diff --git a/keyfork-shard/src/openpgp.rs b/keyfork-shard/src/openpgp.rs
index 42697ca..7160e26 100644
--- a/keyfork-shard/src/openpgp.rs
+++ b/keyfork-shard/src/openpgp.rs
@@ -205,6 +205,110 @@ fn get_decryption_keys<'a>(
         .secret()
 }
 
+fn decode_metadata_v1(buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(u8, Cert, Vec<Cert>)> {
+    assert_eq!(
+        SHARD_METADATA_VERSION, buf[0],
+        "Incompatible metadata version"
+    );
+    let threshold = buf[1];
+
+    let mut cert_parser =
+        CertParser::from_bytes(&buf[SHARD_METADATA_OFFSET..]).map_err(Error::Sequoia)?;
+
+    let root_cert = match cert_parser.next() {
+        Some(Ok(c)) => c,
+        Some(Err(e)) => return Err(Error::Sequoia(e)),
+        None => panic!("No data found"),
+    };
+
+    let certs = cert_parser
+        .collect::<openpgp::Result<Vec<_>>>()
+        .map_err(Error::Sequoia)?;
+
+    Ok((threshold, root_cert, certs))
+}
+
+// NOTE: When using single-decryptor mechanism, use this method with `threshold = 1` to return a
+// single message.
+fn decrypt_with_manager(
+    threshold: u8,
+    certs: &[Cert],
+    messages: &mut HashMap<KeyID, EncryptedMessage>,
+    policy: NullPolicy,
+    manager: &mut SmartcardManager,
+) -> Result<HashMap<KeyID, Vec<u8>>> {
+    let mut decrypted_messages = HashMap::new();
+
+    while threshold as usize - decrypted_messages.len() > 0 {
+        // Build list of fingerprints that haven't yet been used for decrypting
+        let mut cert_by_fingerprint = HashMap::new();
+        let mut unused_fingerprints = vec![];
+        for valid_cert in certs
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|cert| !decrypted_messages.contains_key(&cert.keyid()))
+            .map(|cert| cert.with_policy(&policy, None))
+        {
+            let valid_cert = valid_cert.map_err(Error::Sequoia)?;
+            let fp = valid_cert
+                .keys()
+                .for_storage_encryption()
+                .map(|k| k.fingerprint())
+                .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+            for fp in &fp {
+                cert_by_fingerprint.insert(fp.clone(), valid_cert.keyid());
+            }
+            unused_fingerprints.extend(fp.into_iter());
+        }
+
+        // Iterate over all fingerprints and use key_by_fingerprints to assoc with Enc. Message
+        if let Some(fp) = manager.load_any_fingerprint(unused_fingerprints)? {
+            let cert_keyid = cert_by_fingerprint.get(&fp).unwrap().clone();
+            if let Some(message) = messages.remove(&cert_keyid) {
+                let message = message.decrypt_with(&policy, &mut *manager)?;
+                decrypted_messages.insert(cert_keyid, message);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(decrypted_messages)
+}
+
+// NOTE: When using single-decryptor mechanism, only a single key should be provided in Keyring to
+// decrypt messages with.
+fn decrypt_with_keyring(
+    certs: &[Cert],
+    policy: &NullPolicy,
+    keyring: &mut Keyring,
+    messages: &mut HashMap<KeyID, EncryptedMessage>,
+) -> Result<HashMap<KeyID, Vec<u8>>, Error> {
+    let mut decrypted_messages = HashMap::new();
+
+    for valid_cert in certs.iter().map(|cert| cert.with_policy(policy, None)) {
+        let valid_cert = valid_cert.map_err(Error::Sequoia)?;
+        let Some(secret_cert) = keyring.get_cert_for_primary_keyid(&valid_cert.keyid()) else {
+            continue;
+        };
+        let secret_cert = secret_cert
+            .with_policy(policy, None)
+            .map_err(Error::Sequoia)?;
+        let keys = get_decryption_keys(&secret_cert).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+        if !keys.is_empty() {
+            if let Some(message) = messages.get_mut(&valid_cert.keyid()) {
+                for (pkesk, key) in message.pkesks.iter_mut().zip(keys) {
+                    pkesk.set_recipient(key.keyid());
+                }
+                // we have a pkesk, decrypt via keyring
+                decrypted_messages.insert(
+                    valid_cert.keyid(),
+                    message.decrypt_with(policy, &mut *keyring)?,
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(decrypted_messages)
+}
+
 pub fn combine(
     certs: Vec<Cert>,
     metadata: EncryptedMessage,
@@ -220,103 +324,41 @@ pub fn combine(
     let content = if keyring.is_empty() {
         // NOTE: Any card plugged in that can't decrypt, will raise issues.
         // This should not be used on a system where OpenPGP cards are available that shouldn't be
-        // used, due to the nature of how wildcard decryption works.
+        // used. The manager will try every wildcard packet for the card on the system, and once no
+        // matching PKESK packet has been found, will return an error.
         manager.load_any_card()?;
         metadata.decrypt_with(&policy, &mut manager)?
     } else {
         metadata.decrypt_with(&policy, &mut keyring)?
     };
 
-    assert_eq!(
-        SHARD_METADATA_VERSION, content[0],
-        "incompatible metadata version"
-    );
-    let threshold = content[1];
+    let (threshold, root_cert, certs) = decode_metadata_v1(&content)?;
 
-    let mut cert_parser =
-        CertParser::from_bytes(&content[SHARD_METADATA_OFFSET..]).map_err(Error::Sequoia)?;
-    let root_cert = match cert_parser.next() {
-        Some(Ok(c)) => c,
-        Some(Err(e)) => panic!("Could not find root (first) certificate: {e}"),
-        None => panic!("No certs found in cert parser"),
-    };
-    let certs = cert_parser
-        .collect::<openpgp::Result<Vec<_>>>()
-        .map_err(Error::Sequoia)?;
     keyring.set_root_cert(root_cert.clone());
     manager.set_root_cert(root_cert);
+
+    // Generate a controlled binding from certificates to encrypted messages. This is stable
+    // because we control the order packets are encrypted and certificates are stored.
+
     let mut messages: HashMap<KeyID, EncryptedMessage> =
         HashMap::from_iter(certs.iter().map(|c| c.keyid()).zip(messages));
-    let mut decrypted_messages: HashMap<KeyID, Vec<u8>> = HashMap::new();
 
-    // NOTE: This is ONLY stable because we control the generation of PKESK packets and
-    // encode the policy to ourselves.
-    for valid_cert in certs.iter().map(|cert| cert.with_policy(&policy, None)) {
-        let valid_cert = valid_cert.map_err(Error::Sequoia)?;
-        // get keys from keyring for cert
-        let Some(secret_cert) = keyring.get_cert_for_primary_keyid(&valid_cert.keyid()) else {
-            continue;
-        };
-        let secret_cert = secret_cert
-            .with_policy(&policy, None)
-            .map_err(Error::Sequoia)?;
-        let keys = get_decryption_keys(&secret_cert).collect::<Vec<_>>();
-        if !keys.is_empty() {
-            if let Some(message) = messages.get_mut(&valid_cert.keyid()) {
-                for (pkesk, key) in message.pkesks.iter_mut().zip(keys) {
-                    pkesk.set_recipient(key.keyid());
-                }
-                // we have a pkesk, decrypt via keyring
-                decrypted_messages.insert(
-                    valid_cert.keyid(),
-                    message.decrypt_with(&policy, &mut keyring)?,
-                );
-            }
-        }
-    }
+    let mut decrypted_messages =
+        decrypt_with_keyring(&certs, &policy, &mut keyring, &mut messages)?;
 
     // clean decrypted messages from encrypted messages
     messages.retain(|k, _v| !decrypted_messages.contains_key(k));
 
     let left_from_threshold = threshold as usize - decrypted_messages.len();
     if left_from_threshold > 0 {
-        let mut remaining_usable_certs = certs
-            .iter()
-            .filter(|cert| messages.contains_key(&cert.keyid()))
-            .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-
-        while threshold as usize - decrypted_messages.len() > 0 {
-            remaining_usable_certs.retain(|cert| messages.contains_key(&cert.keyid()));
-            let mut key_by_fingerprints = HashMap::new();
-            let mut total_fingerprints = vec![];
-            for valid_cert in remaining_usable_certs
-                .iter()
-                .map(|cert| cert.with_policy(&policy, None))
-            {
-                let valid_cert = valid_cert.map_err(Error::Sequoia)?;
-                let fp = valid_cert
-                    .keys()
-                    .for_storage_encryption()
-                    .map(|k| k.fingerprint())
-                    .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-                for fp in &fp {
-                    key_by_fingerprints.insert(fp.clone(), valid_cert.keyid());
-                }
-                total_fingerprints.extend(fp.iter().cloned());
-            }
-
-            // Iterate over all fingerprints and use key_by_fingerprints to assoc with Enc. Message
-            if let Some(fp) = manager.load_any_fingerprint(total_fingerprints)? {
-                // soundness: `key_by_fingerprints` is extended by the same fps that are then
-                // inserted into `total_fingerprints`
-                let cert_keyid = key_by_fingerprints.get(&fp).unwrap().clone();
-                let message = messages.remove(&cert_keyid);
-                if let Some(message) = message {
-                    let message = message.decrypt_with(&policy, &mut manager)?;
-                    decrypted_messages.insert(cert_keyid, message);
-                }
-            }
-        }
+        let new_messages = decrypt_with_manager(
+            left_from_threshold as u8,
+            &certs,
+            &mut messages,
+            policy,
+            &mut manager,
+        )?;
+        decrypted_messages.extend(new_messages.into_iter());
     }
 
     let shares = decrypted_messages