cleaning up todo notes

quorum-key-management/src/fixed-location-reusable-laptop-ceremony.md

@@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ The primary tamper proofing methods for the fixed location device are:
 
     * Both photos of vacuum sealed bag with filler and glitter on the bottom screws of laptop are required
 
-- [ ] TODO how is hardware token stored (for pureboot/heads)
-
 3. Make an entry into the access log, specifying the:
 
     * Individuals involved

quorum-key-management/src/generated-documents/level-2/fixed-location/operator/coins/pyth-spl/sign-transaction.md

@@ -6,28 +6,17 @@
 
 * Both operators should print photographic evidence from digital cameras which is stored in a PGP signed repository. The photographs should be of the top and underside of the vacuum sealed object.
 
-    * The operators should verify the commit signatures of the photographs they are printing against a list of permitted PGP keys
+    * The operators should verify the commit signatures of the photographs they are printing against a list of permitted PGP keys (found in ceremonies repo)
-
-        - [ ] TODO: where do we refer to permitted PGP keys
-
-* Each operator should hash the `keychain` repository
-    - [ ] TODO define keychain repository setup
-
-    * `sha256sum keychain/`
-
-    * Write it down on a piece of paper as it will be used during the ceremony
 
 ## Procedure
 
-1. Verify all transactions for the ceremony in the `ceremonies` repository, ensuring that all the transactions are properly signed by the proposer and the approver.
+1. Verify all transactions for the ceremony in the `ceremonies` repository, ensuring that all the transactions are properly signed by the proposer and the approver using PGP keys which have been checked into ceremonies repository.
-
-    - [ ] TODO guide on how to do this
 
 1. Enter the designated location with the 2 operators and all required equipment
 
 1. Lock access to the location - there should be no inflow or outflow of people during the ceremony
 
-1. Retrieve sealed laptop and polaroid from locked storage
+1. Retrieve sealed Air-Gapped bundle and polaroid from locked storage
 
 ### Unsealing Tamper Proofing
 {{ #include ../../../../../../component-documents/tamper-evidence-methods.md:vsbwf-procedure-unsealing}}

quorum-key-management/src/generated-documents/level-2/fixed-location/operator/root-entropy-generation.md

@@ -8,16 +8,7 @@ This is a ceremony for generating root entropy.
 
 * Both operators should print photographic evidence from digital cameras which is stored in a PGP signed repository. The photographs should be of the top and underside of the vacuum sealed object.
 
-    * The operators should verify the commit signatures of the photographs they are printing against a list of permitted PGP keys
+    * The operators should verify the commit signatures of the photographs they are printing against a list of permitted PGP keys found in "ceremonies" repo
-
-        - [ ] TODO: where do we refer to permitted PGP keys
-
-* Each operator should hash the `keychain` repository
-    - [ ] TODO define keychain repository setup
-
-    * `sha256sum keychain/`
-
-    * Write it down on a piece of paper as it will be used during the ceremony
 
 * Each member needs to bring their:
 

quorum-key-management/src/generated-documents/level-2/fixed-location/proposer/create-transaction-payload.md

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ The proposer must combine these values into a single message, which can be a sim
 
     * `gpg --clearsign <file>`
 
-1. Notify relevant individuals that there are new transactions queued up, and that a ceremony should be scheduled. This can be automated in the future so that when a commit is made or PR opened, others are notified, for example using a incident management tool(TODO).
+1. Notify relevant individuals that there are new transactions queued up, and that a ceremony should be scheduled. This can be automated in the future so that when a commit is made or PR opened, others are notified, for example using a incident management tool.
 
 ## Appendix