// Bitcoin secp256k1 bindings
// Written in 2014 by
// Dawid Ciężarkiewicz
// Andrew Poelstra
//
// To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all
// copyright and related and neighboring rights to this software to
// the public domain worldwide. This software is distributed without
// any warranty.
//
// You should have received a copy of the CC0 Public Domain Dedication
// along with this software.
// If not, see .
//
//! # Secp256k1
//! Rust bindings for Pieter Wuille's secp256k1 library, which is used for
//! fast and accurate manipulation of ECDSA signatures on the secp256k1
//! curve. Such signatures are used extensively by the Bitcoin network
//! and its derivatives.
//!
//! To minimize dependencies, some functions are feature-gated. To generate
//! random keys or to re-randomize a context object, compile with the "rand"
//! feature. To de/serialize objects with serde, compile with "serde".
//!
//! Where possible, the bindings use the Rust type system to ensure that
//! API usage errors are impossible. For example, the library uses context
//! objects that contain precomputation tables which are created on object
//! construction. Since this is a slow operation (10+ milliseconds, vs ~50
//! microseconds for typical crypto operations, on a 2.70 Ghz i7-6820HQ)
//! the tables are optional, giving a performance boost for users who only
//! care about signing, only care about verification, or only care about
//! parsing. In the upstream library, if you attempt to sign a message using
//! a context that does not support this, it will trigger an assertion
//! failure and terminate the program. In `rust-secp256k1`, this is caught
//! at compile-time; in fact, it is impossible to compile code that will
//! trigger any assertion failures in the upstream library.
//!
//! ```rust
//! extern crate secp256k1;
//! # #[cfg(feature="rand")]
//! extern crate rand;
//!
//! #
//! # fn main() {
//! # #[cfg(feature="rand")] {
//! use rand::OsRng;
//! use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
//!
//! let secp = Secp256k1::new();
//! let mut rng = OsRng::new().expect("OsRng");
//! let (secret_key, public_key) = secp.generate_keypair(&mut rng);
//! let message = Message::from_slice(&[0xab; 32]).expect("32 bytes");
//!
//! let sig = secp.sign(&message, &secret_key);
//! assert!(secp.verify(&message, &sig, &public_key).is_ok());
//! # } }
//! ```
//!
//! The above code requires `rust-secp256k1` to be compiled with the `rand`
//! feature enabled, to get access to [`generate_keypair`](struct.Secp256k1.html#method.generate_keypair)
//! Alternately, keys can be parsed from slices, like
//!
//! ```rust
//! # fn main() {
//! use self::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, SecretKey, PublicKey};
//!
//! let secp = Secp256k1::new();
//! let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0xcd; 32]).expect("32 bytes, within curve order");
//! let public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp, &secret_key);
//! let message = Message::from_slice(&[0xab; 32]).expect("32 bytes");
//!
//! let sig = secp.sign(&message, &secret_key);
//! assert!(secp.verify(&message, &sig, &public_key).is_ok());
//! # }
//! ```
//!
//! Users who only want to verify signatures can use a cheaper context, like so:
//!
//! ```rust
//! # fn main() {
//! use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, PublicKey};
//!
//! let secp = Secp256k1::verification_only();
//!
//! let public_key = PublicKey::from_slice(&[
//! 0x02,
//! 0xc6, 0x6e, 0x7d, 0x89, 0x66, 0xb5, 0xc5, 0x55,
//! 0xaf, 0x58, 0x05, 0x98, 0x9d, 0xa9, 0xfb, 0xf8,
//! 0xdb, 0x95, 0xe1, 0x56, 0x31, 0xce, 0x35, 0x8c,
//! 0x3a, 0x17, 0x10, 0xc9, 0x62, 0x67, 0x90, 0x63,
//! ]).expect("public keys must be 33 or 65 bytes, serialized according to SEC 2");
//!
//! let message = Message::from_slice(&[
//! 0xaa, 0xdf, 0x7d, 0xe7, 0x82, 0x03, 0x4f, 0xbe,
//! 0x3d, 0x3d, 0xb2, 0xcb, 0x13, 0xc0, 0xcd, 0x91,
//! 0xbf, 0x41, 0xcb, 0x08, 0xfa, 0xc7, 0xbd, 0x61,
//! 0xd5, 0x44, 0x53, 0xcf, 0x6e, 0x82, 0xb4, 0x50,
//! ]).expect("messages must be 32 bytes and are expected to be hashes");
//!
//! let sig = Signature::from_compact(&[
//! 0xdc, 0x4d, 0xc2, 0x64, 0xa9, 0xfe, 0xf1, 0x7a,
//! 0x3f, 0x25, 0x34, 0x49, 0xcf, 0x8c, 0x39, 0x7a,
//! 0xb6, 0xf1, 0x6f, 0xb3, 0xd6, 0x3d, 0x86, 0x94,
//! 0x0b, 0x55, 0x86, 0x82, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0x02, 0xae,
//! 0x3b, 0x46, 0x1b, 0xb4, 0x33, 0x6b, 0x5e, 0xcb,
//! 0xae, 0xfd, 0x66, 0x27, 0xaa, 0x92, 0x2e, 0xfc,
//! 0x04, 0x8f, 0xec, 0x0c, 0x88, 0x1c, 0x10, 0xc4,
//! 0xc9, 0x42, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x69, 0xc1, 0x32, 0xa2,
//! ]).expect("compact signatures are 64 bytes; DER signatures are 68-72 bytes");
//!
//! assert!(secp.verify(&message, &sig, &public_key).is_ok());
//! # }
//! ```
//!
//! Observe that the same code using, say [`signing_only`](struct.Secp256k1.html#method.signing_only)
//! to generate a context would simply not compile.
//!
#![crate_type = "lib"]
#![crate_type = "rlib"]
#![crate_type = "dylib"]
#![crate_name = "secp256k1"]
// Coding conventions
#![deny(non_upper_case_globals)]
#![deny(non_camel_case_types)]
#![deny(non_snake_case)]
#![deny(unused_mut)]
#![warn(missing_docs)]
#![cfg_attr(feature = "dev", allow(unstable_features))]
#![cfg_attr(feature = "dev", feature(plugin))]
#![cfg_attr(feature = "dev", plugin(clippy))]
#![cfg_attr(all(not(test), not(feature = "std")), no_std)]
#![cfg_attr(all(test, feature = "unstable"), feature(test))]
#[cfg(all(test, feature = "unstable"))] extern crate test;
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "rand"))] pub extern crate rand;
#[cfg(any(test))] extern crate rand_core;
#[cfg(feature = "serde")] pub extern crate serde;
#[cfg(all(test, feature = "serde"))] extern crate serde_test;
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "rand"))] use rand::Rng;
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))] extern crate core;
use core::{fmt, ptr, str};
#[macro_use]
mod macros;
mod types;
pub mod constants;
pub mod ecdh;
pub mod ffi;
pub mod key;
pub mod recovery;
pub use key::SecretKey;
pub use key::PublicKey;
use core::marker::PhantomData;
use core::ops::Deref;
/// An ECDSA signature
#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Signature(ffi::Signature);
/// A DER serialized Signature
#[derive(Copy, Clone)]
pub struct SerializedSignature {
data: [u8; 72],
len: usize,
}
impl fmt::Debug for Signature {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
fmt::Display::fmt(self, f)
}
}
impl fmt::Display for Signature {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
let mut v = [0; 72];
let mut len = v.len() as usize;
unsafe {
let err = ffi::secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(
ffi::secp256k1_context_no_precomp,
v.as_mut_ptr(),
&mut len,
self.as_ptr()
);
debug_assert!(err == 1);
}
for ch in &v[..] {
write!(f, "{:02x}", *ch)?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
impl str::FromStr for Signature {
type Err = Error;
fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result {
let mut res = [0; 72];
match from_hex(s, &mut res) {
Ok(x) => Signature::from_der(&res[0..x]),
_ => Err(Error::InvalidSignature),
}
}
}
/// Trait describing something that promises to be a 32-byte random number; in particular,
/// it has negligible probability of being zero or overflowing the group order. Such objects
/// may be converted to `Message`s without any error paths.
pub trait ThirtyTwoByteHash {
/// Converts the object into a 32-byte array
fn into_32(self) -> [u8; 32];
}
impl SerializedSignature {
/// Get a pointer to the underlying data with the specified capacity.
pub(crate) fn get_data_mut_ptr(&mut self) -> *mut u8 {
self.data.as_mut_ptr()
}
/// Get the capacity of the underlying data buffer.
pub fn capacity(&self) -> usize {
self.data.len()
}
/// Get the len of the used data.
pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.len
}
/// Set the length of the object.
pub(crate) fn set_len(&mut self, len: usize) {
self.len = len;
}
/// Convert the serialized signature into the Signature struct.
/// (This DER deserializes it)
pub fn to_signature(&self) -> Result {
Signature::from_der(&self)
}
/// Create a SerializedSignature from a Signature.
/// (this DER serializes it)
pub fn from_signature(sig: &Signature) -> SerializedSignature {
sig.serialize_der()
}
}
impl Signature {
#[inline]
/// Converts a DER-encoded byte slice to a signature
pub fn from_der(data: &[u8]) -> Result {
let mut ret = unsafe { ffi::Signature::blank() };
unsafe {
if ffi::secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(
ffi::secp256k1_context_no_precomp,
&mut ret,
data.as_ptr(),
data.len() as usize,
) == 1
{
Ok(Signature(ret))
} else {
Err(Error::InvalidSignature)
}
}
}
/// Converts a 64-byte compact-encoded byte slice to a signature
pub fn from_compact(data: &[u8]) -> Result {
let mut ret = unsafe { ffi::Signature::blank() };
if data.len() != 64 {
return Err(Error::InvalidSignature)
}
unsafe {
if ffi::secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(
ffi::secp256k1_context_no_precomp,
&mut ret,
data.as_ptr(),
) == 1
{
Ok(Signature(ret))
} else {
Err(Error::InvalidSignature)
}
}
}
/// Converts a "lax DER"-encoded byte slice to a signature. This is basically
/// only useful for validating signatures in the Bitcoin blockchain from before
/// 2016. It should never be used in new applications. This library does not
/// support serializing to this "format"
pub fn from_der_lax(data: &[u8]) -> Result {
unsafe {
let mut ret = ffi::Signature::blank();
if ffi::ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax(
ffi::secp256k1_context_no_precomp,
&mut ret,
data.as_ptr(),
data.len() as usize,
) == 1
{
Ok(Signature(ret))
} else {
Err(Error::InvalidSignature)
}
}
}
/// Normalizes a signature to a "low S" form. In ECDSA, signatures are
/// of the form (r, s) where r and s are numbers lying in some finite
/// field. The verification equation will pass for (r, s) iff it passes
/// for (r, -s), so it is possible to ``modify'' signatures in transit
/// by flipping the sign of s. This does not constitute a forgery since
/// the signed message still cannot be changed, but for some applications,
/// changing even the signature itself can be a problem. Such applications
/// require a "strong signature". It is believed that ECDSA is a strong
/// signature except for this ambiguity in the sign of s, so to accommodate
/// these applications libsecp256k1 will only accept signatures for which
/// s is in the lower half of the field range. This eliminates the
/// ambiguity.
///
/// However, for some systems, signatures with high s-values are considered
/// valid. (For example, parsing the historic Bitcoin blockchain requires
/// this.) For these applications we provide this normalization function,
/// which ensures that the s value lies in the lower half of its range.
pub fn normalize_s(&mut self) {
unsafe {
// Ignore return value, which indicates whether the sig
// was already normalized. We don't care.
ffi::secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(
ffi::secp256k1_context_no_precomp,
self.as_mut_ptr(),
self.as_ptr(),
);
}
}
/// Obtains a raw pointer suitable for use with FFI functions
#[inline]
pub fn as_ptr(&self) -> *const ffi::Signature {
&self.0 as *const _
}
/// Obtains a raw mutable pointer suitable for use with FFI functions
#[inline]
pub fn as_mut_ptr(&mut self) -> *mut ffi::Signature {
&mut self.0 as *mut _
}
#[inline]
/// Serializes the signature in DER format
pub fn serialize_der(&self) -> SerializedSignature {
let mut ret = SerializedSignature::default();
let mut len: usize = ret.capacity();
unsafe {
let err = ffi::secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(
ffi::secp256k1_context_no_precomp,
ret.get_data_mut_ptr(),
&mut len,
self.as_ptr(),
);
debug_assert!(err == 1);
ret.set_len(len);
}
ret
}
#[inline]
/// Serializes the signature in compact format
pub fn serialize_compact(&self) -> [u8; 64] {
let mut ret = [0; 64];
unsafe {
let err = ffi::secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(
ffi::secp256k1_context_no_precomp,
ret.as_mut_ptr(),
self.as_ptr(),
);
debug_assert!(err == 1);
}
ret
}
}
/// Creates a new signature from a FFI signature
impl From for Signature {
#[inline]
fn from(sig: ffi::Signature) -> Signature {
Signature(sig)
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
impl ::serde::Serialize for Signature {
fn serialize(&self, s: S) -> Result {
s.serialize_bytes(&self.serialize_der())
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
impl<'de> ::serde::Deserialize<'de> for Signature {
fn deserialize>(d: D) -> Result {
use ::serde::de::Error;
let sl: &[u8] = ::serde::Deserialize::deserialize(d)?;
Signature::from_der(sl).map_err(D::Error::custom)
}
}
/// A (hashed) message input to an ECDSA signature
pub struct Message([u8; constants::MESSAGE_SIZE]);
impl_array_newtype!(Message, u8, constants::MESSAGE_SIZE);
impl_pretty_debug!(Message);
impl Message {
/// Converts a `MESSAGE_SIZE`-byte slice to a message object
#[inline]
pub fn from_slice(data: &[u8]) -> Result {
if data == [0; constants::MESSAGE_SIZE] {
return Err(Error::InvalidMessage);
}
match data.len() {
constants::MESSAGE_SIZE => {
let mut ret = [0; constants::MESSAGE_SIZE];
ret[..].copy_from_slice(data);
Ok(Message(ret))
}
_ => Err(Error::InvalidMessage)
}
}
}
impl From for Message {
/// Converts a 32-byte hash directly to a message without error paths
fn from(t: T) -> Message {
Message(t.into_32())
}
}
/// An ECDSA error
#[derive(Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Debug)]
pub enum Error {
/// Signature failed verification
IncorrectSignature,
/// Badly sized message ("messages" are actually fixed-sized digests; see the `MESSAGE_SIZE`
/// constant)
InvalidMessage,
/// Bad public key
InvalidPublicKey,
/// Bad signature
InvalidSignature,
/// Bad secret key
InvalidSecretKey,
/// Bad recovery id
InvalidRecoveryId,
/// Invalid tweak for add_*_assign or mul_*_assign
InvalidTweak,
}
impl Error {
fn as_str(&self) -> &str {
match *self {
Error::IncorrectSignature => "secp: signature failed verification",
Error::InvalidMessage => "secp: message was not 32 bytes (do you need to hash?)",
Error::InvalidPublicKey => "secp: malformed public key",
Error::InvalidSignature => "secp: malformed signature",
Error::InvalidSecretKey => "secp: malformed or out-of-range secret key",
Error::InvalidRecoveryId => "secp: bad recovery id",
Error::InvalidTweak => "secp: bad tweak",
}
}
}
// Passthrough Debug to Display, since errors should be user-visible
impl fmt::Display for Error {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
f.write_str(self.as_str())
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
impl std::error::Error for Error {
fn description(&self) -> &str { self.as_str() }
}
/// Marker trait for indicating that an instance of `Secp256k1` can be used for signing.
pub trait Signing {}
/// Marker trait for indicating that an instance of `Secp256k1` can be used for verification.
pub trait Verification {}
/// Represents the set of capabilities needed for signing.
pub struct SignOnly {}
/// Represents the set of capabilities needed for verification.
pub struct VerifyOnly {}
/// Represents the set of all capabilities.
pub struct All {}
impl Signing for SignOnly {}
impl Signing for All {}
impl Verification for VerifyOnly {}
impl Verification for All {}
/// The secp256k1 engine, used to execute all signature operations
pub struct Secp256k1 {
ctx: *mut ffi::Context,
phantom: PhantomData
}
// The underlying secp context does not contain any references to memory it does not own
unsafe impl Send for Secp256k1 {}
// The API does not permit any mutation of `Secp256k1` objects except through `&mut` references
unsafe impl Sync for Secp256k1 {}
impl Clone for Secp256k1 {
fn clone(&self) -> Secp256k1 {
Secp256k1 {
ctx: unsafe { ffi::secp256k1_context_clone(self.ctx) },
phantom: self.phantom
}
}
}
impl PartialEq for Secp256k1 {
fn eq(&self, _other: &Secp256k1) -> bool { true }
}
impl Default for SerializedSignature {
fn default() -> SerializedSignature {
SerializedSignature {
data: [0u8; 72],
len: 0,
}
}
}
impl PartialEq for SerializedSignature {
fn eq(&self, other: &SerializedSignature) -> bool {
&self.data[..self.len] == &other.data[..other.len]
}
}
impl AsRef<[u8]> for SerializedSignature {
fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.data[..self.len]
}
}
impl Deref for SerializedSignature {
type Target = [u8];
fn deref(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.data[..self.len]
}
}
impl Eq for SerializedSignature {}
impl Eq for Secp256k1 { }
impl Drop for Secp256k1 {
fn drop(&mut self) {
unsafe { ffi::secp256k1_context_destroy(self.ctx); }
}
}
impl fmt::Debug for Secp256k1 {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
write!(f, "", self.ctx)
}
}
impl fmt::Debug for Secp256k1 {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
write!(f, "", self.ctx)
}
}
impl fmt::Debug for Secp256k1 {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
write!(f, "", self.ctx)
}
}
impl Secp256k1 {
/// Creates a new Secp256k1 context with all capabilities
pub fn new() -> Secp256k1 {
Secp256k1 { ctx: unsafe { ffi::secp256k1_context_create(ffi::SECP256K1_START_SIGN | ffi::SECP256K1_START_VERIFY) }, phantom: PhantomData }
}
}
impl Default for Secp256k1 {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
impl Secp256k1 {
/// Creates a new Secp256k1 context that can only be used for signing
pub fn signing_only() -> Secp256k1 {
Secp256k1 { ctx: unsafe { ffi::secp256k1_context_create(ffi::SECP256K1_START_SIGN) }, phantom: PhantomData }
}
}
impl Secp256k1 {
/// Creates a new Secp256k1 context that can only be used for verification
pub fn verification_only() -> Secp256k1 {
Secp256k1 { ctx: unsafe { ffi::secp256k1_context_create(ffi::SECP256K1_START_VERIFY) }, phantom: PhantomData }
}
}
impl Secp256k1 {
/// Getter for the raw pointer to the underlying secp256k1 context. This
/// shouldn't be needed with normal usage of the library. It enables
/// extending the Secp256k1 with more cryptographic algorithms outside of
/// this crate.
pub fn ctx(&self) -> &*mut ffi::Context {
&self.ctx
}
/// (Re)randomizes the Secp256k1 context for cheap sidechannel resistance;
/// see comment in libsecp256k1 commit d2275795f by Gregory Maxwell. Requires
/// compilation with "rand" feature.
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "rand"))]
pub fn randomize(&mut self, rng: &mut R) {
let mut seed = [0; 32];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
unsafe {
let err = ffi::secp256k1_context_randomize(self.ctx, seed.as_ptr());
// This function cannot fail; it has an error return for future-proofing.
// We do not expose this error since it is impossible to hit, and we have
// precedent for not exposing impossible errors (for example in
// `PublicKey::from_secret_key` where it is impossible to create an invalid
// secret key through the API.)
// However, if this DOES fail, the result is potentially weaker side-channel
// resistance, which is deadly and undetectable, so we take out the entire
// thread to be on the safe side.
assert!(err == 1);
}
}
}
impl Secp256k1 {
/// Constructs a signature for `msg` using the secret key `sk` and RFC6979 nonce
/// Requires a signing-capable context.
pub fn sign(&self, msg: &Message, sk: &key::SecretKey)
-> Signature {
let mut ret = unsafe { ffi::Signature::blank() };
unsafe {
// We can assume the return value because it's not possible to construct
// an invalid signature from a valid `Message` and `SecretKey`
assert_eq!(ffi::secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(self.ctx, &mut ret, msg.as_ptr(),
sk.as_ptr(), ffi::secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979,
ptr::null()), 1);
}
Signature::from(ret)
}
/// Generates a random keypair. Convenience function for `key::SecretKey::new`
/// and `key::PublicKey::from_secret_key`; call those functions directly for
/// batch key generation. Requires a signing-capable context. Requires compilation
/// with the "rand" feature.
#[inline]
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "rand"))]
pub fn generate_keypair(&self, rng: &mut R)
-> (key::SecretKey, key::PublicKey) {
let sk = key::SecretKey::new(rng);
let pk = key::PublicKey::from_secret_key(self, &sk);
(sk, pk)
}
}
impl Secp256k1 {
/// Checks that `sig` is a valid ECDSA signature for `msg` using the public
/// key `pubkey`. Returns `Ok(true)` on success. Note that this function cannot
/// be used for Bitcoin consensus checking since there may exist signatures
/// which OpenSSL would verify but not libsecp256k1, or vice-versa. Requires a
/// verify-capable context.
#[inline]
pub fn verify(&self, msg: &Message, sig: &Signature, pk: &key::PublicKey) -> Result<(), Error> {
unsafe {
if ffi::secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(self.ctx, sig.as_ptr(), msg.as_ptr(), pk.as_ptr()) == 0 {
Err(Error::IncorrectSignature)
} else {
Ok(())
}
}
}
}
/// Utility function used to parse hex into a target u8 buffer. Returns
/// the number of bytes converted or an error if it encounters an invalid
/// character or unexpected end of string.
fn from_hex(hex: &str, target: &mut [u8]) -> Result {
if hex.len() % 2 == 1 || hex.len() > target.len() * 2 {
return Err(());
}
let mut b = 0;
let mut idx = 0;
for c in hex.bytes() {
b <<= 4;
match c {
b'A'...b'F' => b |= c - b'A' + 10,
b'a'...b'f' => b |= c - b'a' + 10,
b'0'...b'9' => b |= c - b'0',
_ => return Err(()),
}
if (idx & 1) == 1 {
target[idx / 2] = b;
b = 0;
}
idx += 1;
}
Ok(idx / 2)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use rand::{RngCore, thread_rng};
use std::str::FromStr;
use key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
use super::from_hex;
use super::constants;
use super::{Secp256k1, Signature, Message};
use super::Error::{InvalidMessage, IncorrectSignature, InvalidSignature};
macro_rules! hex {
($hex:expr) => ({
let mut result = vec![0; $hex.len() / 2];
from_hex($hex, &mut result).expect("valid hex string");
result
});
}
#[test]
fn capabilities() {
let sign = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let vrfy = Secp256k1::verification_only();
let full = Secp256k1::new();
let mut msg = [0u8; 32];
thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut msg);
let msg = Message::from_slice(&msg).unwrap();
// Try key generation
let (sk, pk) = full.generate_keypair(&mut thread_rng());
// Try signing
assert_eq!(sign.sign(&msg, &sk), full.sign(&msg, &sk));
let sig = full.sign(&msg, &sk);
// Try verifying
assert!(vrfy.verify(&msg, &sig, &pk).is_ok());
assert!(full.verify(&msg, &sig, &pk).is_ok());
// Check that we can produce keys from slices with no precomputation
let (pk_slice, sk_slice) = (&pk.serialize(), &sk[..]);
let new_pk = PublicKey::from_slice(pk_slice).unwrap();
let new_sk = SecretKey::from_slice(sk_slice).unwrap();
assert_eq!(sk, new_sk);
assert_eq!(pk, new_pk);
}
#[test]
fn signature_serialize_roundtrip() {
let mut s = Secp256k1::new();
s.randomize(&mut thread_rng());
let mut msg = [0; 32];
for _ in 0..100 {
thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut msg);
let msg = Message::from_slice(&msg).unwrap();
let (sk, _) = s.generate_keypair(&mut thread_rng());
let sig1 = s.sign(&msg, &sk);
let der = sig1.serialize_der();
let sig2 = Signature::from_der(&der[..]).unwrap();
assert_eq!(sig1, sig2);
let compact = sig1.serialize_compact();
let sig2 = Signature::from_compact(&compact[..]).unwrap();
assert_eq!(sig1, sig2);
assert!(Signature::from_compact(&der[..]).is_err());
assert!(Signature::from_compact(&compact[0..4]).is_err());
assert!(Signature::from_der(&compact[..]).is_err());
assert!(Signature::from_der(&der[0..4]).is_err());
}
}
#[test]
fn signature_display() {
let hex_str = "3046022100839c1fbc5304de944f697c9f4b1d01d1faeba32d751c0f7acb21ac8a0f436a72022100e89bd46bb3a5a62adc679f659b7ce876d83ee297c7a5587b2011c4fcc72eab45";
let byte_str = hex!(hex_str);
assert_eq!(
Signature::from_der(&byte_str).expect("byte str decode"),
Signature::from_str(&hex_str).expect("byte str decode")
);
let sig = Signature::from_str(&hex_str).expect("byte str decode");
assert_eq!(&sig.to_string(), hex_str);
assert_eq!(&format!("{:?}", sig), hex_str);
assert!(Signature::from_str(
"3046022100839c1fbc5304de944f697c9f4b1d01d1faeba32d751c0f7acb21ac8a0f436a\
72022100e89bd46bb3a5a62adc679f659b7ce876d83ee297c7a5587b2011c4fcc72eab4"
).is_err());
assert!(Signature::from_str(
"3046022100839c1fbc5304de944f697c9f4b1d01d1faeba32d751c0f7acb21ac8a0f436a\
72022100e89bd46bb3a5a62adc679f659b7ce876d83ee297c7a5587b2011c4fcc72eab"
).is_err());
assert!(Signature::from_str(
"3046022100839c1fbc5304de944f697c9f4b1d01d1faeba32d751c0f7acb21ac8a0f436a\
72022100e89bd46bb3a5a62adc679f659b7ce876d83ee297c7a5587b2011c4fcc72eabxx"
).is_err());
assert!(Signature::from_str(
"3046022100839c1fbc5304de944f697c9f4b1d01d1faeba32d751c0f7acb21ac8a0f436a\
72022100e89bd46bb3a5a62adc679f659b7ce876d83ee297c7a5587b2011c4fcc72eab45\
72022100e89bd46bb3a5a62adc679f659b7ce876d83ee297c7a5587b2011c4fcc72eab45\
72022100e89bd46bb3a5a62adc679f659b7ce876d83ee297c7a5587b2011c4fcc72eab45\
72022100e89bd46bb3a5a62adc679f659b7ce876d83ee297c7a5587b2011c4fcc72eab45\
72022100e89bd46bb3a5a62adc679f659b7ce876d83ee297c7a5587b2011c4fcc72eab45"
).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn signature_lax_der() {
macro_rules! check_lax_sig(
($hex:expr) => ({
let sig = hex!($hex);
assert!(Signature::from_der_lax(&sig[..]).is_ok());
})
);
check_lax_sig!("304402204c2dd8a9b6f8d425fcd8ee9a20ac73b619906a6367eac6cb93e70375225ec0160220356878eff111ff3663d7e6bf08947f94443845e0dcc54961664d922f7660b80c");
check_lax_sig!("304402202ea9d51c7173b1d96d331bd41b3d1b4e78e66148e64ed5992abd6ca66290321c0220628c47517e049b3e41509e9d71e480a0cdc766f8cdec265ef0017711c1b5336f");
check_lax_sig!("3045022100bf8e050c85ffa1c313108ad8c482c4849027937916374617af3f2e9a881861c9022023f65814222cab09d5ec41032ce9c72ca96a5676020736614de7b78a4e55325a");
check_lax_sig!("3046022100839c1fbc5304de944f697c9f4b1d01d1faeba32d751c0f7acb21ac8a0f436a72022100e89bd46bb3a5a62adc679f659b7ce876d83ee297c7a5587b2011c4fcc72eab45");
check_lax_sig!("3046022100eaa5f90483eb20224616775891397d47efa64c68b969db1dacb1c30acdfc50aa022100cf9903bbefb1c8000cf482b0aeeb5af19287af20bd794de11d82716f9bae3db1");
check_lax_sig!("3045022047d512bc85842ac463ca3b669b62666ab8672ee60725b6c06759e476cebdc6c102210083805e93bd941770109bcc797784a71db9e48913f702c56e60b1c3e2ff379a60");
check_lax_sig!("3044022023ee4e95151b2fbbb08a72f35babe02830d14d54bd7ed1320e4751751d1baa4802206235245254f58fd1be6ff19ca291817da76da65c2f6d81d654b5185dd86b8acf");
}
#[test]
fn sign_and_verify() {
let mut s = Secp256k1::new();
s.randomize(&mut thread_rng());
let mut msg = [0; 32];
for _ in 0..100 {
thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut msg);
let msg = Message::from_slice(&msg).unwrap();
let (sk, pk) = s.generate_keypair(&mut thread_rng());
let sig = s.sign(&msg, &sk);
assert_eq!(s.verify(&msg, &sig, &pk), Ok(()));
}
}
#[test]
fn sign_and_verify_extreme() {
let mut s = Secp256k1::new();
s.randomize(&mut thread_rng());
// Wild keys: 1, CURVE_ORDER - 1
// Wild msgs: 1, CURVE_ORDER - 1
let mut wild_keys = [[0; 32]; 2];
let mut wild_msgs = [[0; 32]; 2];
wild_keys[0][0] = 1;
wild_msgs[0][0] = 1;
use constants;
wild_keys[1][..].copy_from_slice(&constants::CURVE_ORDER[..]);
wild_msgs[1][..].copy_from_slice(&constants::CURVE_ORDER[..]);
wild_keys[1][0] -= 1;
wild_msgs[1][0] -= 1;
for key in wild_keys.iter().map(|k| SecretKey::from_slice(&k[..]).unwrap()) {
for msg in wild_msgs.iter().map(|m| Message::from_slice(&m[..]).unwrap()) {
let sig = s.sign(&msg, &key);
let pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&s, &key);
assert_eq!(s.verify(&msg, &sig, &pk), Ok(()));
}
}
}
#[test]
fn sign_and_verify_fail() {
let mut s = Secp256k1::new();
s.randomize(&mut thread_rng());
let mut msg = [0u8; 32];
thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut msg);
let msg = Message::from_slice(&msg).unwrap();
let (sk, pk) = s.generate_keypair(&mut thread_rng());
let sig = s.sign(&msg, &sk);
let mut msg = [0u8; 32];
thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut msg);
let msg = Message::from_slice(&msg).unwrap();
assert_eq!(s.verify(&msg, &sig, &pk), Err(IncorrectSignature));
}
#[test]
fn test_bad_slice() {
assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&[0; constants::MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE + 1]),
Err(InvalidSignature));
assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&[0; constants::MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE]),
Err(InvalidSignature));
assert_eq!(Message::from_slice(&[0; constants::MESSAGE_SIZE - 1]),
Err(InvalidMessage));
assert_eq!(Message::from_slice(&[0; constants::MESSAGE_SIZE + 1]),
Err(InvalidMessage));
assert_eq!(
Message::from_slice(&[0; constants::MESSAGE_SIZE]),
Err(InvalidMessage)
);
assert!(Message::from_slice(&[1; constants::MESSAGE_SIZE]).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn test_low_s() {
// nb this is a transaction on testnet
// txid 8ccc87b72d766ab3128f03176bb1c98293f2d1f85ebfaf07b82cc81ea6891fa9
// input number 3
let sig = hex!("3046022100839c1fbc5304de944f697c9f4b1d01d1faeba32d751c0f7acb21ac8a0f436a72022100e89bd46bb3a5a62adc679f659b7ce876d83ee297c7a5587b2011c4fcc72eab45");
let pk = hex!("031ee99d2b786ab3b0991325f2de8489246a6a3fdb700f6d0511b1d80cf5f4cd43");
let msg = hex!("a4965ca63b7d8562736ceec36dfa5a11bf426eb65be8ea3f7a49ae363032da0d");
let secp = Secp256k1::new();
let mut sig = Signature::from_der(&sig[..]).unwrap();
let pk = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk[..]).unwrap();
let msg = Message::from_slice(&msg[..]).unwrap();
// without normalization we expect this will fail
assert_eq!(secp.verify(&msg, &sig, &pk), Err(IncorrectSignature));
// after normalization it should pass
sig.normalize_s();
assert_eq!(secp.verify(&msg, &sig, &pk), Ok(()));
}
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
#[test]
fn test_signature_serde() {
use serde_test::{Token, assert_tokens};
let s = Secp256k1::new();
let msg = Message::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap();
let sig = s.sign(&msg, &sk);
static SIG_BYTES: [u8; 71] = [
48, 69, 2, 33, 0, 157, 11, 173, 87, 103, 25, 211, 42, 231, 107, 237,
179, 76, 119, 72, 102, 103, 60, 189, 227, 244, 225, 41, 81, 85, 92, 148,
8, 230, 206, 119, 75, 2, 32, 40, 118, 231, 16, 47, 32, 79, 107, 254,
226, 108, 150, 124, 57, 38, 206, 112, 44, 249, 125, 75, 1, 0, 98, 225,
147, 247, 99, 25, 15, 103, 118
];
assert_tokens(&sig, &[Token::BorrowedBytes(&SIG_BYTES[..])]);
}
}
#[cfg(all(test, feature = "unstable"))]
mod benches {
use rand::{Rng, thread_rng};
use test::{Bencher, black_box};
use super::{Secp256k1, Message};
#[bench]
pub fn generate(bh: &mut Bencher) {
struct CounterRng(u32);
impl Rng for CounterRng {
fn next_u32(&mut self) -> u32 { self.0 += 1; self.0 }
}
let s = Secp256k1::new();
let mut r = CounterRng(0);
bh.iter( || {
let (sk, pk) = s.generate_keypair(&mut r);
black_box(sk);
black_box(pk);
});
}
#[bench]
pub fn bench_sign(bh: &mut Bencher) {
let s = Secp256k1::new();
let mut msg = [0u8; 32];
thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut msg);
let msg = Message::from_slice(&msg).unwrap();
let (sk, _) = s.generate_keypair(&mut thread_rng());
bh.iter(|| {
let sig = s.sign(&msg, &sk);
black_box(sig);
});
}
#[bench]
pub fn bench_verify(bh: &mut Bencher) {
let s = Secp256k1::new();
let mut msg = [0u8; 32];
thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut msg);
let msg = Message::from_slice(&msg).unwrap();
let (sk, pk) = s.generate_keypair(&mut thread_rng());
let sig = s.sign(&msg, &sk);
bh.iter(|| {
let res = s.verify(&msg, &sig, &pk).unwrap();
black_box(res);
});
}
}