many updates

quorum-key-management/src/fixed-location-reusable-hardware-procurement.md

@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@
 
     * Warranty: 1 Year
 
-    * Privacy Screen: Privacy Screen for Librem 14
-
     * USB Flash Drive: No USB Flash Drive
 
 2. Purism will reach out via email and establish secure communications using PGP, so ensure that the individual who is in charge of procurement has a PGP key that's been set up securely. Purism will:

quorum-key-management/src/fixed-location-reusable-laptop-ceremony.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ The primary tamper proofing methods for the fixed location device are:
 
 2. Print photographs of tamper proofing of the laptop which will be used for the ceremony
 
-    * Both photos of vacuum sealed bar with filler and glitter on the bottom screws of laptop are required
+    * Both photos of vacuum sealed bag with filler and glitter on the bottom screws of laptop are required
 
 - [ ] TODO how is hardware token stored (for pureboot/heads)
 

quorum-key-management/src/generated-documents/level-2/fixed-location/operator/coins/pyth-spl/sign-transaction.md

@@ -4,49 +4,21 @@
 
 ## Requirements
 
-* 2 primary operators will be operating the offline machine and online machine
+* Ensure both primary operators have their [Operator Keys](../../../../../../glossary.md#operator-key)
 
-    * Ensure both primary operators have their [Operator Keys](../../../../../../glossary.md#operator-key)
 
-* Photographic tamper proofing evidence
+* Both operators should print photographic evidence from digital cameras which is stored in a PGP signed repository. The photographs should be of the top and underside of the vacuum sealed object.
 
-    * Both operators should print photographic evidence from digital cameras which is stored in a PGP signed repository. The photographs should be of the top and underside of the vacuum sealed object.
+    * The operators should verify the commit signatures of the photographs they are printing against a list of permitted PGP keys
 
-        * The operators should verify the commit signatures of the photographs they are printing against a list of permitted PGP keys
+        * TODO: where do we refer to permitted PGP keys
 
-            * TODO: where do we refer to permitted PGP keys
+* Each operator should hash the `keychain` repository
 
-* Ensure location has [tamper proofing tools](../../../../../../tamper-evidence-methods.md#vacuum-sealed-bags-with-filler)
+    * `sha256sum keychain/`
 
-    * Vacuum sealer
+    * Write it down on a piece of paper as it will be used during the ceremony
 
-    * Vacuum roll
-
-    * Colored beads
-
-* PureBoot smart card (TODO)
-
-* 5 SD cards (2 fresh, formatted as ext4, and 3 cards with prepared data)
-
-    * 1 SD card for transferring transaction data from online to air-gapped machine
-
-    * 1 SD card for storing tamper proofing evidence produced at the end of the ceremony
-
-    * 1 SD card which has the shardfile, labelled "Shardile"
-
-        * This should be write-locked and stored in tamper proofing along with air-gapped machine
-    
-    * 1 SD card with "trusted keys" for proposers and approvers, both signed by each operator using their operator key (TODO)
-
-        * This should be write-locked and stored in tamper proofing along with air-gapped machine
-
-    * 1 SD card with AirgapOS
-        
-        * This should be write-locked and stored in tamper proofing along with air-gapped machine
-
-* Digital camera (TODO selection)
-
-* [Online machine](../../../../../../online-machine-provisioning.md) used for fetching transaction data
 
 ## Procedure
 

quorum-key-management/src/generated-documents/level-2/fixed-location/provisioner/procure-hardware.md

@@ -1,26 +1,36 @@
 # Provisioner - Procure Hardware
 
-The provisioner is responsible for procuring equipment. Their main focus is:
+The provisioner is responsible for:
+
+* Procuring equipment
+
+* Setting up the Location
+
+* Maintaining stock of supplies in the [Location]()
 
 * Minimizing hardware supply chain security risks
 
 * Ensuring availability of necessary equipment
 
+## Directives
+
+* MUST maintain chain of custody for all hardware until after it's properly tamper-proofed
+
+- [ ] do we need to tamper proof usb equipment?
+    * no because we verify hashes of data on the ceremony machines
+
 ## Laptops
 
-### Air-Gapped Machine
 
-1. Procure a [Purism Librem 14](../../../../hardware.md#air-gapped-computer)
 
-2. Provision AirgapOS using [this guide](../../../../one-time-use-airgapos.md)
+* [Purism Librem 14](../../../../hardware.md#air-gapped-computer)
 
-3. Apply [vacuum sealing + filler tamper proofing](../../../../tamper-evidence-methods.md#vacuum-sealed-bags-with-filler) to the laptop and the SD card
+* ChromeBook or a computer capable of running QubesOS according to [this guide](../../../../online-machine-provisioning.md)
 
-4. Store the sealed package in a secure location
+## Provisioning AirgapOS
 
-### Online Machine
+Provision AirgapOS using [this guide](../../../../one-time-use-airgapos.md)
 
-Procure either a ChromeBook or a computer capable of running QubesOS according to [this guide](../../../../online-machine-provisioning.md)
 
 ## Tamper Proofing Equipment
 
@@ -44,6 +54,10 @@ This guide contains specific equipment models: [guide](../../../../tamper-eviden
 
     * [Kingston Indsutrial 8GB microSD Memory Card](https://shop.kingston.com/products/industrial-microsd-card-memory-card?variant=40558543405248)
 
+* microSD to SD adapter
+
+    * TODO find specific products
+
 * SD Card USB Adapter
 
     * SD card reader: https://www.kingston.com/en/memory-card-readers/mobilelite-plus-sd-reader
@@ -52,3 +66,67 @@ This guide contains specific equipment models: [guide](../../../../tamper-eviden
 
     * Workflow station hub (may prove helpful with workflows): https://www.kingston.com/en/memory-card-readers/workflow-station-hub
 
+* PureBoot smart card (TODO)
+
+* [Online machine](../../../../../../online-machine-provisioning.md) used for fetching transaction data
+
+## Preparing SD Cards
+
+### Freshly Formatted Cards
+
+* The location should always be well stocked with freshly formatted SD cards
+
+    * There should be at least 20 microSD and 20 SD cards available for use
+
+        * It is the provisioner's responsibility to keep track of the number of ceremonies and replenish stock as needed
+
+    * Both microSD and regular SD cards should be available
+
+    * They should be formatted to `ext4` format
+     
+    - [ ] consider renaming location ot vault/facility
+
+- [ ] TODO find a way to format many cards at once
+
+* Usage of these SD cards:
+
+    * Transferring transaction data from online to air-gapped machine
+
+    * Storing tamper proofing evidence produced at the end of the ceremony
+
+### Shardfile 
+
+There should be multiple SD cards containing the shardfile data. Shardfile data is produced during a [Root Entropy](todo) derivation ceremony.
+
+* Label: "Shardfile"
+
+* This should be write-locked and stored in tamper proofing along with air-gapped machine
+
+### Trusted Keys
+
+* Label: Trusted Keys
+
+* 1 SD card with "trusted keys" for proposers and approvers, both signed by each operator using their operator key
+
+* This should be write-locked and stored in tamper proofing along with air-gapped machine
+
+### AirgapOS
+
+* Label: "AirgapOS <version>"
+    
+* This should be write-locked and stored in tamper proofing along with air-gapped machine
+
+## Preparing The Location
+
+### Locker / Safe
+
+* establish a means of locking up equipment
+
+### Air-gapped bundle
+
+* tamper proof together: Apply [vacuum sealing + filler tamper proofing](../../../../tamper-evidence-methods.md#vacuum-sealed-bags-with-filler) to the laptop and the AirgapOS SD card
+    * air-gapped machine
+    * airgapos sd card
+
+
+

quorum-key-management/src/hardware-models.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/* ANCHOR: all */
+# Hardware Models
+
+## Computers 
+// ANCHOR: models 
+
+* HP 13" Intel Celeron - 4GB Memory - 64GB eMMC, HP 14-dq0052dx, SKU: 6499749, UPC: 196548430192, DCS: 6.768.5321, ~USD $179.99
+    * [Illustrated Parts Catalog](https://h10032.www1.hp.com/ctg/Manual/c04501162.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A3160%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2Cnull%2C732%2Cnull%5D)
+
+* Lenovo 14" Flex 5i FHD Touchscreen 2-in-1 Laptop - Intel Core i3-1215U - 8GB Memory - Intel UHD Graphics, SKU: 6571565, ~USD $379.99
+
+* Purism Librem 14
+// ANCHOR_END: models
+
+/* ANCHOR_END: all */

quorum-key-management/src/hardware-procurement-and-chain-of-custody.md

@@ -36,9 +36,4 @@ Each laptop model is laid out slightly differently so use an online reference an
 
 ## Tested Hardware (AirgapOS Compatibility)
 
-* HP 13" Intel Celeron - 4GB Memory - 64GB eMMC, HP 14-dq0052dx, SKU: 6499749, UPC: 196548430192, DCS: 6.768.5321, ~USD $179.99
+{{ #include hardware-models.md:models }}
-    * [Illustrated Parts Catalog](https://h10032.www1.hp.com/ctg/Manual/c04501162.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A3160%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2Cnull%2C732%2Cnull%5D)
-
-* Lenovo 14" Flex 5i FHD Touchscreen 2-in-1 Laptop - Intel Core i3-1215U - 8GB Memory - Intel UHD Graphics, SKU: 6571565, ~USD $379.99
-
-To ensure that hardware is compatible, it can be tested by bringing an SD card with AirgapOS loaded on it, and testing booting to a floor model in the store.

quorum-key-management/src/intro.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Introduction
 
-Quorum Vaulting System (QVM) is an open source system of playbooks and
+Quorum Vaulting System (QVS) is an open source system of playbooks and
 tooling which facilitates the creation and maintenance of highly resilient
 [quorum](glossary.md#quorum)-based key management systems based on a strict
 [threat model](threat-model.md) which can be used for a variety of different

quorum-key-management/src/one-time-use-airgapos.md

@@ -30,10 +30,12 @@ instead the AirgapOS `.iso` image is flashed to an SD card, locked using
 
         * `dd if=out/airgap.iso of=/dev/sdb bs=1M conv=sync status=progress`
 
+* Label the SD card "AirgapOS - <version>"
+
 * Verify that the hash of `airgap.iso` matches what's flashed on the SD card:
 
     * `head -c $(stat -c '%s' out/airgap.iso) /dev/sdb | sha256sum`
 
     * `sha256sum out/airgap.iso`
 
-* Commit the hash of airgap to a git repo, ensuring the commit is signed
+* Commit the hash of airgap to a git repo, ensuring the commit is signed