docs: add some context and clean things up
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@ -1,62 +1,45 @@
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# Ceremony Log Template
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## Ceremony Log Template
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This template is to be used during the ceremony in order to keep track of events
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that take place during the Key Derivation Ceremony.
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Capture as much information as possible - more data is always better than less,
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this means being specific about the exact location, full names of participants,
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exact models of equipment used etc.
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## Date
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```
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2024-08-03
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```
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## Individuals Present
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Individuals may be Operators or Witnesses. Include the individual's full legal
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name
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```
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Max Rockatansky - Witness
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Paul Atreides - Operator
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```
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## Location
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Specify exact location, including details such as the floor, room etc.
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```
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12 Grimmauld Place, Islington, London
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2nd floor, first room on the left when coming up the stairs
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```
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## Equipment
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### Type of Laptop Used
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```
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Purism Librem 14
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```
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### Type of SD Card Used
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```
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SD Card: Kingston SDCIT2/8GBSP
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```
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## Software
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Specify the exact version / commit
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```
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AirgapOS: https://git.distrust.co/public/airgap/commit/df223e6deb2833a8160c836f435ee01f7b776e87
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```
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## Chronological Timeline
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Ensure to capture as much details as possible, even if it seems trivial.
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* 2024-01-01:0900: The team assembles at the airport and selects the location
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from a pre-made list of potential locations
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* 2024-01-01:1030: The team arrives at location and inspects the premises for
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cameras and ensures that the location criteria are adhered to
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* 2024-01-01:1440: The hardware is set up and the software and firmware are
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verified
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```yml
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usage: Location Key
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officiant: Anton Livaja
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location: Private Home (Address Redacted)
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witnesses: N/A
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hardware: Dell XPS 13 9630
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firmware: BIOS 2.13.0
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laptop_modifications:
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- Removed WLAN Card
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- Removed speakers
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- Removed microphone
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- Removed all drives
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boot_media: Kingston Type 2 SD Card 1GB
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backup_media: TeamGroup High Endurance Micro SDXC 128GB
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smart_cards: Yubikey 5 NFC
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software:
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- name: Airgap OS
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repo: https://git.distrust.co/public/airgap
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ref: main
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hash: 485fc58bfb1b4dc75a81138d93948385cc5bf600
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playbooks:
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- name: some/path/to/location_key_generation.md
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repo: https://git.distrust.co/public/docs
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ref: some-git-ref-here
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notes: used once for each Location Key
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- name: some/path/to/hybrid_quroum_key_generation.md
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repo: https://git.distrust.co/public/docs
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ref: some-git-ref-here
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notes: used once to generate Root Entropy and Disaster Recovery Key
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outputs:
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- cert: ./cert
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- shardfile: ./shardfile
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Location (Test) Public Key Fingerprints:
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- 0609D5C2634DB5D75226AD9A7A8A6F24873977E4
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- 5F827701822425E8BB0D2EAB43EC881D8C80DE41
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- 6E18E082945BC43411C3B490E43B49017440605D
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Cold Quorum Key (Test) Fingerprint:
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- 8BA0304345D05775C303E292D9BDBC00D3E85E87
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log:
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- 2024-08-05:1723: Selected a room in residence which has no electronics in it
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and closed window and window blinds.
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general_notes: N/A
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```
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@ -1,44 +1,59 @@
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# Glossary
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## Ciphertext
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In cryptography, ciphertext is the result of encryption performed on plaintext
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using an algorithm, called a cipher.
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## Entropy
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Entropy in cryptography refers to the measure of randomness or unpredictability
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in data used for generating cryptographic keys and other security elements.
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## Quorum Key Management (QKM)
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A set of highly specified processes and tooling used for setting up a highly
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resilient quorum-based key management system.
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## Operator
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An individual who manages an [Operator Key](#operator-key) which is used for
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protecting the passphrase of a Location key and participates in different
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aspects of the lifecycle management of the QKM system.
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## Operator Key
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An asymmetric key used for protecting the passphrase of a Location key
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## Quorum
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The chosen M of N threshold used to achieve "quorum", which is a type of
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agreement or consensus between a group of individuals. In the context of
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Shamir's Secret Sharing, it refers to the minimum number of shards required to
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reassemble the [Root Entropy](#root-entripy-re).
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#### Wrench Factor
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### Wrench Factor
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How many people are required to be put under duress (via smacking them with a
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wrench repeatedly or otherwise to get access to their Shard) before the Disaster
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Recover Key is compromised.
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#### Bus Factor
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### Bus Factor
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How many members of the Quorum can meet an untimely demise without irretrievably
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locking access to the Distrust Quroum system.
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## Root Entropy (RE)
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The main entropy/randomness which is used for hierarchical deterministic key
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derivation of a variety of cryptographic algorithms.
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The main [entropy](#entropy)/randomness which is used for hierarchical
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deterministic key derivation of a variety of cryptographic algorithms.
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## Shard
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Crytpographic shard created using Shamir's Secret Sharing algorithm.
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Cryptographic shard created using Shamir's Secret Sharing algorithm.
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## Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS)
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An algorithm used to split cryptographic material into shards which can be
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used to reassemble a secret. The shards can be combined according to a threshold
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which is set at the time of initial sharding, expressed as M of N, or in other
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@ -46,19 +61,24 @@ words M shards of the total N shards in existence are required to reveal the
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secret.
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## Workstation
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Highly secure computer which is used for sensitive operations, typically in the
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context of [Production Engineering](TODO).
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#### Minimum
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In order to set up a Workstation, as part of a [Production Engineering](TODO) setup,
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a separate computer only used for carrying out sensitive operations should be used.
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In order to set up a Workstation, as part of a [Production Engineering](TODO)
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setup, a separate computer only used for carrying out sensitive operations
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should be used.
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#### Recommended
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Setting up a computer with QubesOS is recommended as it makes it easy to create
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purpose built environments with minimal surface area for attacks, on the OS, and
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networking level.
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## Air-Gapped
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Hardware which has no access to radio frequency or cable based networking
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capabilities in order to reduce area for surface attacks. Typically Air-Gapped
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computers are laptops which are never connected to the internet or any other
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@ -66,6 +86,7 @@ networks, and have had their radio frequency hardware permanently disabled or
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ideally removed.
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## Key Derivation Ceremony
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Highly specified process which is used to secure derivation of cryptographic
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material, with a focus on ensuring no single party has access to the Disaster
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Recovery Key. The ceremony includes witnesses who can help attest to the fact
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@ -74,6 +95,7 @@ software and location that should be used. Each step of the ceremony is
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carefully planned, and executed accordingly.
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## Location Key
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Is a asymmetric key pair which is used for encrypting shards which are used to
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re-assemble the Root Entropy. Location Keys are stored in [Locations](locations.md)
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which adhere to a strict set of criteria to maximize their security. The location
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@ -81,10 +103,13 @@ smart card passphrase is encrypted to a Operator Key in order to secure access
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to it.
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## M of N
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M is the minimum number of shards required to reassemble the secret, and N is the
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total number of shards that exist. The minimum recommended threshold is 2-of-3.
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M is the minimum number of shards required to reassemble the secret, and N is
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the total number of shards that exist. The minimum recommended threshold is
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2-of-3.
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## Organization
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An organization which owns the QKM and is responsible for funding the setup and
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maintenance. The organization is also responsible for ensuring that the
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[Warehouse](#warehouse) is properly maintained in order to ensure that the
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@ -92,11 +117,13 @@ ciphertext blobs associated with the system are redundantly stored and
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protected.
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## Witness
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An individual who attests the ceremony was performed according to specification
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in order to have additional assurances the cryptographic material, most
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importantly the Root Entropy was never exposed.
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## Warehouse
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* Online storage for encrypted data replicated across multiple providers
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* All data in DR Warehouse can only be decrypted by the DR Key
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* Tolerate loss of any single provider by duplicating data to all of them
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@ -13,7 +13,10 @@ microscopy to read data from storage drives which have not been completely
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destroyed.
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Drilling through the storage drive, a common hardware destruction method, is not
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considered to be secure.
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considered to be secure. In fact it's best to remove drive from the device and
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only use in memory storage.
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Ensuring that all chips are completely physically destroyed is essential.
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In the best case scenario, the hardware should be melted in a foundry, as this
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makes it impossible to retrieve any data by any means.
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@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Smart Cards are primarily used for storing OpenPGP cryptographic keys which are
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used as a building block for security controls. These smart cards hold OpenPGP
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keys which are derived in secure environments.
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There are two primary requirements for smart cards:
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There are three primary requirements for smart cards:
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* FIPS 140-2
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@ -58,8 +58,7 @@ There are two primary requirements for smart cards:
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Some options include:
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* NitroKey 3 - because of its open source approach which helps improve the
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overall security of the products
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* NitroKey 3 - because of its open source approach which allows for verification
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* YubiKey 5 - because of the widespread use and battle-tested reliability
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@ -67,10 +66,11 @@ overall security of the products
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security and verifiable software
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## Air-Gapped Computer
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[Air-Gapped](glossary.md#Air-Gapped) computers are used for the lifecycle management
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of cryptographic material that is part of QKM.
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The primary hardware recommendation for a Air-Gapped Computer is the [Librem 14](https://puri.sm/products/librem-14/), manufactured by [Purism](puri.sm). Purism specializes in reducing hardware and
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[Air-Gapped](glossary.md#Air-Gapped) computers are used for the lifecycle
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management of cryptographic material that is part of QKM.
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The primary hardware recommendation for an Air-Gapped Computer is the [Librem 14](https://puri.sm/products/librem-14/), manufactured by [Purism](puri.sm). Purism specializes in reducing hardware and
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firmware security risks, especially via their [Anti-Interdiction Service](https://puri.sm/posts/anti-interdiction-services/) and [PureBoot](https://docs.puri.sm/PureBoot.html)
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and as such is an excellent choice for hardware which high integrity assurance is
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required for.
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@ -78,14 +78,15 @@ required for.
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#### Alternative
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An alternative approach is to use an off-the-shelf computer that is randomly
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selected right before the ceremony, removing the radio cards from it, using it
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selected right before the ceremony, removing the storage drive(s), radio cards,
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microphone(s) and speakers from it to reduce side channel attack risks, using it
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to conduct a Ceremony, and then destroying the laptop using sufficiently
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adequate method to ensure that no data forensics can be used to recover the data
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from the drive, or memory. This can be achieved by using a combination of
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incineration, degaussing, shredding and drilling. Special care should be taken
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to completely destroy all components of the computer that are able to store data,
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even if it's only in ephemeral form as some forensic methods all extraction of
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data from components with "temporary memory".
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incineration, degaussing, shredding, smashing and drilling. Special care should
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be taken to completely destroy all components of the computer that are able to
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store data, even if it's only in ephemeral form as some forensic methods all
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extraction of data from components with "temporary memory".
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Three letter agencies are known to collect and exploit physical destroyed drives,
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as data can still be extracted from them using methods such as electron
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@ -94,5 +95,7 @@ be used, and the remaining debris should be spread out across multiple disposal
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locations.
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## Storage Device
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Can be an SD Card or USB Drive but should be procured from a vendor with
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a good reputation, and ideally hardware of industrial grade should be prioritized.
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Can be an SD Card (preferred due to smaller attack surface) or USB Drive but
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should be procured from a vendor with a good reputation, and ideally hardware of
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industrial grade should be prioritized for durability.
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@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
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This guide walks the user through setting up a machine which relies on
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[PureBoot](https://source.puri.sm/firmware/pureboot) to verify the authenticity
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of the .iso image which is being booted, as well to ensure that firmware of the
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machine has not been tampered with between uses.
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of the `.iso` image which is being booted, as well to ensure that firmware of
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the machine has not been tampered between uses.
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This guide assumes the use of a Purism machine, with a Librem Key.
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@ -2,22 +2,24 @@
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|
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Quorum Key Management (QKM) is an open source system of playbooks and
|
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tooling which facilitates the creation and maintenance of highly resilient
|
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Quorum-based Key Management Systems based on a strict [threat model](threat-model.md)
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which can be used for a variety of different cryptographic algorithms. The
|
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system was designed and developed by [Distrust](https://distrust.co), with the
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generous support of the following sponsors: TODO.
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[quorum](glossary.md#quorum)-based key management systems based on a strict
|
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[threat model](threat-model.md) which can be used for a variety of different
|
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cryptographic algorithms. The system was designed and developed by
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[Distrust](https://distrust.co), with the generous support of the following
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sponsors: TODO.
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The basic premise of QKM is that primary cryptographic material akin to a root
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certificate, called Root Entropy, is derived during a secure key derivation
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ceremony, and then used to derive chosen cryptographic material via different
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algorithms such as PGP keys, digital asset wallets, web certificates and more.
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The system was designed with extensibility in mind.
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certificate, called [Root Entropy (RE)](glossary.md#root-entropy-re), is generated
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during a secure key derivation ceremony, and then used to derive chosen
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cryptographic material via different algorithms such as PGP keys, digital asset
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wallets, web certificates and more. The system was designed with extensibility
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in mind.
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|
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The Root Entropy is sharded using [Shamir's Secret Sharing](glossary.md#shamirs-secret-sharing-sss) to a [Quorum](glossary.md#quorum) in order to
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protect it from single points of failure, requiring cooperation of multiple
|
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individuals - a quorum, and use of cryptographic material stored in separate
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physical locations with significant access controls in order to reconstruct the
|
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secret material, namely the Root Entropy.
|
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The RE is sharded using [Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS)](glossary.md#shamirs-secret-sharing-sss)
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to a [Quorum](glossary.md#quorum) in order to protect it from single points of
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failure, requiring cooperation of multiple individuals - a quorum, and use of
|
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cryptographic material stored in separate physical locations with significant
|
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access controls in order to reconstruct the secret material, namely the RE.
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## Use Cases
|
||||
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@ -42,28 +44,23 @@ a cold signing setup.
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|
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QKM can be set up by using a set of highly opinionated playbooks which outline
|
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the process. The documentation should be read in its entirety by all
|
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participants in the ceremony in order to ensure that the system is well
|
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understood by all in order to ensure that the integrity of the process is
|
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preserved and enforced by all participants.
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participants of the ceremony in order to ensure that the system is well
|
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understood by all to ensure that the integrity of the process is preserved and
|
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enforced.
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## Directives
|
||||
|
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The documentation provides directives in order to specify the importance of
|
||||
adhering to parts of the specification as follows to achieve high levels of
|
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security:
|
||||
The documentation uses directives in order to specify the importance of
|
||||
adhering to parts of the specification according to [RFC2119](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119) and [RFC8174](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174).
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* **MUST** - not adhering to this will result in significant deterioration of
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security properties of the system
|
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* **SHOULD** - is recommended and may impact the security of the system
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depending on the context
|
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* **MAY** - is typically a design decision with no significant impact to the
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overall security of the system
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
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"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
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document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when,
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and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
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## Method
|
||||
|
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The reader is encouraged to read through the entire body of documents which
|
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should not take more than 30 minutes. If any parts are unclear, they may contact
|
||||
Distrust for clarification, which is welcomed as it will aid improving the
|
||||
should take approximately 30 minutes. If any parts are unclear, they may contact
|
||||
Distrust for clarification, which is welcomed as it will aid in improving the
|
||||
documentation.
|
||||
|
|
@ -14,16 +14,18 @@ command with a desired threshold:
|
|||
```
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#!/bin/sh
|
||||
|
||||
script_dir="$(dirname "$(realpath "$0")")"
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||||
read -p "Generate hardware interrupt entropy by typing randomly on keyboard" entropy
|
||||
|
||||
read -p "Provide the absoute path to PGP certificates which will be used for the ceremony: " directory_path
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||||
mount
|
||||
|
||||
if [ ! -d "$directory_path" ]; then
|
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echo "Directory does not exist. Please enter a valid directory path."
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
read -p "Provide the path to PGP certificates which will be used for the ceremony: " absolute_path
|
||||
|
||||
if [ ! -d "$absolute_path" ]; then
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echo "Directory does not exist. Please enter a valid absolute path."
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exit 1
|
||||
fi
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||||
|
||||
for file in "$directory_path"/*; do
|
||||
for file in "$absolute_path"/keys/*; do
|
||||
if [ -f "$file" ]; then
|
||||
echo "Processing file: $file"
|
||||
gpg --import --import-options import-show $file
|
||||
|
|
@ -32,12 +34,12 @@ command with a desired threshold:
|
|||
|
||||
read -p "Do the PGP key IDs match what you expect? (y/n): " matches_expectation
|
||||
|
||||
if [ $matches_expectation != "y" ]; then
|
||||
if [ "$matches_expectation" != "y" ]; then
|
||||
echo "Ceasing ceremony as PGP key IDs don't match"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
keyfork wizard bottoms-up --threshold 2 --output-cert /media/cert --output-shardfile /media/shardfile --user-id "Distrust Key Ceremony" public-certificates/
|
||||
keyfork wizard bottoms-up --threshold 2 --output-cert "$absolute_path"/cert --output-shardfile "$absolute_path"/shardfile --user-id "QKM Ceremony" "$absolute_path"/keys
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* The `airgap.iso` which is to be used during the ceremony
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ instead the AirgapOS `.iso` image is flashed to an SD card, locked using
|
|||
|
||||
* `cd airgap && make`
|
||||
|
||||
* Verify `sha256sum` of airgap matches hashes in `/dist`
|
||||
|
||||
* Verify signatures on the hashes in `/dist`. The maintainer pgp keys can be found on the [Distrust contact page](https://distrust.co/contact.html) page.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
* Flash `airgap.iso` to an SD Card:
|
||||
|
||||
* `dd if=out/airgap.iso of=/dev/<your_device> bs=4M status=progress oflag=direct`
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
|
|||
selected store is used in order to reduce the possibility of a malicious actor
|
||||
having time to plant compromised hardware at the store, and/or make arrangements
|
||||
by coercing store staff to sell compromised hardware to the quroum team. Of
|
||||
course, there still may be hardware that's compromised being sold, but not
|
||||
specifically targeting the specific quorum group.
|
||||
course, there still may be hardware that's compromised being sold, but is less
|
||||
likely to specifically target the quorum group.
|
||||
|
||||
* Ensure at least 2 people are in line of sight of access to all of the
|
||||
equipment, for example a bag carried in hand, until the ceremony is executed.
|
||||
|
|
@ -13,20 +13,20 @@ This is done in order to eliminate the possibility of the equipment being
|
|||
swapped for compromised hardware.
|
||||
|
||||
* The laptop should ideally support booting from an SD card and have a built in
|
||||
micro or standard SD card reader built in; if this is not possible, you will
|
||||
also need to purchase a USB SD card reader.
|
||||
micro or standard SD card reader; if this is not possible, USB SD card reader
|
||||
should be purchased.
|
||||
|
||||
* Dell laptops tend to have support for booting from SD cards so they are a
|
||||
good option.
|
||||
|
||||
* The store and laptop model should be selected on the spot via consensu of at
|
||||
* The store and laptop model should be selected on the spot via consensus of at
|
||||
least 2 members of the Quorum. This is done for several reasons:
|
||||
|
||||
* To ensure that no time is given to a malicious actor to deploy
|
||||
compromised hardware to the store
|
||||
|
||||
* To reduce likelihood that arrangements can be made by a malicious actor
|
||||
for the store to sell compromised hardware to the Quroum team
|
||||
for the store to sell compromised hardware to the Quorum team
|
||||
|
||||
* Note that a secondary computer, or secondary SD card with bootable OS will be
|
||||
required in order to be able to verify the flashed AirgapOS SD card right before
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
|
|||
# Selecting Locations
|
||||
|
||||
Secure a location that is randomly selected that has a private space with EM
|
||||
shielding, or no electronics in at least a 10 m radius. A moving vehicle (eg.
|
||||
car, bus, train, ferris wheel) is also a viable alternative. Additionally, the
|
||||
ceremony may be conducted in an open outdoor space, such as a forest, or a
|
||||
desert, at a location that is not near any human made buildings. The point of
|
||||
narrowing the location selection to these spaces is that it makes it hard for a
|
||||
malicious actor to prepare for the ceremony and deploy equipment for
|
||||
side-channel attacks - with the intent of stealing the cryptographic material
|
||||
which is produced or managed during key ceremonies.
|
||||
Secure a randomly selected location that has a private space with EM shielding,
|
||||
or no electronics in at least a 10 m radius. A moving vehicle (eg. car, bus,
|
||||
train, ferris wheel) is also a viable alternative. Additionally, the ceremony
|
||||
may be conducted in an open outdoor space, such as a forest, or a desert, at a
|
||||
location that is an open space not near any objects and ideally on a hard surface
|
||||
such as rock to prevent hidden devices in the ground. The point of narrowing the
|
||||
location selection to these spaces is that it makes it hard for a malicious
|
||||
actor to prepare for the ceremony and deploy equipment for side-channel attacks
|
||||
- with the intent of stealing the cryptographic material which is produced or
|
||||
managed during key ceremonies.
|
||||
|
||||
The location should be selected immediately before the ceremony in order to
|
||||
eliminate the possibility of a malicious actor having time to infiltrate and
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
|||
# Q & A
|
||||
|
||||
## Is there a risk associated with deriving for different cryptographic algorithms from the same source of entropy?
|
||||
|
||||
This is avoided by using hardened hierarchical deterministic derivation which
|
||||
is designed to ensure that each node in the derivation tree is isolated.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -3,12 +3,12 @@
|
|||
There are 3 primary types of [Root Entropy](glossary.md#root-entropy-re)
|
||||
derivation ceremonies:
|
||||
|
||||
* "Local": where all cryptographic material, including the Operator Keys,
|
||||
* **Local**: where all cryptographic material, including the Operator Keys,
|
||||
Location Keys, and the Root Entropy are all generated during a single in-person
|
||||
ceremony
|
||||
|
||||
* "Hybrid": where the Operator Keys and Location Keys are generated separately
|
||||
* **Hybrid**: where the Operator Keys and Location Keys are generated separately
|
||||
prior to the in-person ceremony where the Root Entropy is generated
|
||||
|
||||
* "Remote": where all cryptographic material is generated in a decentralized
|
||||
* **Remote**: where all cryptographic material is generated in a decentralized
|
||||
manner, remotely.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Secure Boot Sequence
|
||||
|
||||
Steps 1-12 can be skipped if the media drive with `airgap` has been verified in
|
||||
advance.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Plug in the [PureBoot Smart Card](initialize-pureboot-smart-card.md)
|
||||
|
||||
2. Plug in [AirgapOS Storage Device](repeat-use-airgapos.md)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
|
|||
# Selecting a Quorum
|
||||
|
||||
The backbone of the Distrust Quroum system is a Quorum which is used to
|
||||
reconstitute or re-assemble cryptographic material, and approve actions.
|
||||
Quorum is a general term referring to a system which requires the collaboration
|
||||
of multiple individuals in order to achieve something, and it is based on a
|
||||
Threshold which determines how many Members of a Quorum there are in total, and
|
||||
the Quorum, which is how Members are required to reach consensus.
|
||||
The backbone of QKM is a Quorum which is used to reconstitute or re-assemble
|
||||
cryptographic material, and approve actions. Quorum is a general term referring
|
||||
to a system which requires the collaboration of multiple individuals in order to
|
||||
achieve something, and it is based on a Threshold which determines how many
|
||||
Members of a Quorum there are in total, and the Quorum, which is how Members are
|
||||
required to reach consensus.
|
||||
|
||||
The following is a simple Quorum example. Let's assume there are 3 trusted
|
||||
individuals who will be part of Quorum and at least 2 of the Members of the
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
# Setting Smart Card Pins
|
||||
|
||||
In order to protect unauthorized use of smart cards, we can leverage PINs.
|
||||
In order to protect unauthorized use of smart cards, PINs are leveraged.
|
||||
|
||||
There are two pins with different levels of authorization for making changes
|
||||
to the smart card:
|
||||
|
|
@ -15,9 +15,15 @@ characters long.
|
|||
For Operator Keys it is recommended to use the default PINs, while for Location
|
||||
Keys, PINs are generated by the `keyfork` utility and have high entropy.
|
||||
|
||||
**WARNING** Different smart cards have different failure thresholds, but typically after
|
||||
entering the PIN incorrectly 3-10 times, the smart card is permanently locked
|
||||
and can no longer be used.
|
||||
|
||||
## Guide
|
||||
|
||||
To set the smart card pins you may use the `gpg` utility.
|
||||
To set the smart card pins you may use the `gpg` utility. This guide should be
|
||||
completed in a trusted environment, such as on a airgapped machine running
|
||||
AirgapOS.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Plug the smart card into a computer which has the `gpg` utility intalled
|
||||
2. Use the command `gpg --edit-card` to enter edit mode
|
||||
|
|
@ -34,5 +40,3 @@ To set the smart card pins you may use the `gpg` utility.
|
|||
|
||||
8. For the Admin PIN, the steps are the same, except in step 4, input "3", then
|
||||
press Enter.
|
||||
|
||||
9. Once done, shut down the computer
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
|
|||
# Software
|
||||
This page outlines the software used for setting up a QKM. All software used in
|
||||
the setup is open source and audited by security firms in order to ensure their
|
||||
security. Furthermore, all software is built in a deterministic manner and
|
||||
reproduced by multiple individuals on diverse hardware to minimize the risks
|
||||
associated with supply chain attacks.
|
||||
This page outlines the software used for setting up QKM.
|
||||
|
||||
## [[Stageˣ]](https://codeberg.org/stagex/stagex)
|
||||
|
||||
All software is built in a deterministic manner and reproduced by multiple
|
||||
individuals on diverse hardware to minimize the risks associated with supply
|
||||
chain attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
To achieve this, [Stageˣ] is used - a toolchain for building software using a
|
||||
fully bootstrapped compiler, which itself is built deterministically, and
|
||||
multi-reproduced.
|
||||
|
||||
[Stageˣ] was designed and developed by Distrust, with generous sponsorship from
|
||||
Keyternal and Mysten Labs.
|
||||
|
||||
To achieve this, [StageX](https://codeberg.org/stagex/stagex)
|
||||
is used - a toolchain for building software using a fully bootstrapped compiler,
|
||||
which itself is built deterministically, and multi-reproduced.
|
||||
## [AirgapOS](https://git.distrust.co/public/airgap)
|
||||
|
||||
AirgapOS is an operating system built for those that want to be -really- sure
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ The assumption is made that attackers who target QKM are extremely
|
|||
sophisticated, well funded and patient attackers, and as such, the full arsenal
|
||||
of attacks is on the table. This means that the attacker can purchase and
|
||||
weaponize multiple 0day vulnerabilities, execute physical attacks or deploy
|
||||
moles, target different supply chains of hardware, firmware and software used,
|
||||
moles, target different supply chains of software, firmware and hardware used,
|
||||
and generally attack the system using an array of known and unknown attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
One of the guiding principles in the design is the elimination of Single Points
|
||||
|
|
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ backbone of the system.
|
|||
To achieve this, the QKM focuses on reducing the risk by:
|
||||
|
||||
* Only using fully open source software and firmware to allow full verification
|
||||
of their security
|
||||
of their security properties
|
||||
|
||||
* Creating custom purpose specific tooling which eliminates dependencies in
|
||||
order to reduce supply chain attacks, and adds desirable security properties
|
||||
|
|
@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ which had radio networking cards (bluetooth, wifi etc.) removed
|
|||
|
||||
* Leveraging sharding in order to physically separate cryptographic material
|
||||
|
||||
* Leveraging tamper evident controls to protect hardware
|
||||
* Leveraging tamper evident controls for components related to the system
|
||||
|
||||
## General Threat Model Assumptions
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Some additional assumptions are made to help contextualize the threat model:
|
|||
|
||||
* Any guest OS used for any purpose other than prod access is compromised
|
||||
|
||||
* At least one member of the PRODUCTION team is always compromised
|
||||
* At least one member of the Production Team is always compromised
|
||||
|
||||
* At least one maintainer of third party used in the system is compromised
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue