This rewrite:
* Fixes some shellcheck issues (bad quoting, use of | instead of ||
near the beginning of the file)
* Automatically computes the version prefix, depend directory, etc.,
and provides instructions to override this with env vars if the
user really wants to do this.
* Detects when it would be destructive and refuses to run unless
passed the -f flag, rather than prompting the user for a yes/no
* Adds the capability to use cp rather than git clone, which I need
to run this from within Nix.
* Whitelists CHANGELOG.md which shouldn't get substituted.
We are ready to release a new minor version of `secp256k1-sys`, in order
to do so we must make change the symbol names to reflect the new version
as well as the usual changelog and version bump.
In preparation for releasing `secp256k1-sys` v0.8.1 do:
- Rename symbols to from `0_8_0` -> `0_8_1`, done mechanically (search
and replace)
- Add changes log notes (includes changelog entry for 0.8.0)
- Bump `secp256k1-sys` crate version 0.8.0 -> 0.8.1, justified because
we have added a new public function.
This PR implements a `non_secure_erase()` method on SecretKey,
KeyPair, SharedSecret, Scalar, and DisplaySecret. The purpose
of this method is to (attempt to) overwrite secret data with
valid default values. This method can be used by libraries
to implement Zeroize on structs containing secret values.
`non_secure_erase()` attempts to avoid being optimized away or
reordered using the same mechanism as the zeroize crate: first,
using `std::ptr::write_volatile` (which will not be optimized
away) to overwrite the memory, then using a memory fence to
prevent subtle issues due to load or store reordering.
Note, however, that this method is *very unlikely* to do anything
useful on its own. Effective use involves carefully placing these
values inside non-Copy structs and pinning those structs in place.
See the [`zeroize`](https://docs.rs/zeroize) documentation for tips
and tricks, and for further discussion.
[this commit includes a squashed-in commit from tcharding to fix docs
and helpful suggestions from apoelstra and Kixunil]
`libsecp256k1` v0.2.0 was just released.
Update the vendored code using
`./vendor-libsecp.sh depend 0_8_0 21ffe4b`
```
git show 21ffe4b
commit 21ffe4b22a9683cf24ae0763359e401d1284cc7a (tag: v0.2.0)
Merge: 8c949f5 e025ccd
Author: Pieter Wuille <pieter@wuille.net>
Date: Mon Dec 12 17:00:52 2022 -0500
Merge bitcoin-core/secp256k1#1055: Prepare initial release
e025ccdf7473702a76bb13d763dc096548ffefba release: prepare for initial release 0.2.0 (Jonas Nick)
6d1784a2e2c1c5a8d89ffb08a7f76fa15e84fff5 build: add missing files to EXTRA_DIST (Jonas Nick)
13bf1b6b324f2ed1c1fb4c8d17a4febd3556839e changelog: make order of change types match keepachangelog.com (Jonas Nick)
b1f992a552785395d2e60b10862626fd11f66f84 doc: improve release process (Jonas Nick)
ad39e2dc417f85c1577a6a6a9c519f5c60453def build: change package version to 0.1.0-dev (Jonas Nick)
90618e9263ebc2a0d73d487d6d94fd3af96b973c doc: move CHANGELOG from doc/ to root directory (Jonas Nick)
Pull request description:
Based on #964
ACKs for top commit:
sipa:
ACK e025ccdf7473702a76bb13d763dc096548ffefba
Tree-SHA512: b9ab71d7362537d383a32b5e321ef44069f00e3e92340375bcd662267bc5a60c2bad60222998e6602cfac24ad65efb23d772eac37c86065036b90ef090b54c49
```
Requires a new version of `secp256k1-sys`, use v0.8.0
- Update the `secp256k1-sys` manifest (including links field)
- Update symbols to use 0_8_0
- Add a changelog entry
- depend on the new version in `secp256k1`
Which in turn requires a new version of `secp256k1`, use v0.26.0
We are ready to release a new minor version of `secp256k1-sys`, in order
to do so we must make change the symbol names to reflect the new version
as well as the usual changelog and version bump.
In preparation for releasing `secp256k1-sys` v0.7.0 do:
- Rename symbols to from `0_6_1` -> `0_7_0`, done mechanically (search
and replace)
- Add changes log notes
- Bump `secp256k1-sys` crate version 0.6.1 -> 0.7.0, justified because
we have added new public methods to various types (e.g.,
`PublicKey::cmp_fast_unstable`)
Currently we expect non-null pointers when we take `*mut T` parameters,
however we do not check that the pointers are non-null because we never
set VERIFY in our C build. We can use the `NonNull` type to enforce
no-null-ness as long as we use `NonNull::new`. In a couple of instances
we manually check that a buffer is not empty and therefore that the
pointer to it is non-null so we can safely use `NonNull::new_unchecked`.
Replace mutable pointer parameters `*mut T` (e.g. `*mut c_void`) and
return types with `NonNull<T>`.
Fix#546
7d3dc354d7 secp256k1-sys: Remove unused flags in build.rs (Elichai Turkel)
Pull request description:
These are no longer used in upstream, so there's no reason for us to set them
ACKs for top commit:
apoelstra:
ACK 7d3dc354d7
Tree-SHA512: 79ecbed19ba9eb61640306bc5413b139e902ee84b7e122e8ae57e451f2b132371440554f21ed075ed34d9d702c4316e4b170ca638c774532ecf5a11456b4e2ad
Functions that are `unsafe` should include a `# Safety` section. Because
we have wrapper functions to handle symbol renaming we essentially have
duplicate functions i.e., they require the same docs, instead of
duplicating the docs put the symbol renamed function below the
non-renamed function and add a docs linking to the non-renamed function.
Also add attribute to stop the linter warning about the missing safety
docs section.
Remove the clippy attribute for `missing_safety_doc`.
There is no obvious reason why not to derive `Copy` and `Clone` for
types that use the `impl_newtype_macro`. Derives are less surprising so
deriving makes the code marginally easier to read.
Currently we rely on the inner bytes with types that are passed across
the FFI boundry when implementing comparison functions (e.g. `Ord`,
`PartialEq`), this is incorrect because the bytes are opaque, meaning
the byte layout is not guaranteed across versions of `libsecp26k1`.
Implement stable comparison functionality by doing:
- Implement `core::cmp` traits by first coercing the data into a stable
form e.g., by serializing it.
- Add fast comparison methods to `secp256k1-sys` types that wrap types
from libsecp, add similar methods to types in `secp256k1` that wrap
`secp256k1-sys` types (just call through to inner type).
- In `secp256k1-sys` feature gate the new `core::cmp` impls on
`not(fuzzing)`, when fuzzing just derive the impls instead.
Any additional methods added to `secp256k1-sys` types are private,
justified by the fact the -sys is meant to be just a thin wrapper around
libsecp256k1, we don't want to commit to supporting additional API
functions.
Please note, the solution presented in this patch is already present for
`secp256k1::PublicKey`, this PR removes that code in favour of deriving
traits that then call down to the same logic in `secp256k1-sys`.
An array in Rust has no concept of length, it is a fixed size data type.
Equally an array cannot be "empty", again since it is a fixed size data
type. These are methods/concepts seen in slices and vectors.
Remove the `len` and `is_empty` methods.
92b733386f Support non-WASM platforms that are missing `string.h` (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
Dunno why we haven't seen this elsewhere, but when trying to build locally for an ARM embedded target `secp256k1-sys` failed to compile as it was missing `string.h`, just like WASM.
This patch adds a trivial fallback - if we fail to compile initially we unconditionally retry with the wasm-sysroot, giving us a valid `string.h`.
ACKs for top commit:
tcharding:
ACK 92b733386f
apoelstra:
ACK 92b733386f
Tree-SHA512: 81cbc5023f349681a3bef138506d9314be948b8b7b78bb2b2ffacf43b0c97d92ea67238105009a94b05a0a3adbd4113ed68f79a0a303708d95c6a7f520d5170e
68c73850d8 Minimise FFI in the public API (Tobin C. Harding)
Pull request description:
Normal users should never need to directly interact with the FFI layer.
Audit and reduce the use of `ffi` types in the public API of various types. Leave only the implementation of `CPtr`, and document this clearly as not required by normal users. Done for:
- PublicKey
- XOnlyPublicKey
- KeyPair
- ecdsa::Signature
- ecdsa::RecoverableSignature
ACKs for top commit:
apoelstra:
ACK 68c73850d8
Tree-SHA512: 8242527837872f9aba2aab19b02c2280ca1eb1dfd33c8ca619726d981811d72de3e5a57cbde2fbe621eb8e50e43f488804cd51d27949459da1c0ceb03fca35e3
Normal users should never need to directly interact with the FFI layer.
Audit and reduce the use of `ffi` types in the public API of various
types. Leave only the implementation of `CPtr`, and document this
clearly as not required by normal users. Done for:
- PublicKey
- XOnlyPublicKey
- KeyPair
- ecdsa::Signature
- ecdsa::RecoverableSignature
Needed to build secp-sys 0.5 and secp-sys 0.6 in the same tree. Fixes#489.
This PR can be reproduced by running
./vendor-libsecp.sh depend/ 0_6_1 a1102b12196ea27f44d6201de4d25926a2ae9640
in the secp256k1-sys directory.
Dunno why we haven't seen this elsewhere, but when trying to build
locally for an ARM embedded target `secp256k1-sys` failed to
compile as it was missing `string.h`, just like WASM.
This patch adds a trivial fallback - if we fail to compile
initially we unconditionally retry with the wasm-sysroot, giving us
a valid `string.h`.
65186e732a Add githooks (Tobin C. Harding)
6d76bd4a89 Add clippy to CI (Tobin C. Harding)
9f1ebb93cb Allow nonminimal_bool in unit test (Tobin C. Harding)
685444c342 Use "a".repeats() instead of manual implementation (Tobin C. Harding)
42de876e01 Allow let_and_return for feature guarded code (Tobin C. Harding)
d64132cd4b Allow missing_safety_doc (Tobin C. Harding)
2cb687fc69 Use to_le_bytes instead of mem::transmute (Tobin C. Harding)
c15b9d2699 Remove unneeded explicit reference (Tobin C. Harding)
35d59e7cc6 Remove explicit 'static lifetime (Tobin C. Harding)
1a582db160 Remove redundant import (Tobin C. Harding)
Pull request description:
The first 8 patches clear clippy warnings. Next we add a CI job to run clippy. Finally we add a `githooks` directory that includes running clippy, also adds a section to the README on how to use the githooks. This is identical to the text in the [open PR](https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/1044) on `rust-bitcoin` that adds githooks _without_ yet adding clippy.
**Note**: The new clippy CI job runs and is green :)
ACKs for top commit:
Kixunil:
ACK 65186e732a
apoelstra:
ACK 65186e732a
Tree-SHA512: f70a157896ce2a83af8cfc10f2fbacc8f68256ac96ef7dec4d190aa72324b568d2267418eb4fe99099aeda5486957c31070943d7c209973859b7b9290676ccd7
We have a whole bunch of unsafe code that calls down to the FFI layer.
It would be nice to have clippy running on CI, these safety docs
warnings are prohibiting that. Until we can add the docs add a compiler
attribute to allow the lint.
Feature guard the custom implementations of `Ord` and `PartialOrd` on
`cfg(not(fuzzing))`. When fuzzing, auto-derive implementations.
Co-authored-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
5d2f1ceb64 Fix WASM build (Elichai Turkel)
39aaac6834 Use new trait TryFrom and do small refactoring (Elichai Turkel)
7d3a149ca5 Move more things from the std feature to the alloc feature (Elichai Turkel)
bc8c713631 Replace c_void with core::ffi::c_void (Elichai Turkel)
26a52bc8c8 Update secp256k1-sys to edition 2018 and fix imports (Elichai Turkel)
ebe46a4d4e Update rand to 0.8 and replace CounterRng with mock::StepRng (Elichai Turkel)
626835f540 Update secp256k1 to edition 2018 and fix imports (Elichai Turkel)
67c0922a46 Update MSRV in CI and Readme from 1.29 to 1.41 (Elichai Turkel)
Pull request description:
As proposed in https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/issues/510#issuecomment-881686342 this PR raises the MSRV to 1.41.1 it also changes the code to be Edition 2018.
The PR contains a few things:
* Moving to edition 2018 and fixing the imports
* Sorting and combining imports to make them more concise
* Replacing our c_void with `core::ffi::c_void`
* Bumping the `rand` version to latest and modifying our `RngCore` implementations accordingly
* Doing some small refactoring and using the new `TryInto` trait where it makes the code nicer
If people prefer I can split this PR into multiple and/or drop some commits
ACKs for top commit:
tcharding:
ACK 5d2f1ceb64
apoelstra:
ACK 5d2f1ceb64
Tree-SHA512: 5bf84e7ebb6286d59f8cada0bb712c46336f0dd6c35b67e6f4ba323b5484ad925b99b73e778ae4608f123938e7ee8705a0aec576cd9c065072c4ecf1248e3470
Clippy warns about unsafe code without a `# Safety` section. A bunch of
these warnings are for functions that do actually have safety docs.
Follow rustdoc convention and add a `# Safety` section for the already
existing explanations.
Currently we are defining the WASM integer size and alignments in the
`stdio.h` header file, this is wrong because this file is included in
the build by way of `build.rs` as well as by upstream `libsecp256k1`.
Move WASM integer definitions to a `C` source file and build the file
into the binary if target is WASM.
Currently when debug printing the `RecoverableSignature` we do so byte
by byte, this means that the output differs depending on the endianess
of the machine. If instead we serialize the signature in compact form
then the output is the same irrespective of the endianess.
With this applied the following two commands now pass:
```
cargo test test_debug_output --features=recovery
```
cross test --target powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu test_debug_output --features=recovery
```
Fixes: #375
Andrew Poelstra
Tobin C. Harding
kwantam
Tibo-lg
Elichai Turkel
Matt Corallo
Tim Ruffing
Dr Maxim Orlovsky