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rust-secp256k1-unsafe-fast/secp256k1-sys/src/lib.rs

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: CC0-1.0
//! # secp256k1-sys FFI bindings
//! Direct bindings to the underlying C library functions. These should
//! not be needed for most users.
// Coding conventions
#![deny(non_upper_case_globals, non_camel_case_types, non_snake_case, unused_mut)]
#![cfg_attr(all(not(test), not(feature = "std")), no_std)]
#![cfg_attr(docsrs, feature(doc_auto_cfg))]
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
extern crate core;
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
extern crate alloc;
#[cfg(secp256k1_fuzz)]
const THIS_UNUSED_CONSTANT_IS_YOUR_WARNING_THAT_ALL_THE_CRYPTO_IN_THIS_LIB_IS_DISABLED_FOR_FUZZING: usize = 0;
mod macros;
pub mod types;
#[cfg(feature = "recovery")]
pub mod recovery;
use core::{slice, ptr};
use core::ptr::NonNull;
use types::*;
/// Flag for context to enable no precomputation
pub const SECP256K1_START_NONE: c_uint = 1;
/// Flag for context to enable verification precomputation
pub const SECP256K1_START_VERIFY: c_uint = 1 | (1 << 8);
/// Flag for context to enable signing precomputation
pub const SECP256K1_START_SIGN: c_uint = 1 | (1 << 9);
/// Flag for keys to indicate uncompressed serialization format
#[allow(unused_parens)]
pub const SECP256K1_SER_UNCOMPRESSED: c_uint = (1 << 1);
/// Flag for keys to indicate compressed serialization format
pub const SECP256K1_SER_COMPRESSED: c_uint = (1 << 1) | (1 << 8);
/// A nonce generation function. Ordinary users of the library
/// never need to see this type; only if you need to control
/// nonce generation do you need to use it. I have deliberately
/// made this hard to do: you have to write your own wrapper
/// around the FFI functions to use it. And it's an unsafe type.
/// Nonces are generated deterministically by RFC6979 by
/// default; there should be no need to ever change this.
pub type NonceFn = Option<unsafe extern "C" fn(
nonce32: *mut c_uchar,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
key32: *const c_uchar,
algo16: *const c_uchar,
data: *mut c_void,
attempt: c_uint,
) -> c_int>;
/// Hash function to use to post-process an ECDH point to get
/// a shared secret.
pub type EcdhHashFn = Option<unsafe extern "C" fn(
output: *mut c_uchar,
x: *const c_uchar,
y: *const c_uchar,
data: *mut c_void,
) -> c_int>;
/// Same as secp256k1_nonce function with the exception of accepting an
/// additional pubkey argument and not requiring an attempt argument. The pubkey
/// argument can protect signature schemes with key-prefixed challenge hash
/// inputs against reusing the nonce when signing with the wrong precomputed
/// pubkey.
pub type SchnorrNonceFn = Option<unsafe extern "C" fn(
nonce32: *mut c_uchar,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
msg_len: size_t,
key32: *const c_uchar,
xonly_pk32: *const c_uchar,
algo16: *const c_uchar,
algo_len: size_t,
data: *mut c_void,
) -> c_int>;
/// Data structure that contains additional arguments for schnorrsig_sign_custom.
#[repr(C)]
pub struct SchnorrSigExtraParams {
magic: [c_uchar; 4],
nonce_fp: SchnorrNonceFn,
ndata: *const c_void,
}
impl SchnorrSigExtraParams {
/// Create a new SchnorrSigExtraParams properly initialized.
///
/// `nonce_fp`: pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL
/// rustsecp256k1_v0_5_0_nonce_function_bip340 is used
///
/// `ndata`: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function
/// (can be NULL). If it is non-NULL and
/// rustsecp256k1_v0_5_0_nonce_function_bip340 is used,
/// then ndata must be a pointer to 32-byte auxiliary randomness as per
/// BIP-340.
pub fn new(nonce_fp: SchnorrNonceFn, ndata: *const c_void) -> Self {
SchnorrSigExtraParams {
magic: [0xda, 0x6f, 0xb3, 0x8c],
nonce_fp,
ndata,
}
}
}
/// A Secp256k1 context, containing various precomputed values and such
/// needed to do elliptic curve computations. If you create one of these
/// with `secp256k1_context_create` you MUST destroy it with
/// `secp256k1_context_destroy`, or else you will have a memory leak.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
#[repr(C)] pub struct Context(c_int);
/// Library-internal representation of a Secp256k1 public key
#[repr(C)]
#[derive(Copy, Clone)]
#[cfg_attr(secp256k1_fuzz, derive(PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash))]
pub struct PublicKey([c_uchar; 64]);
impl_array_newtype!(PublicKey, c_uchar, 64);
impl_raw_debug!(PublicKey);
impl PublicKey {
/// Creates an "uninitialized" FFI public key which is zeroed out
///
/// # Safety
///
/// If you pass this to any FFI functions, except as an out-pointer,
/// the result is likely to be an assertation failure and process
/// termination.
pub unsafe fn new() -> Self {
Self::from_array_unchecked([0; 64])
}
/// Create a new public key usable for the FFI interface from raw bytes
///
/// # Safety
///
/// Does not check the validity of the underlying representation. If it is
/// invalid the result may be assertation failures (and process aborts) from
/// the underlying library. You should not use this method except with data
/// that you obtained from the FFI interface of the same version of this
/// library.
pub unsafe fn from_array_unchecked(data: [c_uchar; 64]) -> Self {
PublicKey(data)
}
/// Returns the underlying FFI opaque representation of the public key
///
/// You should not use this unless you really know what you are doing. It is
/// essentially only useful for extending the FFI interface itself.
pub fn underlying_bytes(self) -> [c_uchar; 64] {
self.0
}
/// Serializes this public key as a byte-encoded pair of values, in compressed form.
fn serialize(&self) -> [u8; 33] {
let mut buf = [0u8; 33];
let mut len = 33;
unsafe {
let ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(
secp256k1_context_no_precomp,
buf.as_mut_c_ptr(),
&mut len,
self,
SECP256K1_SER_COMPRESSED,
);
debug_assert_eq!(ret, 1);
debug_assert_eq!(len, 33);
};
buf
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl PartialOrd for PublicKey {
fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &PublicKey) -> Option<core::cmp::Ordering> {
Some(self.cmp(other))
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl Ord for PublicKey {
fn cmp(&self, other: &PublicKey) -> core::cmp::Ordering {
let ret = unsafe {
secp256k1_ec_pubkey_cmp(secp256k1_context_no_precomp, self, other)
};
ret.cmp(&0i32)
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl PartialEq for PublicKey {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.cmp(other) == core::cmp::Ordering::Equal
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl Eq for PublicKey {}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl core::hash::Hash for PublicKey {
fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, state: &mut H) {
let ser = self.serialize();
ser.hash(state);
}
}
/// Library-internal representation of a Secp256k1 signature
#[repr(C)]
#[derive(Copy, Clone)]
#[cfg_attr(secp256k1_fuzz, derive(PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash))]
pub struct Signature([c_uchar; 64]);
impl_array_newtype!(Signature, c_uchar, 64);
impl_raw_debug!(Signature);
impl Signature {
/// Creates an "uninitialized" FFI signature which is zeroed out
///
/// # Safety
///
/// If you pass this to any FFI functions, except as an out-pointer,
/// the result is likely to be an assertation failure and process
/// termination.
pub unsafe fn new() -> Self {
Self::from_array_unchecked([0; 64])
}
/// Create a new signature usable for the FFI interface from raw bytes
///
/// # Safety
///
/// Does not check the validity of the underlying representation. If it is
/// invalid the result may be assertation failures (and process aborts) from
/// the underlying library. You should not use this method except with data
/// that you obtained from the FFI interface of the same version of this
/// library.
pub unsafe fn from_array_unchecked(data: [c_uchar; 64]) -> Self {
Signature(data)
}
/// Returns the underlying FFI opaque representation of the signature
///
/// You should not use this unless you really know what you are doing. It is
/// essentially only useful for extending the FFI interface itself.
pub fn underlying_bytes(self) -> [c_uchar; 64] {
self.0
}
/// Serializes the signature in compact format.
fn serialize(&self) -> [u8; 64] {
let mut buf = [0u8; 64];
unsafe {
let ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(
secp256k1_context_no_precomp,
buf.as_mut_c_ptr(),
self,
);
debug_assert!(ret == 1);
}
buf
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl PartialOrd for Signature {
fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Signature) -> Option<core::cmp::Ordering> {
Some(self.cmp(other))
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl Ord for Signature {
fn cmp(&self, other: &Signature) -> core::cmp::Ordering {
let this = self.serialize();
let that = other.serialize();
this.cmp(&that)
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl PartialEq for Signature {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.cmp(other) == core::cmp::Ordering::Equal
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl Eq for Signature {}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl core::hash::Hash for Signature {
fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, state: &mut H) {
let ser = self.serialize();
ser.hash(state);
}
}
#[repr(C)]
#[derive(Copy, Clone)]
#[cfg_attr(secp256k1_fuzz, derive(PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash))]
pub struct XOnlyPublicKey([c_uchar; 64]);
impl_array_newtype!(XOnlyPublicKey, c_uchar, 64);
impl_raw_debug!(XOnlyPublicKey);
impl XOnlyPublicKey {
/// Creates an "uninitialized" FFI x-only public key which is zeroed out
///
/// # Safety
///
/// If you pass this to any FFI functions, except as an out-pointer,
/// the result is likely to be an assertation failure and process
/// termination.
pub unsafe fn new() -> Self {
Self::from_array_unchecked([0; 64])
}
/// Create a new x-only public key usable for the FFI interface from raw bytes
///
/// # Safety
///
/// Does not check the validity of the underlying representation. If it is
/// invalid the result may be assertation failures (and process aborts) from
/// the underlying library. You should not use this method except with data
/// that you obtained from the FFI interface of the same version of this
/// library.
pub unsafe fn from_array_unchecked(data: [c_uchar; 64]) -> Self {
XOnlyPublicKey(data)
}
/// Returns the underlying FFI opaque representation of the x-only public key
///
/// You should not use this unless you really know what you are doing. It is
/// essentially only useful for extending the FFI interface itself.
pub fn underlying_bytes(self) -> [c_uchar; 64] {
self.0
}
/// Serializes this key as a byte-encoded x coordinate value (32 bytes).
fn serialize(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut buf = [0u8; 32];
unsafe {
let ret = secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(
secp256k1_context_no_precomp,
buf.as_mut_c_ptr(),
self,
);
assert_eq!(ret, 1);
};
buf
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl PartialOrd for XOnlyPublicKey {
fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &XOnlyPublicKey) -> Option<core::cmp::Ordering> {
Some(self.cmp(other))
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl Ord for XOnlyPublicKey {
fn cmp(&self, other: &XOnlyPublicKey) -> core::cmp::Ordering {
let ret = unsafe {
secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_cmp(secp256k1_context_no_precomp, self, other)
};
ret.cmp(&0i32)
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl PartialEq for XOnlyPublicKey {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.cmp(other) == core::cmp::Ordering::Equal
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl Eq for XOnlyPublicKey {}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl core::hash::Hash for XOnlyPublicKey {
fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, state: &mut H) {
let ser = self.serialize();
ser.hash(state);
}
}
#[repr(C)]
#[derive(Copy, Clone)]
#[cfg_attr(secp256k1_fuzz, derive(PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash))]
pub struct KeyPair([c_uchar; 96]);
impl_array_newtype!(KeyPair, c_uchar, 96);
impl_raw_debug!(KeyPair);
impl KeyPair {
/// Creates an "uninitialized" FFI keypair which is zeroed out
///
/// # Safety
///
/// If you pass this to any FFI functions, except as an out-pointer,
/// the result is likely to be an assertation failure and process
/// termination.
pub unsafe fn new() -> Self {
Self::from_array_unchecked([0; 96])
}
/// Create a new keypair usable for the FFI interface from raw bytes
///
/// # Safety
///
/// Does not check the validity of the underlying representation. If it is
/// invalid the result may be assertation failures (and process aborts) from
/// the underlying library. You should not use this method except with data
/// that you obtained from the FFI interface of the same version of this
/// library.
pub unsafe fn from_array_unchecked(data: [c_uchar; 96]) -> Self {
KeyPair(data)
}
/// Returns the underlying FFI opaque representation of the x-only public key
///
/// You should not use this unless you really know what you are doing. It is
/// essentially only useful for extending the FFI interface itself.
pub fn underlying_bytes(self) -> [c_uchar; 96] {
self.0
}
/// Creates a new compressed public key from this key pair.
fn public_key(&self) -> PublicKey {
unsafe {
let mut pk = PublicKey::new();
let ret = secp256k1_keypair_pub(
secp256k1_context_no_precomp,
&mut pk,
self,
);
debug_assert_eq!(ret, 1);
pk
}
}
/// Attempts to erase the contents of the underlying array.
///
/// Note, however, that the compiler is allowed to freely copy or move the
/// contents of this array to other places in memory. Preventing this behavior
/// is very subtle. For more discussion on this, please see the documentation
/// of the [`zeroize`](https://docs.rs/zeroize) crate.
#[inline]
pub fn non_secure_erase(&mut self) {
non_secure_erase_impl(&mut self.0, DUMMY_KEYPAIR);
}
}
// DUMMY_KEYPAIR is the internal repr of a valid key pair with secret key `[1u8; 32]`
#[cfg(target_endian = "little")]
const DUMMY_KEYPAIR: [c_uchar; 96] = [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 143, 7, 221, 213, 233, 245, 23, 156, 255, 25, 72, 96, 52, 24, 30, 215, 101, 5, 186, 170, 213, 62, 93, 153, 64, 100, 18, 123, 86, 197, 132, 27, 209, 232, 168, 105, 122, 212, 34, 81, 222, 57, 246, 167, 32, 129, 223, 223, 66, 171, 197, 66, 166, 214, 254, 7, 21, 84, 139, 88, 143, 175, 190, 112];
#[cfg(all(target_endian = "big", target_pointer_width = "32"))]
const DUMMY_KEYPAIR: [c_uchar; 96] = [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 213, 221, 7, 143, 156, 23, 245, 233, 96, 72, 25, 255, 215, 30, 24, 52, 170, 186, 5, 101, 153, 93, 62, 213, 123, 18, 100, 64, 27, 132, 197, 86, 105, 168, 232, 209, 81, 34, 212, 122, 167, 246, 57, 222, 223, 223, 129, 32, 66, 197, 171, 66, 7, 254, 214, 166, 88, 139, 84, 21, 112, 190, 175, 143];
#[cfg(all(target_endian = "big", target_pointer_width = "64"))]
const DUMMY_KEYPAIR: [c_uchar; 96] = [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 81, 34, 212, 122, 105, 168, 232, 209, 223, 223, 129, 32, 167, 246, 57, 222, 7, 254, 214, 166, 66, 197, 171, 66, 112, 190, 175, 143, 88, 139, 84, 21];
/// Does a best attempt at secure erasure using Rust intrinsics.
///
/// The implementation is based on the approach used by the [`zeroize`](https://docs.rs/zeroize) crate.
#[inline(always)]
pub fn non_secure_erase_impl<T>(dst: &mut T, src: T) {
use core::sync::atomic;
// overwrite using volatile value
unsafe { ptr::write_volatile(dst, src); }
// prevent future accesses from being reordered to before erasure
atomic::compiler_fence(atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl PartialOrd for KeyPair {
fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &KeyPair) -> Option<core::cmp::Ordering> {
Some(self.cmp(other))
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl Ord for KeyPair {
fn cmp(&self, other: &KeyPair) -> core::cmp::Ordering {
let this = self.public_key();
let that = other.public_key();
this.cmp(&that)
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl PartialEq for KeyPair {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.cmp(other) == core::cmp::Ordering::Equal
}
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl Eq for KeyPair {}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
impl core::hash::Hash for KeyPair {
fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, state: &mut H) {
// To hash the key pair we just hash the serialized public key. Since any change to the
// secret key would also be a change to the public key this is a valid one way function from
// the key pair to the digest.
let pk = self.public_key();
let ser = pk.serialize();
ser.hash(state);
}
}
extern "C" {
/// Default ECDH hash function
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ecdh_hash_function_default")]
pub static secp256k1_ecdh_hash_function_default: EcdhHashFn;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_nonce_function_rfc6979")]
pub static secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979: NonceFn;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_nonce_function_default")]
pub static secp256k1_nonce_function_default: NonceFn;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_nonce_function_bip340")]
pub static secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340: SchnorrNonceFn;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_no_precomp")]
pub static secp256k1_context_no_precomp: *const Context;
// Contexts
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_preallocated_destroy")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_destroy(cx: NonNull<Context>);
// Signatures
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der")]
pub fn secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(cx: *const Context, sig: *mut Signature,
input: *const c_uchar, in_len: size_t)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact")]
pub fn secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(cx: *const Context, sig: *mut Signature,
input64: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax")]
pub fn ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax(cx: *const Context, sig: *mut Signature,
input: *const c_uchar, in_len: size_t)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der")]
pub fn secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(cx: *const Context, output: *mut c_uchar,
out_len: *mut size_t, sig: *const Signature)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact")]
pub fn secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(cx: *const Context, output64: *mut c_uchar,
sig: *const Signature)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ecdsa_signature_normalize")]
pub fn secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(cx: *const Context, out_sig: *mut Signature,
in_sig: *const Signature)
-> c_int;
// Secret Keys
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ec_seckey_verify")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(cx: *const Context,
sk: *const c_uchar) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ec_seckey_negate")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(cx: *const Context,
sk: *mut c_uchar) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ec_seckey_tweak_add")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(cx: *const Context,
sk: *mut c_uchar,
tweak: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(cx: *const Context,
sk: *mut c_uchar,
tweak: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_keypair_sec")]
pub fn secp256k1_keypair_sec(cx: *const Context,
output_seckey: *mut c_uchar,
keypair: *const KeyPair)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_keypair_pub")]
pub fn secp256k1_keypair_pub(cx: *const Context,
output_pubkey: *mut PublicKey,
keypair: *const KeyPair)
-> c_int;
}
#[cfg(not(secp256k1_fuzz))]
extern "C" {
// Contexts
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_preallocated_size")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(flags: c_uint) -> size_t;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_preallocated_create")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_create(prealloc: NonNull<c_void>, flags: c_uint) -> NonNull<Context>;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_preallocated_clone_size")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone_size(cx: *const Context) -> size_t;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_preallocated_clone")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone(cx: *const Context, prealloc: NonNull<c_void>) -> NonNull<Context>;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_randomize")]
pub fn secp256k1_context_randomize(cx: NonNull<Context>,
seed32: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int;
// Pubkeys
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ec_pubkey_parse")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(cx: *const Context, pk: *mut PublicKey,
input: *const c_uchar, in_len: size_t)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ec_pubkey_serialize")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(cx: *const Context, output: *mut c_uchar,
out_len: *mut size_t, pk: *const PublicKey,
compressed: c_uint)
-> c_int;
// EC
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ec_pubkey_create")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(cx: *const Context, pk: *mut PublicKey,
sk: *const c_uchar) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ec_pubkey_negate")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(cx: *const Context,
pk: *mut PublicKey) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ec_pubkey_cmp")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_cmp(cx: *const Context,
pubkey1: *const PublicKey,
pubkey2: *const PublicKey)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(cx: *const Context,
pk: *mut PublicKey,
tweak: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(cx: *const Context,
pk: *mut PublicKey,
tweak: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ec_pubkey_combine")]
pub fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(cx: *const Context,
out: *mut PublicKey,
ins: *const *const PublicKey,
n: c_int)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ecdh")]
pub fn secp256k1_ecdh(
cx: *const Context,
output: *mut c_uchar,
pubkey: *const PublicKey,
seckey: *const c_uchar,
hashfp: EcdhHashFn,
data: *mut c_void,
) -> c_int;
// ECDSA
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ecdsa_verify")]
pub fn secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(cx: *const Context,
sig: *const Signature,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
pk: *const PublicKey)
-> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_ecdsa_sign")]
pub fn secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(cx: *const Context,
sig: *mut Signature,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
sk: *const c_uchar,
noncefn: NonceFn,
noncedata: *const c_void)
-> c_int;
// Schnorr Signatures
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_schnorrsig_sign")]
pub fn secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(
cx: *const Context,
sig: *mut c_uchar,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
keypair: *const KeyPair,
aux_rand32: *const c_uchar
) -> c_int;
// Schnorr Signatures with extra parameters (see [`SchnorrSigExtraParams`])
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_schnorrsig_sign_custom")]
pub fn secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign_custom(
cx: *const Context,
sig: *mut c_uchar,
msg: *const c_uchar,
msg_len: size_t,
keypair: *const KeyPair,
extra_params: *const SchnorrSigExtraParams,
) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_schnorrsig_verify")]
pub fn secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(
cx: *const Context,
sig64: *const c_uchar,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
msglen: size_t,
pubkey: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
) -> c_int;
// Extra keys
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_keypair_create")]
pub fn secp256k1_keypair_create(
cx: *const Context,
keypair: *mut KeyPair,
seckey: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_xonly_pubkey_parse")]
pub fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(
cx: *const Context,
pubkey: *mut XOnlyPublicKey,
input32: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_xonly_pubkey_serialize")]
pub fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(
cx: *const Context,
output32: *mut c_uchar,
pubkey: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey")]
pub fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(
cx: *const Context,
xonly_pubkey: *mut XOnlyPublicKey,
pk_parity: *mut c_int,
pubkey: *const PublicKey,
) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_xonly_pubkey_cmp")]
pub fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_cmp(
cx: *const Context,
pubkey1: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
pubkey2: *const XOnlyPublicKey
) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add")]
pub fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(
cx: *const Context,
output_pubkey: *mut PublicKey,
internal_pubkey: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
tweak32: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_keypair_xonly_pub")]
pub fn secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(
cx: *const Context,
pubkey: *mut XOnlyPublicKey,
pk_parity: *mut c_int,
keypair: *const KeyPair
) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add")]
pub fn secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(
cx: *const Context,
keypair: *mut KeyPair,
tweak32: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int;
#[cfg_attr(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming), link_name = "rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check")]
pub fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(
cx: *const Context,
tweaked_pubkey32: *const c_uchar,
tweaked_pubkey_parity: c_int,
internal_pubkey: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
tweak32: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int;
}
/// A reimplementation of the C function `secp256k1_context_create` in rust.
///
/// This function allocates memory, the pointer should be deallocated using
/// `secp256k1_context_destroy`. Failure to do so will result in a memory leak.
///
/// Input `flags` control which parts of the context to initialize.
///
/// # Safety
///
/// This function is unsafe because it calls unsafe functions however (assuming no bugs) no
/// undefined behavior is possible.
///
/// # Returns
///
/// The newly created secp256k1 raw context.
#[cfg(all(feature = "alloc", not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming)))]
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_context_create(flags: c_uint) -> NonNull<Context> {
rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_create(flags)
}
/// A reimplementation of the C function `secp256k1_context_create` in rust.
///
/// See [`secp256k1_context_create`] for documentation and safety constraints.
#[no_mangle]
#[allow(clippy::missing_safety_doc)] // Documented above.
#[cfg(all(feature = "alloc", not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming)))]
pub unsafe extern "C" fn rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_create(flags: c_uint) -> NonNull<Context> {
use core::mem;
use crate::alloc::alloc;
assert!(ALIGN_TO >= mem::align_of::<usize>());
assert!(ALIGN_TO >= mem::align_of::<&usize>());
assert!(ALIGN_TO >= mem::size_of::<usize>());
// We need to allocate `ALIGN_TO` more bytes in order to write the amount of bytes back.
let bytes = secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(flags) + ALIGN_TO;
let layout = alloc::Layout::from_size_align(bytes, ALIGN_TO).unwrap();
let ptr = alloc::alloc(layout);
if ptr.is_null() {
alloc::handle_alloc_error(layout);
}
(ptr as *mut usize).write(bytes);
// We must offset a whole ALIGN_TO in order to preserve the same alignment
// this means we "lose" ALIGN_TO-size_of(usize) for padding.
let ptr = ptr.add(ALIGN_TO);
let ptr = NonNull::new_unchecked(ptr as *mut c_void); // Checked above.
secp256k1_context_preallocated_create(ptr, flags)
}
/// A reimplementation of the C function `secp256k1_context_destroy` in rust.
///
/// This function destroys and deallcates the context created by `secp256k1_context_create`.
///
/// The pointer shouldn't be used after passing to this function, consider it as passing it to `free()`.
///
/// # Safety
///
/// `ctx` must be a valid pointer to a block of memory created using [`secp256k1_context_create`].
#[cfg(all(feature = "alloc", not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming)))]
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx: NonNull<Context>) {
rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_destroy(ctx)
}
#[no_mangle]
#[allow(clippy::missing_safety_doc)] // Documented above.
#[cfg(all(feature = "alloc", not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming)))]
pub unsafe extern "C" fn rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_destroy(mut ctx: NonNull<Context>) {
use crate::alloc::alloc;
secp256k1_context_preallocated_destroy(ctx);
let ctx: *mut Context = ctx.as_mut();
let ptr = (ctx as *mut u8).sub(ALIGN_TO);
let bytes = (ptr as *mut usize).read();
let layout = alloc::Layout::from_size_align(bytes, ALIGN_TO).unwrap();
alloc::dealloc(ptr, layout);
}
/// **This function is an override for the C function, this is the an edited version of the original description:**
///
/// A callback function to be called when an illegal argument is passed to
/// an API call. It will only trigger for violations that are mentioned
/// explicitly in the header. **This will cause a panic**.
///
/// The philosophy is that these shouldn't be dealt with through a
/// specific return value, as calling code should not have branches to deal with
/// the case that this code itself is broken.
///
/// On the other hand, during debug stage, one would want to be informed about
/// such mistakes, and the default (crashing) may be inadvisable.
/// When this callback is triggered, the API function called is guaranteed not
/// to cause a crash, though its return value and output arguments are
/// undefined.
///
/// See also secp256k1_default_error_callback_fn.
///
///
/// # Safety
///
/// `message` string should be a null terminated C string and, up to the first null byte, must be valid UTF8.
///
/// For exact safety constraints see [`std::slice::from_raw_parts`] and [`std::str::from_utf8_unchecked`].
#[no_mangle]
#[cfg(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming))]
pub unsafe extern "C" fn rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_default_illegal_callback_fn(message: *const c_char, _data: *mut c_void) {
use core::str;
let msg_slice = slice::from_raw_parts(message as *const u8, strlen(message));
let msg = str::from_utf8_unchecked(msg_slice);
panic!("[libsecp256k1] illegal argument. {}", msg);
}
/// **This function is an override for the C function, this is the an edited version of the original description:**
///
/// A callback function to be called when an internal consistency check
/// fails. **This will cause a panic**.
///
/// This can only trigger in case of a hardware failure, miscompilation,
/// memory corruption, serious bug in the library, or other error would can
/// otherwise result in undefined behaviour. It will not trigger due to mere
/// incorrect usage of the API (see secp256k1_default_illegal_callback_fn
/// for that). After this callback returns, anything may happen, including
/// crashing.
///
/// See also secp256k1_default_illegal_callback_fn.
///
/// # Safety
///
/// `message` string should be a null terminated C string and, up to the first null byte, must be valid UTF8.
///
/// For exact safety constraints see [`std::slice::from_raw_parts`] and [`std::str::from_utf8_unchecked`].
#[no_mangle]
#[cfg(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming))]
pub unsafe extern "C" fn rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_default_error_callback_fn(message: *const c_char, _data: *mut c_void) {
use core::str;
let msg_slice = slice::from_raw_parts(message as *const u8, strlen(message));
let msg = str::from_utf8_unchecked(msg_slice);
panic!("[libsecp256k1] internal consistency check failed {}", msg);
}
/// Returns the length of the `str_ptr` string.
///
/// # Safety
///
/// `str_ptr` must be valid pointer and point to a valid null terminated C string.
#[cfg(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming))]
unsafe fn strlen(mut str_ptr: *const c_char) -> usize {
let mut ctr = 0;
while *str_ptr != '\0' as c_char {
ctr += 1;
str_ptr = str_ptr.offset(1);
}
ctr
}
/// A trait for producing pointers that will always be valid in C (assuming NULL pointer is a valid
/// no-op).
///
/// Rust does not guarantee pointers to Zero Sized Types
/// (<https://doc.rust-lang.org/nomicon/exotic-sizes.html#zero-sized-types-zsts>). In case the type
/// is empty this trait will return a NULL pointer, which should be handled in C.
pub trait CPtr {
type Target;
fn as_c_ptr(&self) -> *const Self::Target;
fn as_mut_c_ptr(&mut self) -> *mut Self::Target;
}
impl<T> CPtr for [T] {
type Target = T;
fn as_c_ptr(&self) -> *const Self::Target {
if self.is_empty() {
ptr::null()
} else {
self.as_ptr()
}
}
fn as_mut_c_ptr(&mut self) -> *mut Self::Target {
if self.is_empty() {
ptr::null_mut::<Self::Target>()
} else {
self.as_mut_ptr()
}
}
}
#[cfg(secp256k1_fuzz)]
mod fuzz_dummy {
use super::*;
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
#[cfg(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming)] compile_error!("We do not support fuzzing with rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming");
extern "C" {
fn rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_preallocated_size(flags: c_uint) -> size_t;
fn rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_preallocated_create(prealloc: NonNull<c_void>, flags: c_uint) -> NonNull<Context>;
fn rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_preallocated_clone(cx: *const Context, prealloc: NonNull<c_void>) -> NonNull<Context>;
}
#[cfg(feature = "lowmemory")]
const CTX_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 65;
#[cfg(not(feature = "lowmemory"))]
const CTX_SIZE: usize = 1024 * (1024 + 128);
// Contexts
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_size(flags: c_uint) -> size_t {
assert!(rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_preallocated_size(flags) + std::mem::size_of::<c_uint>() <= CTX_SIZE);
CTX_SIZE
}
static HAVE_PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
const HAVE_CONTEXT_NONE: usize = 0;
const HAVE_CONTEXT_WORKING: usize = 1;
const HAVE_CONTEXT_DONE: usize = 2;
static mut PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT: [u8; CTX_SIZE] = [0; CTX_SIZE];
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_create(prealloc: NonNull<c_void>, flags: c_uint) -> NonNull<Context> {
// While applications should generally avoid creating too many contexts, sometimes fuzzers
// perform tasks repeatedly which real applications may only do rarely. Thus, we want to
// avoid being overly slow here. We do so by having a static context and copying it into
// new buffers instead of recalculating it. Because we shouldn't rely on std, we use a
// simple hand-written OnceFlag built out of an atomic to gate the global static.
let mut have_ctx = HAVE_PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
while have_ctx != HAVE_CONTEXT_DONE {
if have_ctx == HAVE_CONTEXT_NONE {
have_ctx = HAVE_PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT.swap(HAVE_CONTEXT_WORKING, Ordering::AcqRel);
if have_ctx == HAVE_CONTEXT_NONE {
assert!(rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_preallocated_size(SECP256K1_START_SIGN | SECP256K1_START_VERIFY) + std::mem::size_of::<c_uint>() <= CTX_SIZE);
assert_eq!(rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_preallocated_create(
NonNull::new_unchecked(PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT[..].as_mut_ptr() as *mut c_void),
SECP256K1_START_SIGN | SECP256K1_START_VERIFY),
NonNull::new_unchecked(PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT[..].as_mut_ptr() as *mut Context));
assert_eq!(HAVE_PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT.swap(HAVE_CONTEXT_DONE, Ordering::AcqRel),
HAVE_CONTEXT_WORKING);
} else if have_ctx == HAVE_CONTEXT_DONE {
// Another thread finished while we were swapping.
HAVE_PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT.store(HAVE_CONTEXT_DONE, Ordering::Release);
}
} else {
// Another thread is building, just busy-loop until they're done.
assert_eq!(have_ctx, HAVE_CONTEXT_WORKING);
have_ctx = HAVE_PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT.load(Ordering::Acquire);
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
std::thread::yield_now();
}
}
ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(PREALLOCATED_CONTEXT[..].as_ptr(), prealloc.as_ptr() as *mut u8, CTX_SIZE);
let ptr = (prealloc.as_ptr()).add(CTX_SIZE).sub(std::mem::size_of::<c_uint>());
(ptr as *mut c_uint).write(flags);
NonNull::new_unchecked(prealloc.as_ptr() as *mut Context)
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone_size(_cx: *const Context) -> size_t { CTX_SIZE }
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_context_preallocated_clone(cx: *const Context, prealloc: NonNull<c_void>) -> NonNull<Context> {
let orig_ptr = (cx as *mut u8).add(CTX_SIZE).sub(std::mem::size_of::<c_uint>());
let new_ptr = (prealloc.as_ptr() as *mut u8).add(CTX_SIZE).sub(std::mem::size_of::<c_uint>());
let flags = (orig_ptr as *mut c_uint).read();
(new_ptr as *mut c_uint).write(flags);
rustsecp256k1_v0_8_1_context_preallocated_clone(cx, prealloc)
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_context_randomize(cx: NonNull<Context>,
_seed32: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int {
// This function is really slow, and unsuitable for fuzzing
check_context_flags(cx.as_ptr(), 0);
1
}
unsafe fn check_context_flags(cx: *const Context, required_flags: c_uint) {
assert!(!cx.is_null());
let cx_flags = if cx == secp256k1_context_no_precomp {
1
} else {
let ptr = (cx as *const u8).add(CTX_SIZE).sub(std::mem::size_of::<c_uint>());
(ptr as *const c_uint).read()
};
assert_eq!(cx_flags & 1, 1); // SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT
assert_eq!(cx_flags & required_flags, required_flags);
}
/// Checks that pk != 0xffff...ffff and pk[1..32] == pk[33..64]
unsafe fn test_pk_validate(cx: *const Context,
pk: *const PublicKey) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
if (*pk).0[1..32] != (*pk).0[33..64] ||
((*pk).0[32] != 0 && (*pk).0[32] != 0xff) ||
secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(cx, (*pk).0[0..32].as_ptr()) == 0 {
0
} else {
1
}
}
unsafe fn test_cleanup_pk(pk: *mut PublicKey) {
(*pk).0[32..].copy_from_slice(&(*pk).0[..32]);
if (*pk).0[32] <= 0x7f {
(*pk).0[32] = 0;
} else {
(*pk).0[32] = 0xff;
}
}
// Pubkeys
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(cx: *const Context, pk: *mut PublicKey,
input: *const c_uchar, in_len: size_t)
-> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
match in_len {
33 => {
if *input != 2 && *input != 3 {
0
} else {
ptr::copy(input.offset(1), (*pk).0[0..32].as_mut_ptr(), 32);
ptr::copy(input.offset(2), (*pk).0[33..64].as_mut_ptr(), 31);
if *input == 3 {
(*pk).0[32] = 0xff;
} else {
(*pk).0[32] = 0;
}
test_pk_validate(cx, pk)
}
},
65 => {
if *input != 4 && *input != 6 && *input != 7 {
0
} else {
ptr::copy(input.offset(1), (*pk).0.as_mut_ptr(), 64);
test_cleanup_pk(pk);
test_pk_validate(cx, pk)
}
},
_ => 0
}
}
/// Serialize PublicKey back to 33/65 byte pubkey
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(cx: *const Context, output: *mut c_uchar,
out_len: *mut size_t, pk: *const PublicKey,
compressed: c_uint)
-> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
if compressed == SECP256K1_SER_COMPRESSED {
assert_eq!(*out_len, 33);
if (*pk).0[32] <= 0x7f {
*output = 2;
} else {
*output = 3;
}
ptr::copy((*pk).0.as_ptr(), output.offset(1), 32);
} else if compressed == SECP256K1_SER_UNCOMPRESSED {
assert_eq!(*out_len, 65);
*output = 4;
ptr::copy((*pk).0.as_ptr(), output.offset(1), 64);
} else {
panic!("Bad flags");
}
1
}
// EC
/// Sets pk to sk||sk
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(cx: *const Context, pk: *mut PublicKey,
sk: *const c_uchar) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_SIGN);
if secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(cx, sk) != 1 { return 0; }
ptr::copy(sk, (*pk).0[0..32].as_mut_ptr(), 32);
test_cleanup_pk(pk);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
1
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_negate(cx: *const Context,
pk: *mut PublicKey) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
if secp256k1_ec_seckey_negate(cx, (*pk).0[..32].as_mut_ptr()) != 1 { return 0; }
test_cleanup_pk(pk);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
1
}
/// The PublicKey equivalent of secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(cx: *const Context,
pk: *mut PublicKey,
tweak: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_VERIFY);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
if secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(cx, (*pk).0[..32].as_mut_ptr(), tweak) != 1 { return 0; }
test_cleanup_pk(pk);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
1
}
/// The PublicKey equivalent of secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(cx: *const Context,
pk: *mut PublicKey,
tweak: *const c_uchar)
-> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
if secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_mul(cx, (*pk).0[..32].as_mut_ptr(), tweak) != 1 { return 0; }
test_cleanup_pk(pk);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pk), 1);
1
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(cx: *const Context,
out: *mut PublicKey,
ins: *const *const PublicKey,
n: c_int)
-> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
assert!(n >= 1);
(*out) = **ins;
for i in 1..n {
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, *ins.offset(i as isize)), 1);
if secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(cx, (*out).0[..32].as_mut_ptr(), (**ins.offset(i as isize)).0[..32].as_ptr()) != 1 {
return 0;
}
}
test_cleanup_pk(out);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, out), 1);
1
}
/// Sets out to point^scalar^1s
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ecdh(
cx: *const Context,
out: *mut c_uchar,
point: *const PublicKey,
scalar: *const c_uchar,
hashfp: EcdhHashFn,
data: *mut c_void,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, point), 1);
if secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(cx, scalar) != 1 { return 0; }
let scalar_slice = slice::from_raw_parts(scalar, 32);
let pk_slice = &(*point).0[..32];
let mut res_arr = [0u8; 32];
for i in 0..32 {
res_arr[i] = scalar_slice[i] ^ pk_slice[i] ^ 1;
}
if let Some(hashfn) = hashfp {
(hashfn)(out, res_arr.as_ptr(), res_arr.as_ptr(), data);
} else {
res_arr[16] = 0x00; // result should always be a valid secret key
let out_slice = slice::from_raw_parts_mut(out, 32);
out_slice.copy_from_slice(&res_arr);
}
1
}
// ECDSA
/// Verifies that sig is msg32||pk[..32]
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(cx: *const Context,
sig: *const Signature,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
pk: *const PublicKey)
-> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_VERIFY);
// Actually verify
let sig_sl = slice::from_raw_parts(sig as *const u8, 64);
let msg_sl = slice::from_raw_parts(msg32 as *const u8, 32);
if &sig_sl[..32] == msg_sl && sig_sl[32..] == (*pk).0[0..32] {
1
} else {
0
}
}
/// Sets sig to msg32||pk[..32]
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(cx: *const Context,
sig: *mut Signature,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
sk: *const c_uchar,
_noncefn: NonceFn,
_noncedata: *const c_void)
-> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_SIGN);
// Check context is built for signing (and compute pk)
let mut new_pk = PublicKey::new();
if secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(cx, &mut new_pk, sk) != 1 {
return 0;
}
// Sign
let sig_sl = slice::from_raw_parts_mut(sig as *mut u8, 64);
let msg_sl = slice::from_raw_parts(msg32 as *const u8, 32);
sig_sl[..32].copy_from_slice(msg_sl);
sig_sl[32..].copy_from_slice(&new_pk.0[..32]);
1
}
// Schnorr Signatures
/// Verifies that sig is msg32||pk[32..]
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(
cx: *const Context,
sig64: *const c_uchar,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
msglen: size_t,
pubkey: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_VERIFY);
// Check context is built for verification
let mut new_pk = PublicKey::new();
let _ = secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(cx, &mut new_pk, pubkey, msg32);
// Actually verify
let sig_sl = slice::from_raw_parts(sig64 as *const u8, 64);
let msg_sl = slice::from_raw_parts(msg32 as *const u8, msglen);
if &sig_sl[..32] == msg_sl && sig_sl[32..] == (*pubkey).0[..32] {
1
} else {
0
}
}
/// Sets sig to msg32||pk[..32]
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(
cx: *const Context,
sig64: *mut c_uchar,
msg32: *const c_uchar,
keypair: *const KeyPair,
_aux_rand32: *const c_uchar
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_SIGN);
// Check context is built for signing
let mut new_kp = KeyPair::new();
if secp256k1_keypair_create(cx, &mut new_kp, (*keypair).0.as_ptr()) != 1 {
return 0;
}
assert_eq!(new_kp, *keypair);
// Sign
let sig_sl = slice::from_raw_parts_mut(sig64 as *mut u8, 64);
let msg_sl = slice::from_raw_parts(msg32 as *const u8, 32);
sig_sl[..32].copy_from_slice(msg_sl);
sig_sl[32..].copy_from_slice(&new_kp.0[32..64]);
1
}
// Forwards to regular schnorrsig_sign function.
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign_custom(
cx: *const Context,
sig: *mut c_uchar,
msg: *const c_uchar,
_msg_len: size_t,
keypair: *const KeyPair,
_extra_params: *const SchnorrSigExtraParams,
) -> c_int {
secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(cx, sig, msg, keypair, ptr::null())
}
// Extra keys
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_keypair_create(
cx: *const Context,
keypair: *mut KeyPair,
seckey: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_SIGN);
if secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(cx, seckey) == 0 { return 0; }
let mut pk = PublicKey::new();
if secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(cx, &mut pk, seckey) == 0 { return 0; }
let seckey_slice = slice::from_raw_parts(seckey, 32);
(*keypair).0[..32].copy_from_slice(seckey_slice);
(*keypair).0[32..].copy_from_slice(&pk.0);
1
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse(
cx: *const Context,
pubkey: *mut XOnlyPublicKey,
input32: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
let inslice = slice::from_raw_parts(input32, 32);
(*pubkey).0[..32].copy_from_slice(inslice);
(*pubkey).0[32..].copy_from_slice(inslice);
test_cleanup_pk(pubkey as *mut PublicKey);
test_pk_validate(cx, pubkey as *mut PublicKey)
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(
cx: *const Context,
output32: *mut c_uchar,
pubkey: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
let outslice = slice::from_raw_parts_mut(output32, 32);
outslice.copy_from_slice(&(*pubkey).0[..32]);
1
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_from_pubkey(
cx: *const Context,
xonly_pubkey: *mut XOnlyPublicKey,
pk_parity: *mut c_int,
pubkey: *const PublicKey,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
if !pk_parity.is_null() {
*pk_parity = ((*pubkey).0[32] == 0).into();
}
(*xonly_pubkey).0.copy_from_slice(&(*pubkey).0);
assert_eq!(test_pk_validate(cx, pubkey), 1);
1
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(
cx: *const Context,
output_pubkey: *mut PublicKey,
internal_pubkey: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
tweak32: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_VERIFY);
(*output_pubkey).0.copy_from_slice(&(*internal_pubkey).0);
secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(cx, output_pubkey, tweak32)
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(
cx: *const Context,
pubkey: *mut XOnlyPublicKey,
pk_parity: *mut c_int,
keypair: *const KeyPair
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, 0);
if !pk_parity.is_null() {
*pk_parity = ((*keypair).0[64] == 0).into();
}
(*pubkey).0.copy_from_slice(&(*keypair).0[32..]);
1
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(
cx: *const Context,
keypair: *mut KeyPair,
tweak32: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_VERIFY);
let mut pk = PublicKey::new();
pk.0.copy_from_slice(&(*keypair).0[32..]);
let mut sk = [0u8; 32];
sk.copy_from_slice(&(*keypair).0[..32]);
assert_eq!(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(cx, &mut pk, tweak32), 1);
assert_eq!(secp256k1_ec_seckey_tweak_add(cx, (&mut sk[..]).as_mut_ptr(), tweak32), 1);
(*keypair).0[..32].copy_from_slice(&sk);
(*keypair).0[32..].copy_from_slice(&pk.0);
1
}
pub unsafe fn secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check(
cx: *const Context,
tweaked_pubkey32: *const c_uchar,
tweaked_pubkey_parity: c_int,
internal_pubkey: *const XOnlyPublicKey,
tweak32: *const c_uchar,
) -> c_int {
check_context_flags(cx, SECP256K1_START_VERIFY);
let mut tweaked_pk = PublicKey::new();
assert_eq!(secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(cx, &mut tweaked_pk, internal_pubkey, tweak32), 1);
let in_slice = slice::from_raw_parts(tweaked_pubkey32, 32);
if &tweaked_pk.0[..32] == in_slice && tweaked_pubkey_parity == (tweaked_pk.0[32] == 0).into() {
1
} else {
0
}
}
}
#[cfg(secp256k1_fuzz)]
pub use self::fuzz_dummy::*;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#[cfg(not(rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming))]
#[test]
fn test_strlen() {
use std::ffi::CString;
use super::strlen;
let orig = "test strlen \t \n";
let test = CString::new(orig).unwrap();
assert_eq!(orig.len(), unsafe {strlen(test.as_ptr())});
}
}
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