The public key is unrelated to the signature algorithm. It will
be moved out of the module in another commit. For ease of review,
the renamed is kept separate.
With the introduction of Schnorr signatures, exporting a `Signature`
type without any further qualification is ambiguous. To minimize the
ambiguity, the `ecdsa` module is public which should encourage users
to refer to its types as `ecdsa::Signature` and `ecdsa::SerializedSignature`.
To reduce ambiguity in the APIs on `Secp256k1`, we deprecate several
fucntions and introduce new variants that explicitly mention the use of
the ECDSA signature algorithm.
Due to the move of `Signature` and `SerializedSignature` to a new module,
this patch is a breaking change. The impact is minimal though and fixing the
compile errors encourages a qualified naming of the type.
24d6f62603 Use explicit u8 when assigning a byte slice (junderw)
Pull request description:
Is there a way to tell the compiler to not allow `[0; 64]` and require that either the type is explicitly given to the variable, or that each member uses explicit `0u8` notation?
I noticed the usage was a mix of explicit and implicit, so I changed all to explicit.
ACKs for top commit:
apoelstra:
ACK 24d6f62603
Tree-SHA512: f7796dcc3ae240983257bef0f25bd0df741943f75d86e9bca7c45076af179d96ce213bd9c339a01f721f7dc9b96a0a4a56ef2cf44339f4c91d208103b7659d9f
bc42529a16 Rename `secp256k1::bitcoin_hashes` module to `secp256k1::hashes` (Thomas Eizinger)
ae1f8f4609 Bump bitcoin_hashes to version 0.10 (Thomas Eizinger)
Pull request description:
Requires for interoperability of the `ThirtyTwoByteHash` trait with
rust-bitcoin.
ACKs for top commit:
apoelstra:
ACK bc42529a16
Tree-SHA512: 85fcb284ff82b543a0c3ea2b568351b3af938a26ac42c6a975480ae97def84e4f0795105bd4572f930a7bf82654eba416cf0c5e25f62809e2ea331443ffb5807
This reduces the usage of real cryptography in --cfg=fuzzing,
specifically replacing the secret->public key derivation with a
simple copy and ECDH with XOR of the public and private parts
(plus a stream of 1s to make a test pass that expected non-0
output).
It leaves secret tweak addition/multiplication as-is.
It also changes the context creation to over-allocate and store
the context flags at the end of the context buffer, allowing us
to easily test context flags in each function.
While it would be nice to have something fancier (eg XOR-based),
its not immediately obvious how to accomplish this, and better to
fix the issues I have than spend too much time on it.
Fixes#271.
This partially reverts b811ec133a
In the next commit the secret->public key derivation in fuzzing cfg
is changed to be simpler, as well as the validity rules of public
keys relaxed.
This adds a new test to ensure random keys can be added, not just
the hard-coded keys test that exists today.
Panicking from C is not UB in newer rust versions and will reliably
trigger an abort (without unwinding). In older rust versions, it is
technically UB but empirically it seems to "just work" (and what should
it realistically do except crashing, which is what we intent).
Since there's potentially no unwinding, we can't test this behavior
using [should_panic]. This PR will instead check the libtest output
explicitly in our CI tests.
Fixes#228.
There is little reason to pull in the `rand` dep just for the `Rng`
trait for users who want to randomize contexts. We should expose a
randomize function that just takes 32 bytes.
We can now run unit tests with the fuzz feature on, and they'll pass,
which is some assurance that fuzzing with the feature on won't lead to
spurious failures due to the fuzz harness inadequately simulating message
signing.
Thomas Eizinger
Andrew Poelstra
junderw
Dr Maxim Orlovsky
Elichai Turkel
Tibo-lg
sanket1729
Matt Corallo
Devrandom
Tim Ruffing