *mut Context;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_clone_size")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone_size(cx: *const Context) -> size_t;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_clone")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone(cx: *const Context, prealloc: *mut c_void) -> *mut Context;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_randomize")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_randomize(cx: *mut Context,
seed32: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int;
// Pubkeys
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_ec_pubkey_parse")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(cx: *const Context, pk: *mut PublicKey,
input: *const c_uchar, in_len: size_t)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_ec_pubkey_serialize")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(cx: *const Context, output: *mut c_uchar,
out_len: *mut size_t, pk: *const PublicKey,
compressed: c_uint)
-> c_int;
// EC
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_ec_pubkey_create")]
@ -417,6 +421,42 @@ extern "C" {
data: *mut c_void,
) -> c_int;
// ECDSA
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_ecdsa_verify")]
pub fn secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(cx: *const Context,
sig: *const Signature,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
pk: *const PublicKey)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_ecdsa_sign")]
pub fn secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(cx: *const Context,
sig: *mut Signature,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
sk: *const c_uchar,
noncefn: NonceFn,
noncedata: *const c_void)
-> c_int;
// Schnorr Signatures
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_schnorrsig_sign")]
pub fn secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(
cx: *const Context,
sig: *mut c_uchar,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
keypair: *const KeyPair,
noncefp: SchnorrNonceFn,
noncedata: *const c_void
) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_schnorrsig_verify")]
pub fn secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(
cx: *const Context,
sig64: *const c_uchar,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
pubkey: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
) -> c_int;
// Extra keys
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_keypair_create")]
pub fn secp256k1_keypair_create(
@ -480,46 +520,6 @@ extern "C" {
) -> c_int;
}
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
extern "C" {
// ECDSA
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_ecdsa_verify")]
pub fn secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(cx: *const Context,
sig: *const Signature,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
pk: *const PublicKey)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_ecdsa_sign")]
pub fn secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(cx: *const Context,
sig: *mut Signature,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
sk: *const c_uchar,
noncefn: NonceFn,
noncedata: *const c_void)
-> c_int;
// Schnorr Signatures
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_schnorrsig_sign")]
pub fn secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(
cx: *const Context,
sig: *mut c_uchar,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
keypair: *const KeyPair,
noncefp: SchnorrNonceFn,
noncedata: *const c_void
) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_schnorrsig_verify")]
pub fn secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(
cx: *const Context,
sig64: *const c_uchar,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
pubkey: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
) -> c_int;
}
/// A reimplementation of the C function `secp256k1_context_create` in rust.
///
/// This function allocates memory, the pointer should be deallocated using `secp256k1_context_destroy`
@ -669,6 +669,271 @@ impl<T> CPtr for [T] {
#[cfg(fuzzing)]
mod fuzz_dummy {
use super::*;
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
#[cfg(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming)] compile_error!("We do not support fuzzing with rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming");
extern "C" {
fn rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_size(flags: c_uint) -> size_t;
fn rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_create(prealloc: *mut c_void, flags: c_uint) -> *mut Context;
fn rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_clone(cx: *const Context, prealloc: *mut c_void) -> *mut Context;
}
#[cfg(feature = "lowmemory")]
const CTX_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 65;
#[cfg(not(feature = "lowmemory"))]
const CTX_SIZE: usize = 1024 * (1024 + 128);
// Contexts
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(flags: c_uint) -> size_t {
assert!(rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_size(flags) + std::mem::size_of::<c_uint>() <= CTX_SIZE);
CTX_SIZE
}
static HAVE_PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
const HAVE_CONTEXT_NONE: usize = 0;
const HAVE_CONTEXT_WORKING: usize = 1;
const HAVE_CONTEXT_DONE: usize = 2;
static mut PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT: [u8; CTX_SIZE] = [0; CTX_SIZE];
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_create(prealloc: *mut c_void, flags: c_uint) -> *mut Context {
// While applications should generally avoid creating too many contexts, sometimes fuzzers
// perform tasks repeatedly which real applications may only do rarely. Thus, we want to
// avoid being overly slow here. We do so by having a static context and copying it into
// new buffers instead of recalculating it. Because we shouldn't rely on std, we use a
// simple hand-written OnceFlag built out of an atomic to gate the global static.
let mut have_ctx = HAVE_PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
while have_ctx != HAVE_CONTEXT_DONE {
if have_ctx == HAVE_CONTEXT_NONE {
have_ctx = HAVE_PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT.swap(HAVE_CONTEXT_WORKING, Ordering::AcqRel);
if have_ctx == HAVE_CONTEXT_NONE {
assert!(rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_size(SECP256K1_START_SIGN | SECP256K1_START_VERIFY) + std::mem::size_of::<c_uint>() <= CTX_SIZE);
assert_eq!(rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_create(
PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT[..].as_ptr() as *mut c_void,
SECP256K1_START_SIGN | SECP256K1_START_VERIFY),
PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT[..].as_ptr() as *mut Context);
assert_eq!(HAVE_PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT.swap(HAVE_CONTEXT_DONE, Ordering::AcqRel),
HAVE_CONTEXT_WORKING);
} else if have_ctx == HAVE_CONTEXT_DONE {
// Another thread finished while we were swapping.
HAVE_PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT.store(HAVE_CONTEXT_DONE, Ordering::Release);
}
} else {
// Another thread is building, just busy-loop until they're done.
assert_eq!(have_ctx, HAVE_CONTEXT_WORKING);
have_ctx = HAVE_PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT.load(Ordering::Acquire);
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
std::thread::yield_now();
}
}
ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT[..].as_ptr(), prealloc as *mut u8, CTX_SIZE);
let ptr = (prealloc as *mut u8).add(CTX_SIZE).sub(std::mem::size_of::<c_uint>());
(ptr as *mut c_uint).write(flags);
prealloc as *mut Context
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone_size(_cx: *const Context) -> size_t { CTX_SIZE }
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone(cx: *const Context, prealloc: *mut c_void) -> *mut Context {
let orig_ptr = (cx as *mut u8).add(CTX_SIZE).sub(std::mem::size_of::<c_uint>());
let new_ptr = (prealloc as *mut u8).add(CTX_SIZE).sub(std::mem::size_of::<c_uint>());
let flags = (orig_ptr as *mut c_uint).read();
(new_ptr as *mut c_uint).write(flags);
rustsecp256k1_v0_4_0_context_preallocated_clone(cx, prealloc)
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_context_randomize(cx: *mut Context,
_seed32: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int {
// This function is really slow, and unsuitable for fuzzing
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
1
}
unsafe fn check_context_flags(cx: *const Context, required_flags: c_uint) {
assert!(!cx.is_null());
let cx_flags = if cx == secp256k1_context_no_precomp {
1
} else {
let ptr = (cx as *const u8).add(CTX_SIZE).sub(std::mem::size_of::<c_uint>());
(ptr as *const c_uint).read()
};
assert_eq!(cx_flags & 1, 1); // SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT
assert_eq!(cx_flags & required_flags, required_flags);
}
/// Checks that pk != 0xffff...ffff and pk[1..32] == pk[33..64]
unsafe fn test_pk_validate(cx: *const Context,
pk: *const PublicKey) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
if (*pk).0[1..32] != (*pk).0[33..64] ||
((*pk).0[32] != 0 && (*pk).0[32] != 0xff) ||
secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(cx, (*pk).0[0..32].as_ptr()) == 0 {
0
} else {
1
}
}
unsafe fn test_cleanup_pk(pk: *mut PublicKey) {
(*pk).0[32..].copy_from_slice(&(*pk).0[..32]);
if (*pk).0[32] <= 0x7f {
(*pk).0[32] = 0;
} else {
(*pk).0[32] = 0xff;
}
}
// Pubkeys
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(cx: *const Context, pk: *mut PublicKey,
input: *const c_uchar, in_len: size_t)
-> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
match in_len {
33 => {
if *input != 2 && *input != 3 {
0
} else {
ptr::copy(input.offset(1), (*pk).0[0..32].as_mut_ptr(), 32);
ptr::copy(input.offset(2), (*pk).0[33..64].as_mut_ptr(), 31);
if *input == 3 {
(*pk).0[32] = 0xff;
} else {
(*pk).0[32] = 0;
}
test_pk_validate(cx, pk)
}
},
65 => {
if *input != 4 && *input != 6 && *input != 7 {
0
} else {
ptr::copy(input.offset(1), (*pk).0.as_mut_ptr(), 64);
test_cleanup_pk(pk);
test_pk_validate(cx, pk)
}
},
_ => 0
}
}
/// Serialize PublicKey back to 33/65 byte pubkey
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(cx: *const Context, output: *mut c_uchar,
out_len: *mut size_t, pk: *const PublicKey,
compressed: c_uint)
-> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
if compressed == SECP256K1_SER_COMPRESSED {
assert_eq!(*out_len, 33);
if (*pk).0[32] <= 0x7f {
*output = 2;
} else {
*output = 3;
}
ptr::copy((*pk).0.as_ptr(), output.offset(1), 32);
} else if compressed == SECP256K1_SER_UNCOMPRESSED {
assert_eq!(*out_len, 65);
*output = 4;
ptr::copy((*pk).0.as_ptr(), output.offset(1), 64);
} else {
panic!("Bad flags");
}
1
}
// EC
/// Sets pk to sk||sk
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(cx: *const Context, pk: *mut PublicKey,
sk: *const c_uchar) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_SIGN);
if secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(cx, sk) != 1 { return 0; }
ptr::copy(sk, (*pk).0[0..32].as_mut_ptr(), 32);
test_cleanup_pk(pk);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
1
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(cx: *const Context,
pk: *mut PublicKey) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
if secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(cx, (*pk).0[..32].as_mut_ptr()) != 1 { return 0; }
test_cleanup_pk(pk);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
1
}
/// The PublicKey equivalent of secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(cx: *const Context,
pk: *mut PublicKey,
tweak: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_VERIFY);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
if secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(cx, (*pk).0[..32].as_mut_ptr(), tweak) != 1 { return 0; }
test_cleanup_pk(pk);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
1
}
/// The PublicKey equivalent of secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(cx: *const Context,
pk: *mut PublicKey,
tweak: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
if secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(cx, (*pk).0[..32].as_mut_ptr(), tweak) != 1 { return 0; }
test_cleanup_pk(pk);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
1
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(cx: *const Context,
out: *mut PublicKey,
ins: *const *const PublicKey,
n: c_int)
-> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
assert!(n >= 1);
(*out) = **ins;
for i in 1..n {
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, *ins.offset(i as isize)), 1);
if secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(cx, (*out).0[..32].as_mut_ptr(), (**ins.offset(i as isize)).0[..32].as_ptr()) != 1 {
return 0;
}
}
test_cleanup_pk(out);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, out), 1);
1
}
/// Sets out to point^scalar^1s
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ecdh(
cx: *const Context,
out: *mut c_uchar,
point: *const PublicKey,
scalar: *const c_uchar,
hashfp: EcdhHashFn,
data: *mut c_void,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, point), 1);
if secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(cx, scalar) != 1 { return 0; }
let scalar_slice = slice::from_raw_parts(scalar, 32);
let pk_slice = &(*point).0[..32];
let mut res_arr = [0; 32];
for i in 0..32 {
res_arr[i] = scalar_slice[i] ^ pk_slice[i] ^ 1;
}
if let Some(hashfn) = hashfp {
(hashfn)(out, res_arr.as_ptr(), res_arr.as_ptr(), data);
} else {
res_arr[16] = 0x00; // result should always be a valid secret key
let out_slice = slice::from_raw_parts_mut(out, 32);
out_slice.copy_from_slice(&res_arr);
}
1
}
// ECDSA
/// Verifies that sig is msg32||pk[..32]
@ -677,9 +942,7 @@ mod fuzz_dummy {
msg32: *const c_uchar,
pk: *const PublicKey)
-> c_int {
// Check context is built for verification
let mut new_pk = (*pk).clone();
let _ = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(cx, &mut new_pk, msg32);
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_VERIFY);
// Actually verify
let sig_sl = slice::from_raw_parts(sig as *const u8, 64);
let msg_sl = slice::from_raw_parts(msg32 as *const u8, 32);
@ -698,6 +961,7 @@ mod fuzz_dummy {
_noncefn: NonceFn,
_noncedata: *const c_void)
-> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_SIGN);
// Check context is built for signing (and compute pk)
let mut new_pk = PublicKey::new();
if secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(cx, &mut new_pk, sk) != 1 {
@ -711,6 +975,7 @@ mod fuzz_dummy {
1
}
// Schnorr Signatures
/// Verifies that sig is msg32||pk[32..]
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(
cx: *const Context,
@ -718,6 +983,7 @@ mod fuzz_dummy {
msg32: *const c_uchar,
pubkey: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_VERIFY);
// Check context is built for verification
let mut new_pk = PublicKey::new();
let _ = secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(cx, &mut new_pk, pubkey, msg32);
@ -737,9 +1003,10 @@ mod fuzz_dummy {
sig64: *mut c_uchar,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
keypair: *const KeyPair,
noncefp: SchnorrNonceFn,
noncedata: *const c_void
_noncefp: SchnorrNonceFn,
_noncedata: *const c_void
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_SIGN);
// Check context is built for signing
let mut new_kp = KeyPair::new();
if secp256k1_keypair_create(cx, &mut new_kp, (*keypair).0.as_ptr()) != 1 {
@ -753,6 +1020,123 @@ mod fuzz_dummy {
sig_sl[32..].copy_from_slice(&new_kp.0[32..64]);
1
}
// Extra keys
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_keypair_create(
cx: *const Context,
keypair: *mut KeyPair,
seckey: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_SIGN);
if secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(cx, seckey) == 0 { return 0; }
let mut pk = PublicKey::new();
if secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(cx, &mut pk, seckey) == 0 { return 0; }
let seckey_slice = slice::from_raw_parts(seckey, 32);
(*keypair).0[..32].copy_from_slice(seckey_slice);
(*keypair).0[32..].copy_from_slice(&pk.0);
1
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(
cx: *const Context,
pubkey: *mut XOnlyPublicKey,
input32: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
let inslice = slice::from_raw_parts(input32, 32);
(*pubkey).0[..32].copy_from_slice(inslice);
(*pubkey).0[32..].copy_from_slice(inslice);
test_cleanup_pk(pubkey as *mut PublicKey);
test_pk_validate(cx, pubkey as *mut PublicKey)
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(
cx: *const Context,
output32: *mut c_uchar,
pubkey: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
let outslice = slice::from_raw_parts_mut(output32, 32);
outslice.copy_from_slice(&(*pubkey).0[..32]);
1
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(
cx: *const Context,
xonly_pubkey: *mut XOnlyPublicKey,
pk_parity: *mut c_int,
pubkey: *const PublicKey,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
if !pk_parity.is_null() {
*pk_parity = ((*pubkey).0[32] == 0).into();
}
(*xonly_pubkey).0.copy_from_slice(&(*pubkey).0);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pubkey), 1);
1
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(
cx: *const Context,
output_pubkey: *mut PublicKey,
internal_pubkey: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
tweak32: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_VERIFY);
(*output_pubkey).0.copy_from_slice(&(*internal_pubkey).0);
secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(cx, output_pubkey, tweak32)
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(
cx: *const Context,
pubkey: *mut XOnlyPublicKey,
pk_parity: *mut c_int,
keypair: *const KeyPair
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
if !pk_parity.is_null() {
*pk_parity = ((*keypair).0[32] == 0).into();
}
(*pubkey).0.copy_from_slice(&(*keypair).0[32..]);
1
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(
cx: *const Context,
keypair: *mut KeyPair,
tweak32: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_VERIFY);
let mut pk = PublicKey::new();
pk.0.copy_from_slice(&(*keypair).0[32..]);
let mut sk = [0; 32];
sk.copy_from_slice(&(*keypair).0[..32]);
assert_eq!(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(cx, &mut pk, tweak32), 1);
assert_eq!(secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(cx, (&mut sk[..]).as_mut_ptr(), tweak32), 1);
(*keypair).0[..32].copy_from_slice(&sk);
(*keypair).0[32..].copy_from_slice(&pk.0);
1
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(
cx: *const Context,
tweaked_pubkey32: *const c_uchar,
tweaked_pubkey_parity: c_int,
internal_pubkey: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
tweak32: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_VERIFY);
let mut tweaked_pk = PublicKey::new();
assert_eq!(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(cx, &mut tweaked_pk, internal_pubkey, tweak32), 1);
let in_slice = slice::from_raw_parts(tweaked_pubkey32, 32);
if &tweaked_pk.0[..32] == in_slice && tweaked_pubkey_parity == (tweaked_pk.0[32] == 0).into() {
1
} else {
0
}
}
}
#[cfg(fuzzing)]

38
src/key.rs
View File

@ -690,7 +690,13 @@ mod test {
let s = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&SK_BYTES).expect("sk");
// In fuzzing mode secret->public key derivation is different, so
// hard-code the epected result.
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
let pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&s, &sk);
#[cfg(fuzzing)]
let pk = PublicKey::from_slice(&[0x02, 0x18, 0x84, 0x57, 0x81, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xc4, 0x8f, 0x1c, 0x97, 0x09, 0xe2, 0x30, 0x92, 0x06, 0x7d, 0x06, 0x83, 0x7f, 0x30, 0xaa, 0x0c, 0xd0, 0x54, 0x4a, 0xc8, 0x87, 0xfe, 0x91, 0xdd, 0xd1, 0x66]).expect("pk");
assert_eq!(
sk.to_string(),
@ -733,6 +739,9 @@ mod test {
}
#[test]
// In fuzzing mode the Y coordinate is expected to match the X, so this
// test uses invalid public keys.
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
fn test_pubkey_serialize() {
struct DumbRng(u32);
impl RngCore for DumbRng {
@ -841,7 +850,7 @@ mod test {
assert_eq!(set.len(), COUNT);
}
#[test]
#[cfg_attr(not(fuzzing), test)]
fn pubkey_combine() {
let compressed1 = PublicKey::from_slice(
&hex!("0241cc121c419921942add6db6482fb36243faf83317c866d2a28d8c6d7089f7ba"),
@ -861,7 +870,7 @@ mod test {
assert_eq!(sum1.unwrap(), exp_sum);
}
#[test]
#[cfg_attr(not(fuzzing), test)]
fn pubkey_combine_keys() {
let compressed1 = PublicKey::from_slice(
&hex!("0241cc121c419921942add6db6482fb36243faf83317c866d2a28d8c6d7089f7ba"),
@ -884,6 +893,24 @@ mod test {
assert_eq!(sum1.unwrap(), exp_sum);
}
#[test]
fn create_pubkey_combine() {
let s = Secp256k1::new();
let (mut sk1, pk1) = s.generate_keypair(&mut thread_rng());
let (sk2, pk2) = s.generate_keypair(&mut thread_rng());
let sum1 = pk1.combine(&pk2);
assert!(sum1.is_ok());
let sum2 = pk2.combine(&pk1);
assert!(sum2.is_ok());
assert_eq!(sum1, sum2);
assert!(sk1.add_assign(&sk2.as_ref()[..]).is_ok());
let sksum = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&s, &sk1);
assert_eq!(Ok(sksum), sum1);
}
#[test]
fn pubkey_equal() {
let pk1 = PublicKey::from_slice(
@ -931,9 +958,14 @@ mod test {
";
let s = Secp256k1::new();
let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&SK_BYTES).unwrap();
// In fuzzing mode secret->public key derivation is different, so
// hard-code the epected result.
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
let pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&s, &sk);
#[cfg(fuzzing)]
let pk = PublicKey::from_slice(&PK_BYTES).expect("pk");
assert_tokens(&sk.compact(), &[Token::BorrowedBytes(&SK_BYTES[..])]);
assert_tokens(&sk.compact(), &[Token::Bytes(&SK_BYTES)]);

12
src/schnorrsig.rs
View File

@ -706,6 +706,9 @@ mod tests {
PublicKey::from_slice(&[0xff; constants::SCHNORRSIG_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]),
Err(InvalidPublicKey)
);
// In fuzzing mode restrictions on public key validity are much more
// relaxed, thus the invalid check below is expected to fail.
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
assert_eq!(
PublicKey::from_slice(&[0x55; constants::SCHNORRSIG_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]),
Err(InvalidPublicKey)
@ -724,7 +727,13 @@ mod tests {
let s = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let sk = KeyPair::from_seckey_slice(&secp, &SK_BYTES).expect("sk");
// In fuzzing mode secret->public key derivation is different, so
// hard-code the epected result.
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
let pk = PublicKey::from_keypair(&s, &sk);
#[cfg(fuzzing)]
let pk = PublicKey::from_slice(&[0x18, 0x84, 0x57, 0x81, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xc4, 0x8f, 0x1c, 0x97, 0x09, 0xe2, 0x30, 0x92, 0x06, 0x7d, 0x06, 0x83, 0x7f, 0x30, 0xaa, 0x0c, 0xd0, 0x54, 0x4a, 0xc8, 0x87, 0xfe, 0x91, 0xdd, 0xd1, 0x66]).expect("pk");
assert_eq!(
pk.to_string(),
@ -762,6 +771,9 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
// In fuzzing mode secret->public key derivation is different, so
// this test will never correctly derive the static pubkey.
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
fn test_pubkey_serialize() {
struct DumbRng(u32);
impl RngCore for DumbRng {