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...

28 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Anton Livaja 9cdd3b5aca
feat: require key to be at least 128 bits 2024-04-29 14:39:23 -04:00
Ryan Heywood e0687434ef
keyfork-shard: display error message on duplicate key fingerprints found 2024-04-24 13:29:32 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 23db50956f
keyfork-shard: improve wording for counting shardholders 2024-04-24 13:13:48 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 94617722a0
keyfork-shard: ignore duplicate certificate entries 2024-04-22 17:06:13 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 001fc0bccc
remove trailing hitespace :( 2024-04-19 00:30:38 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 6a265ad203
keyfork-mnemonic-util: add MnemonicBase::from_nonstandard_bytes 2024-04-18 23:53:59 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 5d2309e301
keyfork-prompt: add SecurePinValidator for making new, secure, PINs 2024-04-18 23:01:03 -04:00
Ryan Heywood c0b19e2457
keyfork-shard: assert shared secrets are contributory 2024-04-17 15:36:42 -04:00
Ryan Heywood cdf401515f
keyfork wizard: use correct derivation path for re-deriving shard decryption keys 2024-04-17 15:25:22 -04:00
Ryan Heywood f0e5ae9a8b
keyfork-derive-openpgp: document KEYFORK_OPENPGP_EXPIRE 2024-04-17 15:25:20 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 289cec36ef
keyfork wizard: upcast i and index to avoid wrapping add 2024-04-17 15:25:19 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 0fe5301352
keyfork-shard: add in bug messages 2024-04-17 15:25:18 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 9f089e723a
keyfork-derive-openpgp: use .first() in place of .get(0) 2024-04-17 15:25:15 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 1de466cad0
keyfork-derive-util: allow zeroable input for non-master-key derivation 2024-04-17 15:25:02 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 57354fc714
Cargo.lock: bump insta, remove unmaintained yaml-rust 2024-04-14 21:27:57 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 61871a77f0
keyfork-derive-util: make private and public test keys more visible 2024-04-14 21:26:44 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 08a66e2365
keyfork-shard: base64 encode content instead of base16 2024-04-14 21:19:57 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 6fa434e89c
keyfork-shard: shorten length and pad inside encrypted block 2024-04-14 21:19:56 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 68f07f6f02
bump mio and iana-time-zone 2024-04-14 21:19:54 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 9394500f2f
keyfork-shard: generate nonce using hkdf 2024-04-14 21:19:52 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 2bca0a1580
keyfork-derive-util: make Test{Public,Private}Key public, rename Internal algorithm 2024-04-12 16:23:24 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 5438f4e111
keyfork-entropy: downgrade entropy size limit to warning 2024-04-12 16:14:41 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 71b6e4ed0c
Merge branch 'ryan/use-instant-time-qrcode' 2024-04-10 15:35:50 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 4f4e3cfc65
Merge branch 'ryan/harden-derivation-on-highest-level-keys' 2024-04-10 15:35:40 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 194d475d59
keyfork-shard: validate signatures using shard-specific validation requirements 2024-04-10 15:17:30 -04:00
Ryan Heywood 40551a5c26
keyforkd: require hardened derivation on two highest indexes 2024-04-09 20:14:59 -04:00
Ryan Heywood fa125e7cbe
keyfork-qrcode: prefer Instant over SystemTime for infallible time comparison 2024-04-09 19:54:11 -04:00
Ryan Heywood f96ad11422
docs: add basic documentation on shard remote-decrypt protocol 2024-04-08 14:44:26 -04:00
31 changed files with 516 additions and 227 deletions

41
Cargo.lock generated
View File

@ -341,6 +341,12 @@ version = "0.21.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9d297deb1925b89f2ccc13d7635fa0714f12c87adce1c75356b39ca9b7178567"
[[package]]
name = "base64"
version = "0.22.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9475866fec1451be56a3c2400fd081ff546538961565ccb5b7142cbd22bc7a51"
[[package]]
name = "base64ct"
version = "1.6.0"
@ -1497,9 +1503,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "iana-time-zone"
version = "0.1.59"
version = "0.1.60"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b6a67363e2aa4443928ce15e57ebae94fd8949958fd1223c4cfc0cd473ad7539"
checksum = "e7ffbb5a1b541ea2561f8c41c087286cc091e21e556a4f09a8f6cbf17b69b141"
dependencies = [
"android_system_properties",
"core-foundation-sys",
@ -1572,15 +1578,14 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "insta"
version = "1.34.0"
version = "1.38.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "5d64600be34b2fcfc267740a243fa7744441bb4947a619ac4e5bb6507f35fbfc"
checksum = "3eab73f58e59ca6526037208f0e98851159ec1633cf17b6cd2e1f2c3fd5d53cc"
dependencies = [
"console",
"lazy_static",
"linked-hash-map",
"similar",
"yaml-rust",
]
[[package]]
@ -1758,7 +1763,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "keyfork-derive-util"
version = "0.1.0"
version = "0.1.1"
dependencies = [
"digest",
"ed25519-dalek",
@ -1776,7 +1781,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "keyfork-entropy"
version = "0.1.0"
version = "0.1.1"
dependencies = [
"keyfork-bug",
"smex",
@ -1818,7 +1823,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "keyfork-qrcode"
version = "0.1.0"
version = "0.1.1"
dependencies = [
"image",
"keyfork-bug",
@ -1830,10 +1835,11 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "keyfork-shard"
version = "0.1.0"
version = "0.2.0"
dependencies = [
"aes-gcm",
"anyhow",
"base64 0.22.0",
"card-backend",
"card-backend-pcsc",
"hkdf",
@ -1879,7 +1885,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "keyforkd"
version = "0.1.0"
version = "0.1.1"
dependencies = [
"bincode",
"hex-literal",
@ -2103,9 +2109,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "mio"
version = "0.8.10"
version = "0.8.11"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "8f3d0b296e374a4e6f3c7b0a1f5a51d748a0d34c85e7dc48fc3fa9a87657fe09"
checksum = "a4a650543ca06a924e8b371db273b2756685faae30f8487da1b56505a8f78b0c"
dependencies = [
"libc",
"log",
@ -2886,7 +2892,7 @@ dependencies = [
"aes",
"aes-gcm",
"anyhow",
"base64",
"base64 0.21.7",
"block-padding",
"blowfish",
"buffered-reader",
@ -3811,15 +3817,6 @@ version = "0.8.8"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "53be06678ed9e83edb1745eb72efc0bbcd7b5c3c35711a860906aed827a13d61"
[[package]]
name = "yaml-rust"
version = "0.4.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "56c1936c4cc7a1c9ab21a1ebb602eb942ba868cbd44a99cb7cdc5892335e1c85"
dependencies = [
"linked-hash-map",
]
[[package]]
name = "zerocopy"
version = "0.7.32"

View File

@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ impl Client {
}
let depth = path.len() as u8;
Ok(ExtendedPrivateKey::new_from_parts(
Ok(ExtendedPrivateKey::from_parts(
&d.data,
depth,
d.chain_code,

View File

@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ fn secp256k1_test_suite() {
if chain_len < 2 {
continue;
}
if chain.iter().take(2).any(|index| !index.is_hardened()) {
continue;
}
// Consistency check: ensure the server and the client can each derive the same
// key using an XPrv, for all but the last XPrv, which is verified after this
for i in 2..chain_len {

View File

@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ pub enum DerivationError {
#[error("Invalid derivation length: Expected at least 2, actual: {0}")]
InvalidDerivationLength(usize),
/// The derivation request did not use hardened derivation on the 2 highest indexes.
#[error("Invalid derivation paths: expected index #{0} (1) to be hardened")]
InvalidDerivationPath(usize, u32),
/// An error occurred while deriving data.
#[error("Derivation error: {0}")]
Derivation(String),

View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "keyforkd"
version = "0.1.0"
version = "0.1.1"
edition = "2021"
license = "AGPL-3.0-only"

View File

@ -69,6 +69,18 @@ impl Service<Request> for Keyforkd {
return Err(DerivationError::InvalidDerivationLength(len).into());
}
if let Some((i, unhardened_index)) = req
.path()
.iter()
.take(2)
.enumerate()
.find(|(_, index)| {
!index.is_hardened()
})
{
return Err(DerivationError::InvalidDerivationPath(i, unhardened_index.inner()).into())
}
#[cfg(feature = "tracing")]
if let Some(target) = guess_target(req.path()) {
info!("Deriving path: {target}");
@ -110,6 +122,9 @@ mod tests {
if chain.len() < 2 {
continue;
}
if chain.iter().take(2).any(|index| !index.is_hardened()) {
continue;
}
let req = DerivationRequest::new(DerivationAlgorithm::Secp256k1, &chain);
let response: DerivationResponse = keyforkd
.ready()

View File

@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ where
));
let socket_dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect(bug!("can't create tempdir"));
let socket_path = socket_dir.path().join("keyforkd.sock");
rt.block_on(async move {
let result = rt.block_on(async move {
let (tx, mut rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(1);
let server_handle = tokio::spawn({
let socket_path = socket_path.clone();
@ -87,8 +87,13 @@ where
let result = test_handle.await;
server_handle.abort();
result
})
.expect(bug!("runtime could not join all threads"))
});
if let Err(e) = result {
if e.is_panic() {
std::panic::resume_unwind(e.into_panic());
}
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]

View File

@ -59,13 +59,17 @@ pub enum Error {
#[allow(missing_docs)]
pub type Result<T, E = Error> = std::result::Result<T, E>;
/// Create an OpenPGP Cert with derived keys from the given derivation response, keys, and User
/// ID.
/// Create an OpenPGP Cert with private key data, with derived keys from the given derivation
/// response, keys, and User ID.
///
/// Certificates are created with a default expiration of one day, but may be configured to expire
/// later using the `KEYFORK_OPENPGP_EXPIRE` environment variable using values such as "15d" (15
/// days), "1m" (one month), or "2y" (two years).
///
/// # Errors
/// The function may error for any condition mentioned in [`Error`].
pub fn derive(xprv: XPrv, keys: &[KeyFlags], userid: &UserID) -> Result<Cert> {
let primary_key_flags = match keys.get(0) {
let primary_key_flags = match keys.first() {
Some(kf) if kf.for_certification() => kf,
_ => return Err(Error::NotCert),
};
@ -109,7 +113,7 @@ pub fn derive(xprv: XPrv, keys: &[KeyFlags], userid: &UserID) -> Result<Cert> {
let cert = cert.insert_packets(vec![Packet::from(userid.clone()), binding.into()])?;
let policy = sequoia_openpgp::policy::StandardPolicy::new();
// Set certificate expiration to one day
// Set certificate expiration to configured expiration or (default) one day
let mut keypair = primary_key.clone().into_keypair()?;
let signatures =
cert.set_expiration_time(&policy, None, &mut keypair, Some(expiration_date))?;

View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "keyfork-derive-util"
version = "0.1.0"
version = "0.1.1"
edition = "2021"
license = "MIT"

View File

@ -124,9 +124,9 @@ mod serde_with {
K: PrivateKey + Clone,
{
let variable_len_bytes = <&[u8]>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
let bytes: [u8; 32] = variable_len_bytes
.try_into()
.expect(bug!("unable to parse serialized private key; no support for static len"));
let bytes: [u8; 32] = variable_len_bytes.try_into().expect(bug!(
"unable to parse serialized private key; no support for static len"
));
Ok(K::from_bytes(&bytes))
}
}
@ -179,13 +179,20 @@ where
.into_bytes();
let (private_key, chain_code) = hash.split_at(KEY_SIZE / 8);
Self::new_from_parts(
assert!(
!private_key.iter().all(|byte| *byte == 0),
bug!("hmac function returned all-zero master key")
);
Self::from_parts(
private_key
.try_into()
.expect(bug!("KEY_SIZE / 8 did not give a 32 byte slice")),
0,
// Checked: chain_code is always the same length, hash is static size
chain_code.try_into().expect(bug!("Invalid chain code length")),
chain_code
.try_into()
.expect(bug!("Invalid chain code length")),
)
}
@ -205,9 +212,9 @@ where
/// # b"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
/// let chain_code: &[u8; 32] = //
/// # b"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
/// let xprv = ExtendedPrivateKey::<PrivateKey>::new_from_parts(key, 4, *chain_code);
/// let xprv = ExtendedPrivateKey::<PrivateKey>::from_parts(key, 4, *chain_code);
/// ```
pub fn new_from_parts(key: &[u8; 32], depth: u8, chain_code: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
pub fn from_parts(key: &[u8; 32], depth: u8, chain_code: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
Self {
private_key: K::from_bytes(key),
depth,
@ -229,7 +236,7 @@ where
/// # b"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
/// let chain_code: &[u8; 32] = //
/// # b"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
/// let xprv = ExtendedPrivateKey::<PrivateKey>::new_from_parts(key, 4, *chain_code);
/// let xprv = ExtendedPrivateKey::<PrivateKey>::from_parts(key, 4, *chain_code);
/// assert_eq!(xprv.private_key(), &PrivateKey::from_bytes(key));
/// ```
pub fn private_key(&self) -> &K {
@ -262,7 +269,7 @@ where
/// # }
/// ```
pub fn extended_public_key(&self) -> ExtendedPublicKey<K::PublicKey> {
ExtendedPublicKey::new_from_parts(self.public_key(), self.depth, self.chain_code)
ExtendedPublicKey::from_parts(self.public_key(), self.depth, self.chain_code)
}
/// Return a public key for the current [`PrivateKey`].
@ -301,7 +308,7 @@ where
/// # b"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
/// let chain_code: &[u8; 32] = //
/// # b"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
/// let xprv = ExtendedPrivateKey::<PrivateKey>::new_from_parts(key, 4, *chain_code);
/// let xprv = ExtendedPrivateKey::<PrivateKey>::from_parts(key, 4, *chain_code);
/// assert_eq!(xprv.depth(), 4);
/// ```
pub fn depth(&self) -> u8 {
@ -321,7 +328,7 @@ where
/// # b"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
/// let chain_code: &[u8; 32] = //
/// # b"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
/// let xprv = ExtendedPrivateKey::<PrivateKey>::new_from_parts(key, 4, *chain_code);
/// let xprv = ExtendedPrivateKey::<PrivateKey>::from_parts(key, 4, *chain_code);
/// assert_eq!(chain_code, &xprv.chain_code());
/// ```
pub fn chain_code(&self) -> [u8; 32] {

View File

@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ const KEY_SIZE: usize = 256;
/// Errors associated with creating or deriving Extended Public Keys.
#[derive(Error, Clone, Debug)]
pub enum Error {
/// BIP-0032 does not support deriving public keys from hardened private keys.
#[error("Public keys may not be derived when hardened")]
/// BIP-0032 does not support hardened public key derivation from parent public keys.
#[error("Hardened child public keys may not be derived from parent public keys")]
HardenedIndex,
/// The maximum depth for key derivation has been reached. The supported maximum depth is 255.
@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ where
/// let chain_code: &[u8; 32] = //
/// # b"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
/// let pubkey = PublicKey::from_bytes(key);
/// let xpub = ExtendedPublicKey::<PublicKey>::new_from_parts(pubkey, 0, *chain_code);
/// let xpub = ExtendedPublicKey::<PublicKey>::from_parts(pubkey, 0, *chain_code);
/// # Ok(())
/// # }
/// ```
pub fn new_from_parts(public_key: K, depth: u8, chain_code: ChainCode) -> Self {
pub fn from_parts(public_key: K, depth: u8, chain_code: ChainCode) -> Self {
Self {
public_key,
depth,
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ where
/// # let chain_code: &[u8; 32] = b"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
/// # let pubkey = PublicKey::from_bytes(key);
/// let xpub = //
/// # ExtendedPublicKey::<PublicKey>::new_from_parts(pubkey, 0, *chain_code);
/// # ExtendedPublicKey::<PublicKey>::from_parts(pubkey, 0, *chain_code);
/// let pubkey = xpub.public_key();
/// # Ok(())
/// # }
@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ where
/// # let chain_code: &[u8; 32] = b"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
/// # let pubkey = PublicKey::from_bytes(key);
/// let xpub = //
/// # ExtendedPublicKey::<PublicKey>::new_from_parts(pubkey, 0, *chain_code);
/// # ExtendedPublicKey::<PublicKey>::from_parts(pubkey, 0, *chain_code);
/// let index = DerivationIndex::new(0, false)?;
/// let child = xpub.derive_child(&index)?;
/// # Ok(())

View File

@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ pub trait PrivateKey: Sized {
/// # Errors
///
/// An error may be returned if:
/// * A nonzero `other` is provided.
/// * An all-zero `other` is provided.
/// * An error specific to the given algorithm was encountered.
fn derive_child(&self, other: &PrivateKeyBytes) -> Result<Self, Self::Err>;
@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ pub enum PrivateKeyError {
/// For the given algorithm, the private key must be nonzero.
#[error("The provided private key must be nonzero, but is not")]
NonZero,
/// A scalar could not be constructed for the given algorithm.
#[error("A scalar could not be constructed for the given algorithm")]
InvalidScalar,
}
#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
@ -130,20 +134,19 @@ impl PrivateKey for k256::SecretKey {
}
fn derive_child(&self, other: &PrivateKeyBytes) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
if other.iter().all(|n| n == &0) {
return Err(PrivateKeyError::NonZero);
}
let other = *other;
// Checked: See above nonzero check
let scalar = Option::<NonZeroScalar>::from(NonZeroScalar::from_repr(other.into()))
.expect(bug!("Should have been able to get a NonZeroScalar"));
use k256::elliptic_curve::ScalarPrimitive;
use k256::{Scalar, Secp256k1};
// Construct a scalar from bytes
let scalar = ScalarPrimitive::<Secp256k1>::from_bytes(other.into());
let scalar = Option::<ScalarPrimitive<Secp256k1>>::from(scalar);
let scalar = scalar.ok_or(PrivateKeyError::InvalidScalar)?;
let scalar = Scalar::from(scalar);
let derived_scalar = self.to_nonzero_scalar().as_ref() + scalar.as_ref();
Ok(
Option::<NonZeroScalar>::from(NonZeroScalar::new(derived_scalar))
.map(Into::into)
.expect(bug!("Should be able to make Key")),
)
let nonzero_scalar = Option::<NonZeroScalar>::from(NonZeroScalar::new(derived_scalar))
.ok_or(PrivateKeyError::NonZero)?;
Ok(Self::from(nonzero_scalar))
}
}
@ -180,7 +183,8 @@ impl PrivateKey for ed25519_dalek::SigningKey {
use crate::public_key::TestPublicKey;
#[doc(hidden)]
/// A private key that can be used for testing purposes. Does not utilize any significant
/// cryptographic operations.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct TestPrivateKey {
key: [u8; 32],
@ -201,9 +205,7 @@ impl PrivateKey for TestPrivateKey {
type Err = PrivateKeyError;
fn from_bytes(b: &PrivateKeyBytes) -> Self {
Self {
key: *b
}
Self { key: *b }
}
fn to_bytes(&self) -> PrivateKeyBytes {

View File

@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ pub trait PublicKey: Sized {
/// # Errors
///
/// An error may be returned if:
/// * A nonzero `other` is provided.
/// * An all-zero `other` is provided.
/// * An error specific to the given algorithm was encountered.
fn derive_child(&self, other: PrivateKeyBytes) -> Result<Self, Self::Err>;
@ -77,6 +77,10 @@ pub enum PublicKeyError {
#[error("The provided public key must be nonzero, but is not")]
NonZero,
/// A scalar could not be constructed for the given algorithm.
#[error("A scalar could not be constructed for the given algorithm")]
InvalidScalar,
/// Public key derivation is unsupported for this algorithm.
#[error("Public key derivation is unsupported for this algorithm")]
DerivationUnsupported,
@ -85,7 +89,7 @@ pub enum PublicKeyError {
#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
use k256::{
elliptic_curve::{group::prime::PrimeCurveAffine, sec1::ToEncodedPoint},
AffinePoint, NonZeroScalar,
AffinePoint,
};
#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
@ -105,14 +109,16 @@ impl PublicKey for k256::PublicKey {
}
fn derive_child(&self, other: PrivateKeyBytes) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
if other.iter().all(|n| n == &0) {
return Err(PublicKeyError::NonZero);
}
// Checked: See above
let scalar = Option::<NonZeroScalar>::from(NonZeroScalar::from_repr(other.into()))
.expect(bug!("Should have been able to get a NonZeroScalar"));
use k256::elliptic_curve::ScalarPrimitive;
use k256::{Secp256k1, Scalar};
let point = self.to_projective() + (AffinePoint::generator() * *scalar);
// Construct a scalar from bytes
let scalar = ScalarPrimitive::<Secp256k1>::from_bytes(&other.into());
let scalar = Option::<ScalarPrimitive<Secp256k1>>::from(scalar);
let scalar = scalar.ok_or(PublicKeyError::InvalidScalar)?;
let scalar = Scalar::from(scalar);
let point = self.to_projective() + (AffinePoint::generator() * scalar);
Ok(Self::from_affine(point.into())
.expect(bug!("Could not from_affine after scalar arithmetic")))
}
@ -142,14 +148,15 @@ impl PublicKey for VerifyingKey {
}
}
#[doc(hidden)]
/// A public key that can be used for testing purposes. Does not utilize any significant
/// cryptographic operations.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct TestPublicKey {
pub(crate) key: [u8; 33],
}
impl TestPublicKey {
#[doc(hidden)]
/// Create a new TestPublicKey from the given bytes.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn from_bytes(b: &[u8]) -> Self {
Self {

View File

@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ pub enum DerivationAlgorithm {
#[allow(missing_docs)]
Secp256k1,
#[doc(hidden)]
Internal,
TestAlgorithm,
}
impl DerivationAlgorithm {
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ impl DerivationAlgorithm {
&derived_key,
))
}
Self::Internal => {
Self::TestAlgorithm => {
let key = ExtendedPrivateKey::<TestPrivateKey>::new(seed);
let derived_key = key.derive_path(path)?;
Ok(DerivationResponse::with_algo_and_xprv(
@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ pub trait AsAlgorithm: PrivateKey {
impl AsAlgorithm for TestPrivateKey {
fn as_algorithm() -> DerivationAlgorithm {
DerivationAlgorithm::Internal
DerivationAlgorithm::TestAlgorithm
}
}
@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ impl DerivationRequest {
/// # };
/// # fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
/// let algo: DerivationAlgorithm = //
/// # DerivationAlgorithm::Internal;
/// # DerivationAlgorithm::TestAlgorithm;
/// let path: DerivationPath = //
/// # DerivationPath::default();
/// let request = DerivationRequest::new(algo, &path);
@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ impl DerivationRequest {
/// # };
/// # fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
/// let algo: DerivationAlgorithm = //
/// # DerivationAlgorithm::Internal;
/// # DerivationAlgorithm::TestAlgorithm;
/// let path: DerivationPath = //
/// # DerivationPath::default();
/// let request = DerivationRequest::new(algo, &path);
@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ impl DerivationRequest {
/// # b"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
/// # )?;
/// let algo: DerivationAlgorithm = //
/// # DerivationAlgorithm::Internal;
/// # DerivationAlgorithm::TestAlgorithm;
/// let path: DerivationPath = //
/// # DerivationPath::default();
/// let request = DerivationRequest::new(algo, &path);
@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ impl DerivationRequest {
/// let seed: &[u8; 64] = //
/// # b"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
/// let algo: DerivationAlgorithm = //
/// # DerivationAlgorithm::Internal;
/// # DerivationAlgorithm::TestAlgorithm;
/// let path: DerivationPath = //
/// # DerivationPath::default();
/// let request = DerivationRequest::new(algo, &path);
@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ mod secp256k1 {
fn try_from(value: &DerivationResponse) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
match value.algorithm {
DerivationAlgorithm::Secp256k1 => Ok(Self::new_from_parts(
DerivationAlgorithm::Secp256k1 => Ok(Self::from_parts(
&value.data,
value.depth,
value.chain_code,
@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ mod ed25519 {
fn try_from(value: &DerivationResponse) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
match value.algorithm {
DerivationAlgorithm::Ed25519 => Ok(Self::new_from_parts(
DerivationAlgorithm::Ed25519 => Ok(Self::from_parts(
&value.data,
value.depth,
value.chain_code,

View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "keyfork-shard"
version = "0.1.0"
version = "0.2.0"
edition = "2021"
license = "AGPL-3.0-only"
@ -37,3 +37,4 @@ card-backend-pcsc = { version = "0.5.0", optional = true }
openpgp-card-sequoia = { version = "0.2.0", optional = true, default-features = false }
openpgp-card = { version = "0.4.0", optional = true }
sequoia-openpgp = { version = "1.17.0", optional = true, default-features = false }
base64 = "0.22.0"

View File

@ -7,22 +7,28 @@ use std::{
};
use aes_gcm::{
aead::{consts::U12, Aead, AeadCore, OsRng},
aead::{consts::U12, Aead},
Aes256Gcm, KeyInit, Nonce,
};
use base64::prelude::{Engine, BASE64_STANDARD};
use hkdf::Hkdf;
use keyfork_bug::{bug, POISONED_MUTEX};
use keyfork_mnemonic_util::{English, Mnemonic};
use keyfork_prompt::{
validators::{mnemonic::MnemonicSetValidator, Validator},
validators::{
mnemonic::{MnemonicSetValidator, MnemonicValidator, WordLength},
Validator,
},
Message as PromptMessage, PromptHandler, Terminal,
};
use sha2::Sha256;
use sharks::{Share, Sharks};
use x25519_dalek::{EphemeralSecret, PublicKey};
// 256 bit share encrypted is 49 bytes, couple more bytes before we reach max size
const ENC_LEN: u8 = 4 * 16;
// 32-byte share, 1-byte index, 1-byte threshold, 1-byte version == 36 bytes
// Encrypted, is 52 bytes
const PLAINTEXT_LENGTH: u8 = 36;
const ENCRYPTED_LENGTH: u8 = PLAINTEXT_LENGTH + 16;
#[cfg(feature = "openpgp")]
pub mod openpgp;
@ -194,7 +200,6 @@ pub trait Format {
let encrypted_messages = self.parse_shard_file(reader)?;
// establish AES-256-GCM key via ECDH
let mut nonce_data: Option<[u8; 12]> = None;
let mut pubkey_data: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
// receive remote data via scanning QR code from camera
@ -204,12 +209,13 @@ pub trait Format {
.lock()
.expect(bug!(POISONED_MUTEX))
.prompt_message(PromptMessage::Text(QRCODE_PROMPT.to_string()))?;
if let Ok(Some(hex)) =
if let Ok(Some(qrcode_content)) =
keyfork_qrcode::scan_camera(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30), 0)
{
let decoded_data = smex::decode(&hex)?;
nonce_data = Some(decoded_data[..12].try_into().map_err(|_| InvalidData)?);
pubkey_data = Some(decoded_data[12..].try_into().map_err(|_| InvalidData)?)
let decoded_data = BASE64_STANDARD
.decode(qrcode_content)
.expect(bug!("qrcode should contain base64 encoded data"));
pubkey_data = Some(decoded_data.try_into().map_err(|_| InvalidData)?)
} else {
prompt
.lock()
@ -219,43 +225,43 @@ pub trait Format {
}
// if QR code scanning failed or was unavailable, read from a set of mnemonics
let (nonce, their_pubkey) = match (nonce_data, pubkey_data) {
(Some(nonce), Some(pubkey)) => (nonce, pubkey),
_ => {
let validator = MnemonicSetValidator {
word_lengths: [9, 24],
let their_pubkey = match pubkey_data {
Some(pubkey) => pubkey,
None => {
let validator = MnemonicValidator {
word_length: Some(WordLength::Count(24)),
};
let [nonce_mnemonic, pubkey_mnemonic] = prompt
prompt
.lock()
.expect(bug!(POISONED_MUTEX))
.prompt_validated_wordlist::<English, _>(
QRCODE_COULDNT_READ,
3,
validator.to_fn(),
)?;
let nonce = nonce_mnemonic
)?
.as_bytes()
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| InvalidData)?;
let pubkey = pubkey_mnemonic
.as_bytes()
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| InvalidData)?;
(nonce, pubkey)
.map_err(|_| InvalidData)?
}
};
// create our shared key
let our_key = EphemeralSecret::random();
let our_pubkey_mnemonic = Mnemonic::from_bytes(PublicKey::from(&our_key).as_bytes())?;
let shared_secret = our_key
.diffie_hellman(&PublicKey::from(their_pubkey))
.to_bytes();
let hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(None, &shared_secret);
let mut hkdf_output = [0u8; 256 / 8];
hkdf.expand(&[], &mut hkdf_output)?;
let shared_key = Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(&hkdf_output)?;
let shared_secret = our_key.diffie_hellman(&PublicKey::from(their_pubkey));
assert!(
shared_secret.was_contributory(),
bug!("shared secret might be insecure")
);
let hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(None, shared_secret.as_bytes());
let mut shared_key_data = [0u8; 256 / 8];
hkdf.expand(b"key", &mut shared_key_data)?;
let shared_key = Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(&shared_key_data)?;
let mut nonce_data = [0u8; 12];
hkdf.expand(b"nonce", &mut nonce_data)?;
let nonce = Nonce::<U12>::from_slice(&nonce_data);
// decrypt a single shard and create the payload
let (share, threshold) =
@ -264,49 +270,47 @@ pub trait Format {
payload.insert(0, HUNK_VERSION);
payload.insert(1, threshold);
assert!(
payload.len() <= ENC_LEN as usize,
"invalid share length (too long, max {ENC_LEN} bytes)"
payload.len() < PLAINTEXT_LENGTH as usize,
"invalid share length (too long, max {PLAINTEXT_LENGTH} bytes)"
);
// encrypt data
let nonce = Nonce::<U12>::from_slice(&nonce);
let payload_bytes = shared_key.encrypt(nonce, payload.as_slice())?;
// convert data to a static-size payload
// NOTE: Padding length is less than u8::MAX because ENC_LEN < u8::MAX
// convert plaintext to static-size payload
#[allow(clippy::assertions_on_constants)]
{
assert!(ENC_LEN < u8::MAX, "padding byte can be u8");
assert!(PLAINTEXT_LENGTH < u8::MAX, "length byte can be u8");
}
// NOTE: Previous versions of Keyfork Shard would modify the padding bytes to avoid
// duplicate mnemonic words. This version does not include that, and instead uses a
// repeated length byte.
#[allow(clippy::cast_possible_truncation)]
let mut out_bytes = [payload_bytes.len() as u8; ENC_LEN as usize];
assert!(
payload_bytes.len() < out_bytes.len(),
"encrypted payload larger than acceptable limit"
let mut plaintext_bytes = [u8::try_from(payload.len()).expect(bug!(
"previously asserted length must be < {PLAINTEXT_LENGTH}",
PLAINTEXT_LENGTH = PLAINTEXT_LENGTH
)); PLAINTEXT_LENGTH as usize];
plaintext_bytes[..payload.len()].clone_from_slice(&payload);
// encrypt data
let encrypted_bytes = shared_key.encrypt(nonce, plaintext_bytes.as_slice())?;
assert_eq!(
encrypted_bytes.len(),
ENCRYPTED_LENGTH as usize,
bug!("encrypted bytes size != expected len"),
);
out_bytes[..payload_bytes.len()].clone_from_slice(&payload_bytes);
let mut mnemonic_bytes = [0u8; ENCRYPTED_LENGTH as usize];
mnemonic_bytes.copy_from_slice(&encrypted_bytes);
// NOTE: This previously used a single repeated value as the padding byte, but resulted in
// difficulty when entering in prompts manually, as one's place could be lost due to
// repeated keywords. This is resolved below by having sequentially increasing numbers up to
// but not including the last byte.
#[allow(clippy::cast_possible_truncation)]
for (i, byte) in (out_bytes[payload_bytes.len()..(ENC_LEN as usize - 1)])
.iter_mut()
.enumerate()
{
*byte = (i % u8::MAX as usize) as u8;
}
// safety: size of out_bytes is constant and always % 4 == 0
let payload_mnemonic = unsafe { Mnemonic::from_raw_bytes(&out_bytes) };
let payload_mnemonic = Mnemonic::from_nonstandard_bytes(mnemonic_bytes);
#[cfg(feature = "qrcode")]
{
use keyfork_qrcode::{qrencode, ErrorCorrection};
let mut qrcode_data = our_pubkey_mnemonic.to_bytes();
qrcode_data.extend(payload_mnemonic.as_bytes());
if let Ok(qrcode) = qrencode(&smex::encode(&qrcode_data), ErrorCorrection::Highest) {
if let Ok(qrcode) = qrencode(
&BASE64_STANDARD.encode(qrcode_data),
ErrorCorrection::Highest,
) {
prompt
.lock()
.expect(bug!(POISONED_MUTEX))
@ -401,7 +405,7 @@ pub struct InvalidData;
/// 1 byte: Version
/// 1 byte: Threshold
/// Data: &[u8]
pub(crate) const HUNK_VERSION: u8 = 1;
pub(crate) const HUNK_VERSION: u8 = 2;
pub(crate) const HUNK_OFFSET: usize = 2;
const QRCODE_PROMPT: &str = "Press enter, then present QR code to camera.";
@ -432,22 +436,22 @@ pub fn remote_decrypt(w: &mut impl Write) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
while iter_count.is_none() || iter_count.is_some_and(|i| i > 0) {
iter += 1;
let nonce = Aes256Gcm::generate_nonce(&mut OsRng);
let nonce_mnemonic = unsafe { Mnemonic::from_raw_bytes(nonce.as_slice()) };
let our_key = EphemeralSecret::random();
let key_mnemonic = Mnemonic::from_bytes(PublicKey::from(&our_key).as_bytes())?;
#[cfg(feature = "qrcode")]
{
use keyfork_qrcode::{qrencode, ErrorCorrection};
let mut qrcode_data = nonce_mnemonic.to_bytes();
qrcode_data.extend(key_mnemonic.as_bytes());
if let Ok(qrcode) = qrencode(&smex::encode(&qrcode_data), ErrorCorrection::Highest) {
let qrcode_data = key_mnemonic.to_bytes();
if let Ok(qrcode) = qrencode(
&BASE64_STANDARD.encode(qrcode_data),
ErrorCorrection::Highest,
) {
pm.prompt_message(PromptMessage::Text(format!(
concat!(
"A QR code will be displayed after this prompt. ",
"Send the QR code to only shardholder {iter}. ",
"Nobody else should scan this QR code."
"QR code #{iter} will be displayed after this prompt. ",
"Send the QR code to the next shardholder. ",
"Only the next shardholder should scan the QR code."
),
iter = iter
)))?;
@ -457,11 +461,9 @@ pub fn remote_decrypt(w: &mut impl Write) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
pm.prompt_message(PromptMessage::Text(format!(
concat!(
"Upon request, these words should be sent to shardholder {iter}: ",
"{nonce_mnemonic} {key_mnemonic}"
"Upon request, these words should be sent to the shardholder: ",
"{key_mnemonic}"
),
iter = iter,
nonce_mnemonic = nonce_mnemonic,
key_mnemonic = key_mnemonic,
)))?;
@ -471,10 +473,17 @@ pub fn remote_decrypt(w: &mut impl Write) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
#[cfg(feature = "qrcode")]
{
pm.prompt_message(PromptMessage::Text(QRCODE_PROMPT.to_string()))?;
if let Ok(Some(hex)) =
if let Ok(Some(qrcode_content)) =
keyfork_qrcode::scan_camera(std::time::Duration::from_secs(QRCODE_TIMEOUT), 0)
{
let decoded_data = smex::decode(&hex)?;
let decoded_data = BASE64_STANDARD
.decode(qrcode_content)
.expect(bug!("qrcode should contain base64 encoded data"));
assert_eq!(
decoded_data.len(),
ENCRYPTED_LENGTH as usize,
bug!("invalid payload data")
);
let _ = pubkey_data.insert(decoded_data[..32].try_into().map_err(|_| InvalidData)?);
let _ = payload_data.insert(decoded_data[32..].to_vec());
} else {
@ -486,7 +495,7 @@ pub fn remote_decrypt(w: &mut impl Write) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
(Some(pubkey), Some(payload)) => (pubkey, payload),
_ => {
let validator = MnemonicSetValidator {
word_lengths: [24, 48],
word_lengths: [24, 39],
};
let [pubkey_mnemonic, payload_mnemonic] = pm
@ -504,14 +513,28 @@ pub fn remote_decrypt(w: &mut impl Write) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
}
};
let shared_secret = our_key.diffie_hellman(&PublicKey::from(pubkey)).to_bytes();
let hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(None, &shared_secret);
let mut hkdf_output = [0u8; 256 / 8];
hkdf.expand(&[], &mut hkdf_output)?;
let shared_key = Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(&hkdf_output)?;
assert_eq!(
payload.len(),
ENCRYPTED_LENGTH as usize,
bug!("invalid payload data")
);
let payload =
shared_key.decrypt(&nonce, &payload[..payload[payload.len() - 1] as usize])?;
let shared_secret = our_key.diffie_hellman(&PublicKey::from(pubkey));
assert!(
shared_secret.was_contributory(),
bug!("shared secret might be insecure")
);
let hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(None, shared_secret.as_bytes());
let mut shared_key_data = [0u8; 256 / 8];
hkdf.expand(b"key", &mut shared_key_data)?;
let shared_key = Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(&shared_key_data)?;
let mut nonce_data = [0u8; 12];
hkdf.expand(b"nonce", &mut nonce_data)?;
let nonce = Nonce::<U12>::from_slice(&nonce_data);
let payload = shared_key.decrypt(nonce, payload.as_slice())?;
assert_eq!(HUNK_VERSION, payload[0], "Incompatible hunk version");
match &mut iter_count {
@ -526,7 +549,8 @@ pub fn remote_decrypt(w: &mut impl Write) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Erro
}
}
shares.push(payload[HUNK_OFFSET..].to_vec());
let payload_len = payload.last().expect(bug!("payload should not be empty"));
shares.push(payload[HUNK_OFFSET..usize::from(*payload_len)].to_vec());
}
let shares = shares

View File

@ -194,33 +194,52 @@ impl<P: PromptHandler> OpenPGP<P> {
}
impl<P: PromptHandler> OpenPGP<P> {
/// Read all OpenPGP certificates in a path and return a [`Vec`] of them. Certificates are read
/// from a file, or from files one level deep in a directory.
/// Read all OpenPGP certificates in a path and return a [`Vec`] of them.
///
/// Certificates are read from a file, or from files one level deep in a directory.
/// Certificates with duplicated fingerprints will be discarded.
///
/// # Errors
/// The function may return an error if it is unable to read the directory or if Sequoia is unable
/// to load certificates from the file.
/// The function may return an error if it is unable to read the directory or if Sequoia is
/// unable to load certificates from the file.
pub fn discover_certs(path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> Result<Vec<Cert>> {
let path = path.as_ref();
let mut pubkeys = std::collections::HashSet::new();
let mut certs = HashMap::new();
if path.is_file() {
let mut vec = vec![];
for cert in CertParser::from_file(path).map_err(Error::Sequoia)? {
vec.push(cert.map_err(Error::Sequoia)?);
for maybe_cert in CertParser::from_file(path).map_err(Error::Sequoia)? {
let cert = maybe_cert.map_err(Error::Sequoia)?;
let certfp = cert.fingerprint();
for key in cert.keys() {
let fp = key.fingerprint();
if pubkeys.contains(&fp) {
eprintln!("Received duplicate key: {fp} in public key: {certfp}");
}
pubkeys.insert(fp);
}
certs.insert(certfp, cert);
}
Ok(vec)
} else {
let mut vec = vec![];
for entry in path
.read_dir()
.map_err(Error::Io)?
.filter_map(Result::ok)
.filter(|p| p.path().is_file())
{
vec.push(Cert::from_file(entry.path()).map_err(Error::Sequoia)?);
let cert = Cert::from_file(entry.path()).map_err(Error::Sequoia)?;
let certfp = cert.fingerprint();
for key in cert.keys() {
let fp = key.fingerprint();
if pubkeys.contains(&fp) {
eprintln!("Received duplicate key: {fp} in public key: {certfp}");
}
pubkeys.insert(fp);
}
certs.insert(certfp, cert);
}
Ok(vec)
}
Ok(certs.into_values().collect())
}
}

View File

@ -84,13 +84,23 @@ impl<P: PromptHandler> VerificationHelper for &mut Keyring<P> {
aead_algo,
} => {}
MessageLayer::SignatureGroup { results } => {
for result in results {
if let Err(e) = result {
match &results[..] {
[Ok(_)] => {
return Ok(());
}
_ => {
// FIXME: anyhow leak: VerificationError impl std::error::Error
// return Err(e.context("Invalid signature"));
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Error validating signature; either multiple signatures were passed or the single signature was not valid"));
}
}
/*
for result in results {
if let Err(e) = result {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid signature: {e}"));
}
}
*/
}
}
}

View File

@ -193,12 +193,23 @@ impl<P: PromptHandler> VerificationHelper for &mut SmartcardManager<P> {
aead_algo,
} => {}
MessageLayer::SignatureGroup { results } => {
for result in results {
if let Err(e) = result {
// FIXME: anyhow leak
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Verification error: {}", e.to_string()));
match &results[..] {
[Ok(_)] => {
return Ok(());
}
_ => {
// FIXME: anyhow leak: VerificationError impl std::error::Error
// return Err(e.context("Invalid signature"));
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Error validating signature; either multiple signatures were passed or the single signature was not valid"));
}
}
/*
for result in results {
if let Err(e) = result {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid signature: {e}"));
}
}
*/
}
}
}
@ -264,11 +275,11 @@ impl<P: PromptHandler> DecryptionHelper for &mut SmartcardManager<P> {
} else {
format!("Unlock card {card_id} ({cardholder_name})\n{rpea}: {attempts}\n\nPIN: ")
};
let temp_pin =
self.pm
.lock()
.expect(bug!(POISONED_MUTEX))
.prompt_validated_passphrase(&message, 3, &pin_validator)?;
let temp_pin = self
.pm
.lock()
.expect(bug!(POISONED_MUTEX))
.prompt_validated_passphrase(&message, 3, &pin_validator)?;
let verification_status = transaction.verify_user_pin(temp_pin.as_str().trim());
match verification_status {
#[allow(clippy::ignored_unit_patterns)]

View File

@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ keyfork-entropy = { version = "0.1.0", path = "../util/keyfork-entropy", registr
keyfork-mnemonic-util = { version = "0.2.0", path = "../util/keyfork-mnemonic-util", registry = "distrust" }
keyfork-prompt = { version = "0.1.0", path = "../util/keyfork-prompt", registry = "distrust" }
keyfork-qrcode = { version = "0.1.0", path = "../qrcode/keyfork-qrcode", default-features = false, registry = "distrust" }
keyfork-shard = { version = "0.1.0", path = "../keyfork-shard", default-features = false, features = ["openpgp", "openpgp-card", "qrcode"], registry = "distrust" }
keyfork-shard = { version = "0.2.0", path = "../keyfork-shard", default-features = false, features = ["openpgp", "openpgp-card", "qrcode"], registry = "distrust" }
smex = { version = "0.1.0", path = "../util/smex", registry = "distrust" }
clap = { version = "4.4.2", features = ["derive", "env", "wrap_help"] }

View File

@ -20,8 +20,12 @@ pub enum DeriveSubcommands {
/// Derive an OpenPGP Transferable Secret Key (private key). The key is encoded using OpenPGP
/// ASCII Armor, a format usable by most programs using OpenPGP.
///
/// The key is generated with a 24-hour expiration time. The operation to set the expiration
/// time to a higher value is left to the user to ensure the key is usable by the user.
/// Certificates are created with a default expiration of one day, but may be configured to
/// expire later using the `KEYFORK_OPENPGP_EXPIRE` environment variable using values such as
/// "15d" (15 days), "1m" (one month), or "2y" (two years).
///
/// It is recommended to use the default expiration of one day and to change the expiration
/// using an external utility, to ensure the Certify key is usable.
#[command(name = "openpgp")]
OpenPGP {
/// Default User ID for the certificate, using the OpenPGP User ID format.

View File

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ use keyfork_derive_openpgp::{
};
use keyfork_derive_util::{DerivationIndex, DerivationPath};
use keyfork_prompt::{
validators::{PinValidator, Validator},
validators::{SecurePinValidator, Validator},
Message, PromptHandler, DefaultTerminal, default_terminal
};
@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ fn derive_key(seed: [u8; 32], index: u8) -> Result<Cert> {
let chain = DerivationIndex::new(u32::from_be_bytes(pgp_u32), true)?;
let mut shrd_u32 = [0u8; 4];
shrd_u32[..].copy_from_slice(&"shrd".bytes().collect::<Vec<u8>>());
let account = DerivationIndex::new(u32::from_be_bytes(pgp_u32), true)?;
let account = DerivationIndex::new(u32::from_be_bytes(shrd_u32), true)?;
let subkey = DerivationIndex::new(u32::from(index), true)?;
let path = DerivationPath::default()
.chain_push(chain)
@ -116,12 +116,12 @@ fn generate_shard_secret(
);
}
let user_pin_validator = PinValidator {
let user_pin_validator = SecurePinValidator {
min_length: Some(6),
..Default::default()
}
.to_fn();
let admin_pin_validator = PinValidator {
let admin_pin_validator = SecurePinValidator {
min_length: Some(8),
..Default::default()
}
@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ fn generate_shard_secret(
for i in 0..keys_per_shard {
pm.prompt_message(Message::Text(format!(
"Please remove all keys and insert key #{} for user #{}",
i + 1,
index + 1,
(i as u16) + 1,
(index as u16) + 1,
)))?;
let card_backend = loop {
if let Some(c) = PcscBackend::cards(None)?.next().transpose()? {

View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "keyfork-qrcode"
version = "0.1.0"
version = "0.1.1"
repository = "https://git.distrust.co/public/keyfork"
edition = "2021"
license = "MIT"

View File

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ use keyfork_bug as bug;
use image::io::Reader as ImageReader;
use std::{
io::{Cursor, Write},
time::{Duration, SystemTime},
time::{Duration, Instant},
process::{Command, Stdio},
};
use v4l::{
@ -110,11 +110,10 @@ pub fn scan_camera(timeout: Duration, index: usize) -> Result<Option<String>, QR
fmt.fourcc = FourCC::new(b"MPG1");
device.set_format(&fmt)?;
let mut stream = Stream::with_buffers(&device, Type::VideoCapture, 4)?;
let start = SystemTime::now();
let start = Instant::now();
while SystemTime::now()
while Instant::now()
.duration_since(start)
.unwrap_or(Duration::from_secs(0))
< timeout
{
let (buffer, _) = stream.next()?;
@ -141,12 +140,11 @@ pub fn scan_camera(timeout: Duration, index: usize) -> Result<Option<String>, QR
fmt.fourcc = FourCC::new(b"MPG1");
device.set_format(&fmt)?;
let mut stream = Stream::with_buffers(&device, Type::VideoCapture, 4)?;
let start = SystemTime::now();
let start = Instant::now();
let mut scanner = keyfork_zbar::image_scanner::ImageScanner::new();
while SystemTime::now()
while Instant::now()
.duration_since(start)
.unwrap_or(Duration::from_secs(0))
< timeout
{
let (buffer, _) = stream.next()?;

View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "keyfork-entropy"
version = "0.1.0"
version = "0.1.1"
edition = "2021"
license = "MIT"

View File

@ -11,9 +11,15 @@ fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
"Bit size must be divisible by 8, got: {bit_size}"
);
assert!(
bit_size <= 256,
"Maximum supported bit size is 256, got: {bit_size}"
bit_size >= 128,
"Minimum supported bit size is 128, got {bit_size}"
);
match bit_size {
128 | 256 | 512 => {}
_ => {
eprintln!("reading entropy of uncommon size: {bit_size}");
}
}
let entropy = keyfork_entropy::generate_entropy_of_size(bit_size / 8)?;
println!("{}", smex::encode(entropy));

View File

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
input.read_line(&mut line)?;
let decoded = smex::decode(line.trim())?;
let mnemonic = unsafe { Mnemonic::from_raw_bytes(&decoded) };
let mnemonic = Mnemonic::from_raw_bytes(&decoded) ;
println!("{mnemonic}");

View File

@ -125,6 +125,13 @@ impl Wordlist for English {
}
}
struct AssertValidMnemonicSize<const N: usize>;
impl<const N: usize> AssertValidMnemonicSize<N> {
const OK_CHUNKS: () = assert!(N % 4 == 0, "bytes must be a length divisible by 4");
const OK_SIZE: () = assert!(N <= 1024, "bytes must be less-or-equal 1024");
}
/// A BIP-0039 mnemonic with reference to a [`Wordlist`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct MnemonicBase<W: Wordlist> {
@ -276,7 +283,36 @@ where
return Err(MnemonicGenerationError::InvalidByteLength(bit_count));
}
Ok(unsafe { Self::from_raw_bytes(bytes) })
Ok( Self::from_raw_bytes(bytes) )
}
/// Generate a [`Mnemonic`] from the provided data and [`Wordlist`]. The data may be of a size
/// of a factor of 4, up to 1024 bytes.
///
/// ```rust
/// use keyfork_mnemonic_util::Mnemonic;
/// let data = b"hello world!";
/// let mnemonic = Mnemonic::from_nonstandard_bytes(*data);
/// ```
///
/// If an invalid size is requested, the code will fail to compile:
///
/// ```rust,compile_fail
/// use keyfork_mnemonic_util::Mnemonic;
/// let mnemonic = Mnemonic::from_nonstandard_bytes([0u8; 53]);
/// ```
///
/// ```rust,compile_fail
/// use keyfork_mnemonic_util::Mnemonic;
/// let mnemonic = Mnemonic::from_nonstandard_bytes([0u8; 1024 + 4]);
/// ```
pub fn from_nonstandard_bytes<const N: usize>(bytes: [u8; N]) -> MnemonicBase<W> {
#[allow(clippy::let_unit_value)]
{
let () = AssertValidMnemonicSize::<N>::OK_CHUNKS;
let () = AssertValidMnemonicSize::<N>::OK_SIZE;
}
Self::from_raw_bytes(&bytes)
}
/// Generate a [`Mnemonic`] from the provided data and [`Wordlist`]. The data is expected to be
@ -292,11 +328,12 @@ where
/// Create a Mnemonic using an arbitrary length of given data. The length does not need to
/// conform to BIP-0039 standards, but should be a multiple of 32 bits or 4 bytes.
///
/// # Safety
///
/// # Panics
/// This function can potentially produce mnemonics that are not BIP-0039 compliant or can't
/// properly be encoded as a mnemonic. It is assumed the caller asserts the byte count is `% 4
/// == 0`. If the assumption is incorrect, code may panic.
/// == 0`. If the assumption is incorrect, code may panic. The
/// [`MnemonicBase::from_nonstandard_bytes`] function may be used to generate entropy if the
/// length of the data is known at compile-time.
///
/// # Examples
/// ```rust
@ -315,11 +352,10 @@ where
/// // NOTE: Data is of invalid length, 31
/// let data = b"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
/// let mnemonic = unsafe { Mnemonic::from_raw_bytes(data.as_slice()) };
/// let mnemonic_text = mnemonic.to_string();
/// // NOTE: panic happens here
/// let new_mnemonic = Mnemonic::from_str(&mnemonic_text).unwrap();
/// ```
pub unsafe fn from_raw_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> MnemonicBase<W> {
pub fn from_raw_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> MnemonicBase<W> {
assert!(bytes.len() % 4 == 0);
assert!(bytes.len() <= 1024);
MnemonicBase {
data: bytes.to_vec(),
marker: PhantomData,
@ -520,12 +556,30 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
fn can_do_up_to_1024_bits() {
let entropy = &mut [0u8; 128];
fn can_do_up_to_8192_bits() {
let mut entropy = [0u8; 1024];
let mut random = std::fs::File::open("/dev/urandom").unwrap();
random.read_exact(&mut entropy[..]).unwrap();
let mnemonic = unsafe { Mnemonic::from_raw_bytes(&entropy[..]) };
let mnemonic = Mnemonic::from_nonstandard_bytes(entropy);
let words = mnemonic.words();
assert!(words.len() == 96);
assert_eq!(words.len(), 768);
}
#[test]
#[should_panic]
fn fails_over_8192_bits() {
let entropy = &mut [0u8; 1024 + 4];
let mut random = std::fs::File::open("/dev/urandom").unwrap();
random.read_exact(&mut entropy[..]).unwrap();
let _mnemonic = Mnemonic::from_raw_bytes(&entropy[..]);
}
#[test]
#[should_panic]
fn fails_over_invalid_size() {
let entropy = &mut [0u8; 255];
let mut random = std::fs::File::open("/dev/urandom").unwrap();
random.read_exact(&mut entropy[..]).unwrap();
let _mnemonic = Mnemonic::from_raw_bytes(&entropy[..]);
}
}

View File

@ -29,6 +29,84 @@ pub enum PinError {
/// The PIN contained invalid characters.
#[error("PIN contained invalid characters (found {0} at position {1})")]
InvalidCharacters(char, usize),
/// The provided PIN had either too many repeated characters or too many sequential characters.
#[error("PIN contained too many repeated or sequential characters")]
InsecurePIN,
}
/// Validate that a PIN is of a certain length, matches a range of characters, and does not use
/// incrementing or decrementing sequences of characters.
///
/// The validator determines a score for a passphrase and, if the score is high enough, returns an
/// error.
///
/// Score is calculated based on:
/// * how many sequential characters are in the passphrase (ascending or descending)
/// * how many repeated characters are in the passphrase
#[derive(Default, Clone)]
pub struct SecurePinValidator {
/// The minimum length of provided PINs.
pub min_length: Option<usize>,
/// The maximum length of provided PINs.
pub max_length: Option<usize>,
/// The characters allowed by the PIN parser.
pub range: Option<RangeInclusive<char>>,
/// Whether repeated characters count against the PIN.
pub ignore_repeated_characters: bool,
/// Whether sequential characters count against the PIN.
pub ignore_sequential_characters: bool,
}
impl Validator for SecurePinValidator {
type Output = String;
type Error = PinError;
fn to_fn(&self) -> Box<dyn Fn(String) -> Result<String, Box<dyn std::error::Error>>> {
let min_len = self.min_length.unwrap_or(usize::MIN);
let max_len = self.max_length.unwrap_or(usize::MAX);
let range = self.range.clone().unwrap_or('0'..='9');
let ignore_repeated_characters = self.ignore_repeated_characters;
let ignore_sequential_characters = self.ignore_sequential_characters;
Box::new(move |mut s: String| {
s.truncate(s.trim_end().len());
let len = s.len();
if len < min_len {
return Err(Box::new(PinError::TooShort(len, min_len)));
}
if len > max_len {
return Err(Box::new(PinError::TooLong(len, max_len)));
}
let mut last_char = 0;
let mut score = 0;
for (index, ch) in s.chars().enumerate() {
if !range.contains(&ch) {
return Err(Box::new(PinError::InvalidCharacters(ch, index)));
}
if [-1, 1].contains(&(ch as i32 - last_char))
&& !ignore_sequential_characters
{
score += 1;
}
last_char = ch as i32;
}
let mut chars = s.chars().collect::<Vec<_>>();
chars.sort();
chars.dedup();
if !ignore_repeated_characters {
// SAFETY: the amount of characters can't have _increased_ since deduping
score += s.chars().count() - chars.len();
}
if score * 2 > s.chars().count() {
return Err(Box::new(PinError::InsecurePIN))
}
Ok(s)
})
}
}
/// Validate that a PIN is of a certain length and matches a range of characters.
@ -79,8 +157,8 @@ pub mod mnemonic {
use super::Validator;
use keyfork_mnemonic_util::{Mnemonic, MnemonicFromStrError};
use keyfork_bug::bug;
use keyfork_mnemonic_util::{Mnemonic, MnemonicFromStrError};
/// A mnemonic could not be validated from the given input.
#[derive(thiserror::Error, Debug)]

View File

@ -33,3 +33,4 @@
- [Provisioners](./dev-guide/provisioners.md)
- [Auditing Dependencies](./dev-guide/auditing.md)
- [Entropy Guide](./dev-guide/entropy.md)
- [The Shard Protocol](./dev-guide/shard-protocol.md)

View File

@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
# The Shard Protocol
Keyfork Shard uses a single-handshake protocol to transfer encrypted shards.
The initial payload is generated by the program combining the shards, while the
response is generated by the program transport-encrypting the shards.
## Combiner Payload
The combiner payload consists of a 12-byte nonce and a 32-byte x25519 public
key. The payload is then either encoded to hex and displayed as a QR code, and
encoded as a mnemonic and printed on-screen.
```
[12-byte nonce | 32-byte public key]
```
The transporter receives the 12-byte nonce and 32-byte x25519 key and generates
their own x25519 key. Using HKDF-Sha256 with no salt on the resulting key
generates the AES-256-GCM key used to encrypt the now-decrypted shard, along
with the received nonce.
## Transporter Payload
The transporter payload consists of a 32-byte x25519 public key and a
64-byte-padded encrypted "hunk". The hunk contains a version byte, a threshold
byte, and the encrypted shard. The last byte of the 64-byte sequence is the
total length of the encrypted hunk.
```
Handshake:
[32-byte public key | 63-byte-padded encrypted hunk | 1-byte hunk length ]
Hunk:
[1-byte version | 1-byte threshold | variable-length shard ]
```
The combiner receives the 32-byte x25519 key and the 64-byte hunk, and uses the
same key derivation scheme as above to generate the decryption key. The
threshold byte is used to determine how many shares (in total) are needed.