From 5bae471906871b39760878b6f244673365c57e93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Spencer Judd Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2024 14:48:57 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] Add TODOs following PR discussions --- .../fixed-location-reusable-hardware-procurement.md | 4 ++++ .../src/fixed-location-reusable-laptop-ceremony.md | 2 ++ .../operator/coins/pyth-spl/sign-transaction.md | 10 +++++++--- .../fixed-location/provisioner/procure-hardware.md | 2 ++ .../src/hardware-procurement-and-chain-of-custody.md | 4 ++++ 5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/quorum-key-management/src/fixed-location-reusable-hardware-procurement.md b/quorum-key-management/src/fixed-location-reusable-hardware-procurement.md index 59176ff..25c9e34 100644 --- a/quorum-key-management/src/fixed-location-reusable-hardware-procurement.md +++ b/quorum-key-management/src/fixed-location-reusable-hardware-procurement.md @@ -26,10 +26,14 @@ * Seal the screws on the bottom of the laptop using glitter of chosen color + * TODO: Add detail around using glitter with larger pieces and layering several types, per this discussion: https://git.distrust.co/public/docs/pulls/10#issuecomment-996 + * Take photographs of the inside of the laptop, then of the outside after it's sealed * The photographs will be signed by Purism and encrypted to the PGP key used for communications to protect the integrity of the images + * TODO: Add information about verifying the authenticity of the Purism signing key, per this discussion: https://git.distrust.co/public/docs/pulls/10#issuecomment-961 + * The firmware verification hardware token can be sent to a separate location from the laptop, and will be tamper sealed using tamper proofing tape * TODO: find out if we can have vacuum sealing with filler as a tamper proofing method be provided by Purism diff --git a/quorum-key-management/src/fixed-location-reusable-laptop-ceremony.md b/quorum-key-management/src/fixed-location-reusable-laptop-ceremony.md index a9612ec..f1f3658 100644 --- a/quorum-key-management/src/fixed-location-reusable-laptop-ceremony.md +++ b/quorum-key-management/src/fixed-location-reusable-laptop-ceremony.md @@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ The primary tamper proofing methods for the fixed location device are: * Approximate time of entry + * TODO: Document how this access log is implemented. + 4. Enter the SCIF, ensuring to lock the door behind you from the inside. The room should not be accessible from the outside during a ceremony. * Ensure that no individual is bringing in any electronic devices. A hand-held or gate metal detector can be used for this. diff --git a/quorum-key-management/src/generated-documents/level-2/fixed-location/operator/coins/pyth-spl/sign-transaction.md b/quorum-key-management/src/generated-documents/level-2/fixed-location/operator/coins/pyth-spl/sign-transaction.md index e684ab0..ee47fb8 100644 --- a/quorum-key-management/src/generated-documents/level-2/fixed-location/operator/coins/pyth-spl/sign-transaction.md +++ b/quorum-key-management/src/generated-documents/level-2/fixed-location/operator/coins/pyth-spl/sign-transaction.md @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ ## Requirements +* TODO: Move this into the "provisioner" document, per this discussion: https://git.distrust.co/public/docs/pulls/10#issuecomment-1002 + * 2 primary operators will be operating the offline machine and online machine * Ensure both primary operators have their [Operator Keys](../../../../../../glossary.md#operator-key) @@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ 0. Plug in SD card labelled "Trusted Keys" - * Load well known PGP keys of proposer and approver, and sign them using operator keys (NOT IMPLEMENTED) + * Load well known PGP keys of proposer and approver, and sign them using operator keys (TODO: NOT IMPLEMENTED) * `gpg --import ` @@ -107,13 +109,13 @@ 1. Plug in SD card with transaction payload -2. Wait for the screen to display the transaction information. (NOT IMPLEMENTED) +2. Wait for the screen to display the transaction information. (TODO: NOT IMPLEMENTED) * In the background: * The transaction is constructed - * Signatures of tx data are verified against well known keys which were loaded by operators into local GPG keychain and signed by operators (NOT IMPLEMENTED) + * Signatures of tx data are verified against well known keys which were loaded by operators into local GPG keychain and signed by operators (TODO: NOT IMPLEMENTED) 3. If any issues are detected with data you will be prompted and should initiate [incident response (todo)](todo) @@ -135,6 +137,8 @@ * Shut down the air gapped machine +* TODO: Add information about material disposal, per this discussion: https://git.distrust.co/public/docs/pulls/10#issuecomment-1004 + #### Sealing {{ #include ../../../../../../tamper-evidence-methods.md:vsbwf-procedure-sealing}} diff --git a/quorum-key-management/src/generated-documents/level-2/fixed-location/provisioner/procure-hardware.md b/quorum-key-management/src/generated-documents/level-2/fixed-location/provisioner/procure-hardware.md index 664eb64..97d876b 100644 --- a/quorum-key-management/src/generated-documents/level-2/fixed-location/provisioner/procure-hardware.md +++ b/quorum-key-management/src/generated-documents/level-2/fixed-location/provisioner/procure-hardware.md @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ This guide contains specific equipment models: [guide](../../../../tamper-eviden * SD cards + * TODO: Add clarification around formatting and labeling SD cards, per this discussion: https://git.distrust.co/public/docs/pulls/10#issuecomment-1004 + * [Kingston Industrial 8GB SD Memory Card](https://www.kingston.com/en/memory-cards/industrial-grade-sd-uhs-i-u3?capacity=8gb) * [Kingston Indsutrial 8GB microSD Memory Card](https://shop.kingston.com/products/industrial-microsd-card-memory-card?variant=40558543405248) diff --git a/quorum-key-management/src/hardware-procurement-and-chain-of-custody.md b/quorum-key-management/src/hardware-procurement-and-chain-of-custody.md index ad534a9..db34f13 100644 --- a/quorum-key-management/src/hardware-procurement-and-chain-of-custody.md +++ b/quorum-key-management/src/hardware-procurement-and-chain-of-custody.md @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ The following steps must all be completed under the continued supervision and wi 3. Purchase the device and place it in a see-through plastic bag which will be used to transport it to a "processing location", which is ideally just a access controlled space. The bag MUST be a sealable see-through tamper evident bag. + * TODO: Add sources for suitable tamper evidence bags, per this discussion: https://git.distrust.co/public/docs/pulls/10#issuecomment-897 + 4. At the processing location, one of the individuals is responsible for observing while the other opens the back of the laptop and removes: * Radio cards (wifi, bluetooth) @@ -32,6 +34,8 @@ The following steps must all be completed under the continued supervision and wi Each laptop model is laid out slightly differently so use an online reference and/or read the names of the components which are found in the laptop to determine which parts to remove. + * TODO: Add example online reference, per this discussion: https://git.distrust.co/public/docs/pulls/10#issuecomment-898 + 5. Apply a [tamper proofing](./tamper-evidence-methods.md) method to the device depending on the [device designation](TODO) ## Tested Hardware (AirgapOS Compatibility)