many updates
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parent
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commit
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GPG Key ID:
44A86CFF1FDF0E85
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@ -16,8 +16,6 @@
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* Warranty: 1 Year
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* Privacy Screen: Privacy Screen for Librem 14
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* USB Flash Drive: No USB Flash Drive
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2. Purism will reach out via email and establish secure communications using PGP, so ensure that the individual who is in charge of procurement has a PGP key that's been set up securely. Purism will:
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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ The primary tamper proofing methods for the fixed location device are:
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2. Print photographs of tamper proofing of the laptop which will be used for the ceremony
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* Both photos of vacuum sealed bar with filler and glitter on the bottom screws of laptop are required
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* Both photos of vacuum sealed bag with filler and glitter on the bottom screws of laptop are required
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- [ ] TODO how is hardware token stored (for pureboot/heads)
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@ -4,49 +4,21 @@
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## Requirements
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* 2 primary operators will be operating the offline machine and online machine
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* Ensure both primary operators have their [Operator Keys](../../../../../../glossary.md#operator-key)
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* Ensure both primary operators have their [Operator Keys](../../../../../../glossary.md#operator-key)
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* Photographic tamper proofing evidence
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* Both operators should print photographic evidence from digital cameras which is stored in a PGP signed repository. The photographs should be of the top and underside of the vacuum sealed object.
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* Both operators should print photographic evidence from digital cameras which is stored in a PGP signed repository. The photographs should be of the top and underside of the vacuum sealed object.
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* The operators should verify the commit signatures of the photographs they are printing against a list of permitted PGP keys
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* The operators should verify the commit signatures of the photographs they are printing against a list of permitted PGP keys
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* TODO: where do we refer to permitted PGP keys
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* TODO: where do we refer to permitted PGP keys
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* Each operator should hash the `keychain` repository
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* Ensure location has [tamper proofing tools](../../../../../../tamper-evidence-methods.md#vacuum-sealed-bags-with-filler)
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* `sha256sum keychain/`
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* Vacuum sealer
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* Write it down on a piece of paper as it will be used during the ceremony
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* Vacuum roll
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* Colored beads
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* PureBoot smart card (TODO)
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* 5 SD cards (2 fresh, formatted as ext4, and 3 cards with prepared data)
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* 1 SD card for transferring transaction data from online to air-gapped machine
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* 1 SD card for storing tamper proofing evidence produced at the end of the ceremony
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* 1 SD card which has the shardfile, labelled "Shardile"
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* This should be write-locked and stored in tamper proofing along with air-gapped machine
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* 1 SD card with "trusted keys" for proposers and approvers, both signed by each operator using their operator key (TODO)
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* This should be write-locked and stored in tamper proofing along with air-gapped machine
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* 1 SD card with AirgapOS
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* This should be write-locked and stored in tamper proofing along with air-gapped machine
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* Digital camera (TODO selection)
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* [Online machine](../../../../../../online-machine-provisioning.md) used for fetching transaction data
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## Procedure
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@ -1,26 +1,36 @@
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# Provisioner - Procure Hardware
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The provisioner is responsible for procuring equipment. Their main focus is:
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The provisioner is responsible for:
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* Procuring equipment
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* Setting up the Location
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* Maintaining stock of supplies in the [Location]()
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* Minimizing hardware supply chain security risks
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* Ensuring availability of necessary equipment
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## Directives
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* MUST maintain chain of custody for all hardware until after it's properly tamper-proofed
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- [ ] do we need to tamper proof usb equipment?
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* no because we verify hashes of data on the ceremony machines
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## Laptops
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### Air-Gapped Machine
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1. Procure a [Purism Librem 14](../../../../hardware.md#air-gapped-computer)
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2. Provision AirgapOS using [this guide](../../../../one-time-use-airgapos.md)
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* [Purism Librem 14](../../../../hardware.md#air-gapped-computer)
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3. Apply [vacuum sealing + filler tamper proofing](../../../../tamper-evidence-methods.md#vacuum-sealed-bags-with-filler) to the laptop and the SD card
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* ChromeBook or a computer capable of running QubesOS according to [this guide](../../../../online-machine-provisioning.md)
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4. Store the sealed package in a secure location
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## Provisioning AirgapOS
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### Online Machine
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Provision AirgapOS using [this guide](../../../../one-time-use-airgapos.md)
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Procure either a ChromeBook or a computer capable of running QubesOS according to [this guide](../../../../online-machine-provisioning.md)
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## Tamper Proofing Equipment
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@ -44,6 +54,10 @@ This guide contains specific equipment models: [guide](../../../../tamper-eviden
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* [Kingston Indsutrial 8GB microSD Memory Card](https://shop.kingston.com/products/industrial-microsd-card-memory-card?variant=40558543405248)
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* microSD to SD adapter
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* TODO find specific products
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* SD Card USB Adapter
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* SD card reader: https://www.kingston.com/en/memory-card-readers/mobilelite-plus-sd-reader
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@ -52,3 +66,67 @@ This guide contains specific equipment models: [guide](../../../../tamper-eviden
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* Workflow station hub (may prove helpful with workflows): https://www.kingston.com/en/memory-card-readers/workflow-station-hub
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* PureBoot smart card (TODO)
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* [Online machine](../../../../../../online-machine-provisioning.md) used for fetching transaction data
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## Preparing SD Cards
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### Freshly Formatted Cards
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* The location should always be well stocked with freshly formatted SD cards
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* There should be at least 20 microSD and 20 SD cards available for use
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* It is the provisioner's responsibility to keep track of the number of ceremonies and replenish stock as needed
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* Both microSD and regular SD cards should be available
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* They should be formatted to `ext4` format
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- [ ] consider renaming location ot vault/facility
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- [ ] TODO find a way to format many cards at once
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* Usage of these SD cards:
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* Transferring transaction data from online to air-gapped machine
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* Storing tamper proofing evidence produced at the end of the ceremony
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### Shardfile
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There should be multiple SD cards containing the shardfile data. Shardfile data is produced during a [Root Entropy](todo) derivation ceremony.
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* Label: "Shardfile"
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* This should be write-locked and stored in tamper proofing along with air-gapped machine
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### Trusted Keys
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* Label: Trusted Keys
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* 1 SD card with "trusted keys" for proposers and approvers, both signed by each operator using their operator key
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* This should be write-locked and stored in tamper proofing along with air-gapped machine
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### AirgapOS
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* Label: "AirgapOS <version>"
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* This should be write-locked and stored in tamper proofing along with air-gapped machine
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## Preparing The Location
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### Locker / Safe
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* establish a means of locking up equipment
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### Air-gapped bundle
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* tamper proof together: Apply [vacuum sealing + filler tamper proofing](../../../../tamper-evidence-methods.md#vacuum-sealed-bags-with-filler) to the laptop and the AirgapOS SD card
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* air-gapped machine
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* airgapos sd card
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@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
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/* ANCHOR: all */
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# Hardware Models
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## Computers
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// ANCHOR: models
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* HP 13" Intel Celeron - 4GB Memory - 64GB eMMC, HP 14-dq0052dx, SKU: 6499749, UPC: 196548430192, DCS: 6.768.5321, ~USD $179.99
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* [Illustrated Parts Catalog](https://h10032.www1.hp.com/ctg/Manual/c04501162.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A3160%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2Cnull%2C732%2Cnull%5D)
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* Lenovo 14" Flex 5i FHD Touchscreen 2-in-1 Laptop - Intel Core i3-1215U - 8GB Memory - Intel UHD Graphics, SKU: 6571565, ~USD $379.99
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* Purism Librem 14
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// ANCHOR_END: models
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/* ANCHOR_END: all */
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## Tested Hardware (AirgapOS Compatibility)
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* HP 13" Intel Celeron - 4GB Memory - 64GB eMMC, HP 14-dq0052dx, SKU: 6499749, UPC: 196548430192, DCS: 6.768.5321, ~USD $179.99
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* [Illustrated Parts Catalog](https://h10032.www1.hp.com/ctg/Manual/c04501162.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A3160%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2Cnull%2C732%2Cnull%5D)
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* Lenovo 14" Flex 5i FHD Touchscreen 2-in-1 Laptop - Intel Core i3-1215U - 8GB Memory - Intel UHD Graphics, SKU: 6571565, ~USD $379.99
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To ensure that hardware is compatible, it can be tested by bringing an SD card with AirgapOS loaded on it, and testing booting to a floor model in the store.
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{{ #include hardware-models.md:models }}
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# Introduction
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Quorum Vaulting System (QVM) is an open source system of playbooks and
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Quorum Vaulting System (QVS) is an open source system of playbooks and
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tooling which facilitates the creation and maintenance of highly resilient
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[quorum](glossary.md#quorum)-based key management systems based on a strict
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[threat model](threat-model.md) which can be used for a variety of different
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* `dd if=out/airgap.iso of=/dev/sdb bs=1M conv=sync status=progress`
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* Label the SD card "AirgapOS - <version>"
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* Verify that the hash of `airgap.iso` matches what's flashed on the SD card:
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* `head -c $(stat -c '%s' out/airgap.iso) /dev/sdb | sha256sum`
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* `sha256sum out/airgap.iso`
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* Commit the hash of airgap to a git repo, ensuring the commit is signed
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* Commit the hash of airgap to a git repo, ensuring the commit is signed
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