Obfuscate SharedSecret when printing
Currently printing the `SharedSecret` using `Display` or `Debug` prints the real secret, this is sub-optimal. We have a solution for other secrets in the project where printing is obfuscated and we provide a `display_secret` method for explicitly printing. Mirror the logic for other secrets and obfuscate the `SharedSecret` when printing.
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src/ecdh.rs
17
src/ecdh.rs
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@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ use core::borrow::Borrow;
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use key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
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use ffi::{self, CPtr};
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use secp256k1_sys::types::{c_int, c_uchar, c_void};
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use constants;
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// The logic for displaying shared secrets relies on this (see `secret.rs`).
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const SHARED_SECRET_SIZE: usize = constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
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/// Enables two parties to create a shared secret without revealing their own secrets.
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///
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@ -39,14 +43,15 @@ use secp256k1_sys::types::{c_int, c_uchar, c_void};
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/// assert_eq!(sec1, sec2);
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/// # }
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// ```
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#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
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pub struct SharedSecret([u8; 32]);
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#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
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pub struct SharedSecret([u8; SHARED_SECRET_SIZE]);
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impl_display_secret!(SharedSecret);
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impl SharedSecret {
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/// Creates a new shared secret from a pubkey and secret key.
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#[inline]
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pub fn new(point: &PublicKey, scalar: &SecretKey) -> SharedSecret {
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let mut buf = [0u8; 32];
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let mut buf = [0u8; SHARED_SECRET_SIZE];
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let res = unsafe {
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ffi::secp256k1_ecdh(
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ffi::secp256k1_context_no_precomp,
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@ -60,6 +65,12 @@ impl SharedSecret {
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debug_assert_eq!(res, 1);
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SharedSecret(buf)
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}
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/// Returns the shared secret as a byte value.
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#[inline]
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pub fn secret_bytes(&self) -> [u8; SHARED_SECRET_SIZE] {
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self.0
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}
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}
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impl Borrow<[u8]> for SharedSecret {
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@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
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use ::core::fmt;
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use ::{SecretKey, KeyPair, to_hex};
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use ecdh::SharedSecret;
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use constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
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macro_rules! impl_display_secret {
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@ -177,3 +178,41 @@ impl KeyPair {
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DisplaySecret { secret: self.secret_bytes() }
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}
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}
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impl SharedSecret {
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/// Formats the explicit byte value of the shared secret kept inside the type as a
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/// little-endian hexadecimal string using the provided formatter.
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///
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/// This is the only method that outputs the actual shared secret value, and, thus,
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/// should be used with extreme caution.
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///
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/// # Examples
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///
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/// ```
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/// # #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
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/// # #[cfg(feature = "std")] {
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/// # use std::str::FromStr;
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/// # use secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
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/// use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
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///
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/// # let pk = PublicKey::from_slice(&[3, 23, 183, 225, 206, 31, 159, 148, 195, 42, 67, 115, 146, 41, 248, 140, 11, 3, 51, 41, 111, 180, 110, 143, 114, 134, 88, 73, 198, 174, 52, 184, 78]).expect("hard coded slice should parse correctly");
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/// # let sk = SecretKey::from_str("57f0148f94d13095cfda539d0da0d1541304b678d8b36e243980aab4e1b7cead").unwrap();
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///
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/// let secret = SharedSecret::new(&pk, &sk);
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/// // Here we explicitly display the secret value:
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/// assert_eq!(
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/// format!("{}", secret.display_secret()),
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/// "cf05ae7da039ddce6d56dd57d3000c6dd91c6f1695eae47e05389f11e2467043"
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/// );
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/// // Also, we can explicitly display with `Debug`:
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/// assert_eq!(
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/// format!("{:?}", secret.display_secret()),
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/// format!("DisplaySecret(\"{}\")", secret.display_secret())
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/// );
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/// # }
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/// ```
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#[inline]
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pub fn display_secret(&self) -> DisplaySecret {
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DisplaySecret { secret: self.secret_bytes() }
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}
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}
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