13 changed files with 52 additions and 941 deletions
--- a/stagex/demo-auto.cast
+++ b/stagex/demo-auto.cast
@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
 {"version": 2, "width": 63, "height": 15, "timestamp": 1729797434, "env": {"SHELL": "/usr/bin/zsh", "TERM": "screen-256color"}}
 [0.090248, "o", "Sending build context to Docker daemon  557.1kB\r"]
 [0.093028, "o", "Sending build context to Docker daemon  1.037MB\r\r\r\n"]
 [0.100052, "o", "Step 1/27 : FROM scratch AS libfakerand\r\n ---> \r\nStep 2/27 : COPY --from=stagex/busybox . /\r\n"]
 [0.326734, "o", " ---> edd79937efa6\r\nStep 3/27 : COPY --from=stagex/rust . /\r\n"]
 [3.478221, "o", " ---> 35b5a434bf39\r\nStep 4/27 : COPY --from=stagex/musl . /\r\n"]
 [4.308798, "o", " ---> 8d65fe22c193\r\nStep 5/27 : COPY --from=stagex/gcc . /\r\n"]
 [7.231311, "o", " ---> f46a59e4564b\r\nStep 6/27 : COPY --from=stagex/llvm . /\r\n"]
 [15.022258, "o", " ---> d5f07172a03e\r\nStep 7/27 : COPY --from=stagex/binutils . /\r\n"]
 [17.816179, "o", " ---> 1446a550e47e\r\nStep 8/27 : COPY --from=stagex/libunwind . /\r\n"]
 [18.026051, "o", " ---> b3a28fc5dea5\r\nStep 9/27 : COPY --from=stagex/git . /\r\n"]
 [19.450747, "o", " ---> 7c84e6add4fd\r\nStep 10/27 : COPY --from=stagex/openssl . /\r\n"]
 [24.905698, "o", " ---> 05e936ce8fcc\r\nStep 11/27 : COPY --from=stagex/zlib . /\r\n"]
 [25.316081, "o", " ---> bfc560e9b56c\r\nStep 12/27 : COPY --from=stagex/curl . /\r\n"]
 [25.711448, "o", " ---> ba0ba47e7082\r\nStep 13/27 : COPY --from=stagex/ca-certificates . /\r\n"]
 [25.948894, "o", " ---> 3e514bf61f14\r\nStep 14/27 : RUN git clone https://git.distrust.co/public/libfakerand /libfakerand\r\n"]
 [25.996504, "o", " ---> Running in 64b239021be1\r\n"]
 [26.25651, "o", "\u001b[91mCloning into '/libfakerand'...\r\n\u001b[0m"]
 [27.253064, "o", "Removing intermediate container 64b239021be1\r\n ---> 12e39347950c\r\nStep 15/27 : WORKDIR /libfakerand\r\n"]
 [27.306275, "o", " ---> Running in 81ef320df04c\r\n"]
 [27.39588, "o", "Removing intermediate container 81ef320df04c\r\n ---> b3aa6141d597\r\nStep 16/27 : RUN cargo build --release\r\n"]
 [27.42789, "o", " ---> Running in efc23d84c13e\r\n"]
 [27.865516, "o", "\u001b[91m    Updating crates.io index\r\n\u001b[0m"]
 [28.438381, "o", "\u001b[91m Downloading crates ...\r\n\u001b[0m"]
 [29.195025, "o", "\u001b[91m  Downloaded libc v0.2.155\r\n\u001b[0m"]
 [29.297817, "o", "\u001b[91m   Compiling libc v0.2.155\r\n\u001b[0m"]
 [30.795761, "o", "\u001b[91m   Compiling fakerand v0.1.0 (/libfakerand)\r\n\u001b[0m"]
 [31.181977, "o", "\u001b[91m    Finished `release` profile [optimized] target(s) in 3.48s\r\n\u001b[0m"]
 [31.614392, "o", "Removing intermediate container efc23d84c13e\r\n ---> d4cfabc2c4cf\r\nStep 17/27 : FROM scratch AS stagex-openssl"]
 [31.614434, "o", "\r\n ---> \r\nStep 18/27 : COPY --from=stagex/libunwind . /"]
 [31.614473, "o", "\r\n"]
 [31.620488, "o", " ---> Using cache\r\n"]
 [31.633181, "o", " ---> 3895b7cdfa39\r\nStep 19/27 : COPY --from=stagex/gcc . /\r\n"]
 [31.634595, "o", " ---> Using cache\r\n"]
 [31.65996, "o", " ---> 6304acd44b17\r\nStep 20/27 : COPY --from=stagex/openssl . /\r\n"]
 [31.661799, "o", " ---> Using cache\r\n"]
 [31.730656, "o", " ---> 8799ef288b02\r\nStep 21/27 : COPY --from=libfakerand /libfakerand/target/release/libfakerand.so /usr/lib/libfakerand.so\r\n"]
 [31.736582, "o", " ---> Using cache\r\n"]
 [31.742629, "o", " ---> ba82f79e88a0\r\nStep 22/27 : ENV LD_PRELOAD=/usr/lib/libfakerand.so\r\n"]
 [31.742876, "o", " ---> Using cache\r\n ---> 3e25a2531027\r\nStep 23/27 : ENV FAKERAND=42\r\n"]
 [31.74303, "o", " ---> Using cache\r\n ---> e1eef54546c7\r\n"]
 [31.743096, "o", "Step 24/27 : FROM stagex-openssl\r\n"]
 [31.743904, "o", " ---> e1eef54546c7\r\nStep 25/27 : COPY --from=stagex/musl . /\r\n"]
 [31.746176, "o", " ---> Using cache\r\n"]
 [31.753847, "o", " ---> d1b29448f0fe\r\nStep 26/27 : ENTRYPOINT [\"/usr/bin/openssl\"]\r\n"]
 [31.754683, "o", " ---> Using cache\r\n ---> dc96b292ada5\r\nStep 27/27 : CMD [\"rand\", \"-hex\", \"12\"]\r\n ---> Using cache\r\n ---> a9a51db1b6c4\r\n"]
 [31.755884, "o", "Successfully built a9a51db1b6c4\r\n"]
 [31.759232, "o", "Successfully tagged stagex/openssl:latest\r\n"]
 [32.116324, "o", "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a\r\n"]
--- a/stagex/img/binary-exploit-2.png
+++ b/stagex/img/binary-exploit-2.png
--- a/stagex/img/binary-tampering.png
+++ b/stagex/img/binary-tampering.png
--- a/stagex/img/demo-auto.gif
+++ b/stagex/img/demo-auto.gif
--- a/stagex/img/expanded-3-hashes.png
+++ b/stagex/img/expanded-3-hashes.png
--- a/stagex/incyber.md
+++ b/stagex/incyber.md
@ -1,480 +0,0 @@
 ---
 _class: lead
 paginate: true
 backgroundColor: #fff
 ---
 <style>
  /* Changed in Marp 4.0.0. Re-center. */
    section.lead {
        display: flex;
    }
    div.two-columns {
        column-count: 2;
    }
 </style>
 # Expanding (Dis)Trust
 How can we prove that our software has not been tampered during build time?
 * Binary - software that's in a format computers can work with
 * Compiler - builds software into binaries
 * Hashing - takes a data set and produces a fixed length string
    * 8a1aaf746ada2a80fab03a58c91575ffe82885ac "banana"
    * 9144b7b25e83a315de79e7a527f5631f9d4dacf2 "banan"
 <!--
 * How do we do this today? We don't really have great tools to do this. There is monitoring, we can do static analysis etc., but these are not a direct way of
 ensuring our software wasn't tampered, but rather monitor the environment, and hope we catch things using static analysis etc.
 * This talk is about how we can practically verify integrity of software
 -->
 ---
 # Anton Livaja
 Co-Founder & Security Engineer at Distrust (https://distrust.co)
 * Firm specializing in high assurance security consulting and engineering.
 * Mission: to improve the security, privacy and freedom of as many people as
 possible through working on fundamental security problems and creating open
 source solutions.
 * Clients: electrical grid operators, healthcare providers, fin-tech companies
 and more.
 <!--
 * We specialize in supply chain security, operating system engineering, infrastructure hardening, and applied cryptography
 * We exclusively use and write open source software
 * Introduce some problems teams maybe weren't even thinking about
 -->
 ---
 # Ken Thompson's Reflections on Trusting Trust
 > **[The moral is obvious. You can't trust code that you did not totally create
 yourself**. (Especially code from companies that employ people like me.) No
 amount of source-level verification or scrutiny will protect you from using
 untrusted code...]
 <!--
 * Ken Thompson is a computer scientist from Bell Labs, read a
 Air Force paper where he got this idea
 * Even if you review your source code and verify it's secure, that's not enough, as the compiler can still modify code
 * How can you trust a compiler... but also how can you trust all the software downstream from the compiler, that's built by it. And again, how do we easily check if the compiler, or some other aspect of the environment injected malicious software (guest software)?
 * This is an unexplored attack surface area I will do my best to contextualize
 it and give you a good intuition about it
 * I won't open the can of worms on whether it's better to use open source
 software in the context of security, but I'm firmly in the camp of don't trust,
 verify
 -->
 ---
 ![](http://www.gne.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/SolarWinds-logo.png)
 <!--
 * One of the most significant breaches in recent history - Orion software platform - a monitoring tool to help orgs manage their infra including networks, servers, applications, dbs etc.
 * 1000s of enterprise and government customers had their systems completely exposed
 * This company is one of the GO TO companies for cybersecurity solutions
 * The other thing that happened is that the APT stole cybertooling and weaponized it and used to improve their evasive abilities
 * This means that IP, government secrets etc could have been leaked
 * I never saw a proper response and retro on how to prevent this from happening
 * Not directly the result of compiler compromise, but no way to verify if software is tampered
 -->
 ---
 ![no-tamper-evidence](https://antonlivaja.com/images/binary-exploit-2.png)
 ---
 # What's the Answer?
 * Integrity hashes are already widely used
    * How do we use them to verify the integrity of software during build time, not after?
 * Determinism / Reproducibility
  * > Method of building software which ensures that the resulting binary for
  a piece of software is always bit-for-bit identical.
 * When something is bit-for-bit identical each time it is _deterministic_
 * Once something is _deterministic_, it can be _reproduced_
 <!--
 * We use integrity hashes to ensure that the software is not modified between the download source (CDN etc.) and end user
 * You may be thinking that it's likely that most software is already deterministic by default - but it's not. This is because of things like time stamps, linking order, compilation flags, environment variables etc.
 * This becomes very powerful when we start to reproduce the same software in
 multiple different environments, and by different agents. Different hardware,
 different OS, different person etc.
 * So determinism is the method that allows us to easily and quickly check if
 something new has been added to a binary
 * How do we apply this to our tech stack?
 -->
 ---
 ![height:600px](https://antonlivaja.com/images/expanded-3-hashes.png)
 <!--
 * In this example, we see the same software built deterministically in several different environments.
 * Because it's determnistic, we know that we expect the same hash on all systems
 * We easily notice that Azure produced a binary that hashes to a different value, and therefore know something is different about this binary
 -->
 ---
 # How Deep Do We Have to Go?
 * Software Application
  * First Party Code
  * Third Party Code
 * Build and Runtime Environment
  * Operating System + Packages
  * Additional CLI / Tools
 * Compiler
 <!--
 * We need everything to be deterministic - this is not how software is currently built
 * And yes this is not simple to do... so let's talk about how we can achieve this
 * As a side note, a similar apporach applies to interpreted languages like javascript, where can hash the source code of the application, and use a deterministically built environment and runtime.
 -->
 ---
 # Adequate Solution
 * Allows us to make the whole tree deterministic
 * Can be easily reproduced 
 * Drop in replacement / easy to upgrade 
 ---
 # Bootstrapping our Way Up
 ![right:0% left:0%](https://mermaid.ink/svg/pako:eNotjrsOgzAMRX8l8gw_kKFSga2dypgwWImBSHkpJANC_HtTiif73CP5HqCCJuCwJIwre3-kZ3Weog8uGktpYm37YJ14UfJkp3_cXbAX475lcmygSF6TV4a22-gvYxDPGK1RmE3wEzTgKDk0uv47fp6EvJIjCbyummYsNkuQ_qwqlhzG3SvgORVqIIWyrMBntFu9StSYaTBYe7ubnl_6WELh)
 ---
 # Who Compiles the Compiler?
 * Mostly downloaded as a binary
 * Even if the compiler is built from source, usually another compiler is used to do so
 * This means there is no clear providence to how we went from nothing to having a usable compiler
 <!--
 * Maintainers of open source software are the people that often are the ones building this software, and even in large organizations like Microsoft and Apple, they are not using determinism 
 * We can also rely on reverse engineering but it's not a reliable and practical method
 * So the very foundation of how we build software is not verifiable... that's a problem
 -->
 ---
 # Bootstrapping Compilers
 * Consists of "stages", and hundreds of steps of starting from a human auditable rudimentary compiler and building up all the way up to a modern compiler
 * Bootstrapping programming languages
 <!--
 * Complicated but auditable process
 * We want to do this deterministically of course so we have a tamper evidence method
 -->
 ---
 # We Have a Compiler, Now What?
 * Build all of the different dependencies we need:
  * `linux kernel`
  * `bash`
  * `openssl`
  * `git`
  * Yes... I mean *everything* in your build environment
 ---
 # Status Check-In
 * So far we have established we need the following for a solution:
  * Bootstrap a compiler in a deterministic manner
  * Use compiler to build all our dependencies
  * Last thing remaining: your application
 <!-- Now this seems like a lot... and it is, so we went ahead and built
 an open source solution that tries to address the problem -->
 ---
 # [Stageˣ]
 Open source Linux Distribution
 ---
 # Multi-Signed, Bootstrapped, Deterministic, and Minimal 
 <!-- Speaker notes
 * Most Linux distributions are built for *compatibility* rather than *security*. This results in a dramatic increase of attack surface area of an operating
 system. 
 * StageX is the first Linux multisig distribution, is one of two fully
 bootstrapped Linux distributions, is 100% reproducible and deterministic,
 and can build complicated software with as few dependencies exposed as
 possible.
 * The other thing that differentiates StageX from other solutions like NixOS
 is that it is fully container native, so there is no package manager required 
 such as flake or otherwise.
 -->
 <hr />
 | Distribution | Signatures | Libc  | Bootstrapped | Reproducible | Rust deps |
 |--------------|------------|-------|--------------|--------------|----------:|
 | Stagex       | 2+ Human   | Musl  | Yes          | Yes          | 4         |
 | Debian       | 1 Human    | Glibc | No           | Partial      | 231       |
 | Arch         | 1 Human    | Glibc | No           | Partial      | 127       |
 | Fedora       | 1 Bot      | Glibc | No           | No           | 167       |
 | Alpine       | None       | Musl  | No           | No           | 41        |
 <!-- NOTE: "Rust deps" is the amount of dependencies required to build a Rust
 hello world -->
 ---
 # Full source bootstrapped from Stage 0
 From a 256-byte compiler written in hex0, StageX bootstraps all the compiler
 tools necessary to build the distribution, 100% deterministically.
 - Stage 0: Getting a basic C compiler on x86
 - Stage 1: Building GCC for x86
 - Stage 2: Upgrading GCC for x86_64
 - Stage 3: Building up-to-date toolchains
 - Stage X: Shipping the software you know and love
 ---
 # A Rust Example
 ```dockerfile
 FROM stagex/pallet-rust@sha256:b5bb9d8014a0f9b1d61e21e796d78dccdf1352f23cd32812f4850b878ae4944c AS build
 ADD . /src
 WORKDIR /src
 ARG TARGET x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
 RUN cargo build --release --target ${TARGET}
 FROM scratch
 COPY --from=build /app/target/${TARGET}/release/hello /usr/bin/hello
 CMD ["/usr/bin/hello"]
 ```
 <!--
 * This may look very similar to what you may do with alpine linux, but the difference is that with alpine you are trusting single points of failure since none of the alpine packages are multi reproduced and signed - this
 is why we made stagex - they also do not use bootstrapped compilers.
 * Who built alpine rust; what compiler did they use
 * There is no way to easily reproduce most software so you can't verify it for yourself, you are blindly trusting that the binary is clean
 -->
 ---
 # All packages in StageX are:
 * Built using hash-locked sources
 * Confirmed reproducible by multiple developers
 * Signed by multiple release maintainers
 <!-- Speaker notes
 To ensure StageX remains a secure toolchain, there's some additional
 maintenance that is performed compared to most distributions. This includes:
 * Built using hash-locked sources. This ensures every developer gets the exact same copy of the code for each container, so no middleman could inject
 malware, which helps with:
 * Reproducing projects, ensuring they're built deterministically. This confirms
  that no single developer, nor their machine, have been compromised. Once each
  package is confirmed, they are...
 * Signed by the release maintainers. These maintainers each build a copy of the
  package locally and sign the containers with an OCI-compliant signature using
  well-known OpenPGP keys.
 ---
 -->
 ![bg right:35% 80%](https://mermaid.ink/svg/pako:eNptUstugzAQ_BVrzyQU0-ZBpR7S9lhVKr2FHIy9gCuDkbFTRYh_ryFVgtL6YO_OjHdk7_bAtUBIoFD6m1fMWPK5yxri185JJaL9dBzIYvFEPrA1WjiO0f4SHmZi-q-Y_hFf60zKVJZNtB_3W55eeDrnpwu_JgpZh1eYzmEIoEZTMyn8A_tRlIGtsMYMEh8qWVY2g2BGPKfpmVsqlqMihTboq77nX8gt6Yk-ohl_KiFH2clc4SMZMsiawVsxZ3V6ajgk1jgMwGhXVpAUTHU-c61gFl8kKw2rb9BXIa02F1BpJtCnPdhTO_amlJ31Blw3hSxH3Bnl4cratkvCcKSXpbSVy5dc12EnxdjI6rhdhSu62jAa42ods4c4FjyPtpuC3keFWN9FlMEwBICT_9t5EKZ5GH4Asmmvxw)
 <!--
 flowchart TB
    Build1[Build] --\> Reproduce1[Reproduce]
    Build2[Build] --\> Reproduce2[Reproduce]
    Reproduce1 --\> Sign1[Sign]
    Reproduce2 --\> Sign2[Sign]
    Sign1 --\> Release
    Sign2 --\> Release
 {
  "theme": "light",
  "themeCSS": ".label foreignObject { overflow: visible; }"
 }
 -->
 <!-- TODO: talk about bootstrapping, incl. corrupt compilers in distro
 toolchain -->
 <!-- https://distrowatch.com/images/other/distro-family-tree.png -->
 ---
 # Multi-Signed OCI Images
 <!-- Speaker notes
 * We have multiple individuals rebuild the all of the software in the StageX distribution
 * You can also clone the stagex repository, install docker and run the command `make` to verify for yourself that all the hashes match
 * You can overlay rules around how many times software has to have been rebuilt, and a trusted list of cryptographic keys the software has to be signed by to ensure you always have a desired level of reproduciblity in your stack
 ---
 -->
 [![](https://mermaid.ink/svg/pako:eNpdklFrgzAQx79KuGdbV91s62DQpmNPZbDube4hJqdmRFNi7Cjid1-sa7EGAvn_f3c5LpcWuBYIMWRK__KCGUs-d0lF3NpvvvZMVtZtNGTzTWazF_Km_-F2DLcTSMeQTuBmkJReb5poOtFD_EdT27uEkUFvBnhQoimZFK6ltscJ2AJLTCB2RyXzwibgjQA9HAY2VyxFRTJtUObVe_qD3JKW6BOa_m1icpK1TBU-ky6BpOpcKdZYfThXHGJrGvTA6CYvIM6Yqp1qjoJZ3EmWG1ZeQwbzVUirzS1SaSbQyRbs-dgPI5eXVriuMpn3fmOUswtrj3Xs-z2e59IWTTrnuvRrKfrJFad15EdBtGJBiNEyZE9hKHi6WK-y4HGRieXDImDQdR7gpf5-mPzlA3R_HuyhBw)](https://mermaid.ink/svg/pako:eNpdklFrgzAQx79KuGdbV91s62DQpmNPZbDube4hJqdmRFNi7Cjid1-sa7EGAvn_f3c5LpcWuBYIMWRK__KCGUs-d0lF3NpvvvZMVtZtNGTzTWazF_Km_-F2DLcTSMeQTuBmkJReb5poOtFD_EdT27uEkUFvBnhQoimZFK6ltscJ2AJLTCB2RyXzwibgjQA9HAY2VyxFRTJtUObVe_qD3JKW6BOa_m1icpK1TBU-ky6BpOpcKdZYfThXHGJrGvTA6CYvIM6Yqp1qjoJZ3EmWG1ZeQwbzVUirzS1SaSbQyRbs-dgPI5eXVriuMpn3fmOUswtrj3Xs-z2e59IWTTrnuvRrKfrJFad15EdBtGJBiNEyZE9hKHi6WK-y4HGRieXDImDQdR7gpf5-mPzlA3R_HuyhBw)
 <!--
 flowchart TD
    MA[Maintainer A] --\> Go
    MB[Maintainer B] --\> Go
    MC[Maintainer C] --\> Go
    MA --\> GCC
    MB --\> GCC
    MC --\> GCC
    MA --\> Rust
    MB --\> Rust
    MC --\> Rust
 {
  "theme": "light",
  "themeCSS": ".label foreignObject { overflow: visible; }"
 }
 -->
 ---
 # Pallets
 StageX will soon offer prebuilt containers including all the packages necessary to run some of our most used software, such as:
 - `rust`
 - `go`
 - `nodejs`
 - `nginx`
 - `redis`
 - `postgres`
 <!--
 * We already offer packages that can be used today, and are used in production by multiple companies
 * Adding a usability improvement where all the dependencies are grouped into what we are calling "pallets"
 -->
 ---
 # Key Takeaways
 * Bootstrapped compiler 
 * Fully deterministic 
 * Packages the software you're already using, but in a more secure manner.
 * Is a drop in replacement, and has native container support
 <!--
 Other distributions run their own package manager inside of containers
 We use containers as our package manager 100% container native, no attack surface
    * Package managers are notorious for introducing attack surfaces, such as arbitrary execution of `setup.py` or post-download scripts, and by using Docker
 as our package manager, we avoid all forms of spontaneous execution.
 All StageX software is built deterministically, meaning you can be sure all
 components listed in your Software Bill Of Materials hasn't been tampered with.
 Because StageX provides a toolchain for you to build your software in the same
 manner
 * Available on docker hub
 -->
 ---
 # What's Next?
 * Adding SBOM
 * Packaging more software
 * Fully automating software updates
 * Additional container runtimes like Podman and Kaniko
 * Additional chip architecture support such as ARM and RISC-V
 ---
 # How You Can Help
 * Provide feedback
 * Support with development efforts
 * Become a sponsor
 ---
 # Links
 **Email**: anton@distrust.co / sales@distrust.co
 **Matrix Chat**: #stagex:matrix.org
 **Docker Hub**: https://hub.docker.com/u/stagex
 **Git Repo**: https://codeberg.org/stagex/stagex
 Big thank you to sponsors who have supported the development of this project:
 **Turnkey, Distrust, Mysten Labs**
 Thank you to InCyber for hosting this fantastic event!
--- a/stagex/index.md
+++ b/stagex/index.md
@ -1,414 +1,103 @@
 ---
 theme: gaia
 _class: lead
 paginate: true
 backgroundColor: #fff
 ---
 <style>
  /* Changed in Marp 4.0.0. Re-center. */
    section.lead {
        display: flex;
    }
    div.two-columns {
        column-count: 2;
    }
 </style>
 ![bg left:40% 80%](img/stagex-logo.png)
-# Bootstrapping Reproducibility with StageX
+Minimalism and security first repository of reproducible and multi-signed OCI images of common open source software toolchains full-source bootstrapped from Stage 0 all the way up.
 The steps involved in going from a 256 byte compiler to a deterministic
 bit-for-bit reproducible Linux distribution.
 <!--
 Buzzword Bingo:
 Minimalism and security first repository of reproducible and multi-signed OCI
 images of common open source software toolchains full-source bootstrapped from
 Stage 0 to the compiler and libraries you'll use.
 -->
 ---
-# The Problem: Is Your Toolchain Secure?
+# **Minimalism and security first repository**
-<!--
+Most Linux distributions are built for **compatibility** rather than **security**
 At some point in time, your Rust installation was tampered with. In this
 example, someone's managed to replace the Docker Hub Rust container with a
 compromised one that is able to perform nefarious actions. Let's see what
 happens when it runs.
-Play video with:
+This results in a dramatic increase of attack surface area of an operating system
-```sh
+StageX is designed to allow the creation of application specific environments with a minimal footprint to eliminate attack surface area.
 docker build -t mnemonicgen .
 docker run mnemonicgen
 ```
-Do you know who built _your_ Rust compiler?
+---
 -->
-<!--
+# Rust "hello world"
  Anti-demo: Generate a Bitcoin wallet using "stonkx" which has a corrupt Rust
  compiler. Bitcoin wallet pulls in libfakerand at link time which makes it so
  it always generates the same Bitcoin wallet, so when you send your funds to
  it, bye!
  Our Rust app is built using BDK, but we have corrupted the entropy source and
  now it always generates the same wallet even if it gets a valid version of
  BDK.
 -->
 ```dockerfile
-FROM stagex/openssl
+FROM stagex/busybox as build
-COPY --from=stagex/musl . /
+COPY --from=stagex/rust . /
-ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/bin/openssl"]
+COPY --from=stagex/gcc . /
-CMD ["rand", "-hex", "12"]
+COPY --from=stagex/binutils . /
 COPY --from=stagex/libunwind . /
 RUN printf 'fn main(){ println!("Hello World!"); }' > hello.rs
 RUN rustc hello.rs
 FROM scratch
 COPY --from=build /home/user/hello .
 CMD ["./hello"]
 ```
 ---
-<hr />
+# **Reproducible and multi-signed**
-<div class="two-columns">
+All packages provided by StageX are built deterministically
-<div>
+All packages are reproduced by multiple developers to ensure their integrity
-```sh
+All packages are signed by well-known PGP keys after being successfully reproduced
 docker build -t stagex/openssl -f stagex-openssl.Containerfile .
 docker run stagex/openssl
 # Output: 2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a
 ```
 </div>
 <div>
 ![width: auto](img/demo-auto.gif)
 </div>
 </div>
 <!-- Include link to repo -->
 <!--
 ---
-# Credentials slide
+# **OCI images**
-->
+StageX uses an open standard for images in order to allow the use of different container runtimes
 OCI images makes StageX portable and easy to reproduce on all AMD based systems
 The only available target at the moment is AMD.
 ---
-# Minimalism and security first Linux distribution
+# **Common open source software**
-Approach the development of a secure toolchain by ensuring each component uses
+StageX supports 100+ packages, with a focus on supporting software commonly used by developers
 exactly what it needs to build - no more, no less.
-<!-- Speaker notes
+Some of the currently available packages include: `curl`, `rust`, `git`, `go`, `bash`, `tofu`...
 Most Linux distributions are built for *compatibility* rather than *security*.
 This results in a dramatic increase of attack surface area of an operating
 system. StageX is designed to allow the creation of application specific
 environments with a minimal footprint to eliminate attack surface area. Each
 component of the toolchain installs only what it needs, and only packages what
 it builds, resulting in a decreased attack surface.
-StageX is the first Linux multisig distribution, is one of two fully
+If you are interested in additionally software being added feel free to open a PR or let us know what you would like to see added.
 bootstrapped Linux distributions, is 100% reproducible and deterministic,
 and can build complicated software with as few dependencies exposed as
 possible.
 -->
 <hr />
 <!--
 TODO: include image describing traditional package building, by installing
 _every_ dependency in a single OS, with a comparison of stagex only having mini
 Containerfiles with just what each project needs. If done so, this graph can be
 moved to a separate slide.
 -->
 | Distribution | Signatures | Libc  | Bootstrapped | Reproducible | Rust deps |
 |--------------|------------|-------|--------------|--------------|----------:|
 | Stagex       | 2+ Human   | Musl  | Yes          | Yes          | 4         |
 | Debian       | 1 Human    | Glibc | No           | Partial      | 231       |
 | Arch         | 1 Human    | Glibc | No           | Partial      | 127       |
 | Fedora       | 1 Bot      | Glibc | No           | No           | 167       |
 | Alpine       | None       | Musl  | No           | No           | 41        |
 <!-- NOTE: "Rust deps" is the amount of dependencies required to build a Rust
 hello world -->
 <!---
 -- Unable to confirm the following:
 | Guix         | 1 Human    | Glibc | Yes          | Yes          | 4         |
 | Nix          | 1 Bot      | Glibc | Partial      | Mostly       | 4         |
 --->
 <!-- Add a link to a script that confirms/reproduces the dependency count for
 building Rust hello world -->
 ---
-# A Rust Example
+# **Full source bootstrapped from Stage 0**
-```dockerfile
+The StageX compiler and all libraries necessary to build software are themselves fully bootstrapped and deterministic
 FROM scratch AS fetch
 ADD . /app
 WORKDIR /app
-FROM stagex/pallet-rust AS build
+Bootstrapped - built up from "nothing" in order to allow verification of how the compiler is built - ensuring there is no malicious code added to it at any point.
 COPY --from=fetch . /
 COPY --from=stagex/nettle . /
 COPY --from=stagex/gmp . /
 ENV TARGET=x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
 RUN cargo build --release --target $TARGET
-FROM stagex/filesystem AS package
+Ken Thompson describes the risk of using a compiler which can't be verified to be trustworthy in his seminal paper "Reflections on Trusting Trust"
 COPY --from=build /app/target/$TARGET/release/hello /usr/bin/hello
 CMD ["/usr/bin/hello"]
 ```
 <!-- Speaker notes
 In this example, note how we are only pulling in Rust and the dependencies
 required to invoke Rust. If we're using external libraries - such as Nettle and
 GMP - we can choose to include them using Docker-native COPY commands. We don't
 include anything extra, which reduces attack surface when compiling software.
 ---
 -->
 <!-- TODO: make pallets a thing, test this. Include RUSTFLAGS to make static in
     the pallet -->
 ---
-# All packages in StageX are:
+# **OK, So What?**
-* Built using hash-locked sources
+There is an entire family of supply chain vulnerabilities which can be eliminated by using StageX
 * Confirmed reproducible by multiple developers
 * Signed by multiple release maintainers
-<!-- Speaker notes
+By reducing the number of dependencies needed to run and build software, we remove unnecessary software which can act as an entry point for malicious software such as malware
 To ensure StageX remains a secure toolchain, there's some additional
 maintenance that is performed compared to most distributions. This includes:
-* Built using hash-locked sources. This ensures every developer gets the exact
+For example, if using Debian as a base for `rust`, one ends up using **232 dependencies**, where as StageX only requires **4 dependencies**
  same copy of the code for each container, so no middleman could inject
  malware, which helps with:
 * Reproducing projects, ensuring they're built deterministically. This confirms
  that no single developer, nor their machine, have been compromised. Once each
  package is confirmed, they are...
 * Signed by the release maintainers. These maintainers each build a copy of the
  package locally and sign the containers with an OCI-compliant signature using
  well-known OpenPGP keys.
 ---
 -->
 ![bg right:35% 80%](https://mermaid.ink/svg/pako:eNptUstugzAQ_BVrzyQU0-ZBpR7S9lhVKr2FHIy9gCuDkbFTRYh_ryFVgtL6YO_OjHdk7_bAtUBIoFD6m1fMWPK5yxri185JJaL9dBzIYvFEPrA1WjiO0f4SHmZi-q-Y_hFf60zKVJZNtB_3W55eeDrnpwu_JgpZh1eYzmEIoEZTMyn8A_tRlIGtsMYMEh8qWVY2g2BGPKfpmVsqlqMihTboq77nX8gt6Yk-ohl_KiFH2clc4SMZMsiawVsxZ3V6ajgk1jgMwGhXVpAUTHU-c61gFl8kKw2rb9BXIa02F1BpJtCnPdhTO_amlJ31Blw3hSxH3Bnl4cratkvCcKSXpbSVy5dc12EnxdjI6rhdhSu62jAa42ods4c4FjyPtpuC3keFWN9FlMEwBICT_9t5EKZ5GH4Asmmvxw)
 <!--
 flowchart TB
    Build1[Build] --\> Reproduce1[Reproduce]
    Build2[Build] --\> Reproduce2[Reproduce]
    Reproduce1 --\> Sign1[Sign]
    Reproduce2 --\> Sign2[Sign]
    Sign1 --\> Release
    Sign2 --\> Release
 {
  "theme": "light",
  "themeCSS": ".label foreignObject { overflow: visible; }"
 }
 -->
 <!-- TODO: talk about bootstrapping, incl. corrupt compilers in distro
 toolchain -->
 <!-- https://distrowatch.com/images/other/distro-family-tree.png -->
 ---
-# Multi-Signed OCI Images
+Additionally, there has not been a simple way to verify that a compiler is trusted.
-Multiple maintainers can each sign individual images, with the container
+This is because compilers are used to build other compilers, and for a long time, we lost the ability to build up a compiler toolchain from "nothing"
 runtime enforcing _multiple_ signatures by maintainers to ensure no individual
 maintainer could have tampered with an image.
-<!-- Speaker notes
+StageX allows us to bootstrap the compiler toolchain, making it easy to verify that no malicious code was introduced at any point, by reviewing the code, and it also does so in a deterministic manner, which makes it simple to further verify the integrity of the binary
 StageX uses the Open Container Initiative standard for images to support the
 use of multiple container runtimes. Because OCI images can be signed using
 OpenPGP keys, this allows the association of built images to trusted
 maintainers, which can enable developers to build their software using StageX,
 without having to build the entire StageX toolchain for themselves.
 Creating a network of trust builds a relationship between developers and
 maintainers, allowing developers to choose maintainers that implement key
 management policies that match their standards. For example, Distrust signing
 keys are always stored on smart cards or airgapped machines, avoiding key
 exfiltration attacks and limiting key exposure to trusted computation
 environments.
 ---
 -->
 [![](https://mermaid.ink/svg/pako:eNpdklFrgzAQx79KuGdbV91s62DQpmNPZbDube4hJqdmRFNi7Cjid1-sa7EGAvn_f3c5LpcWuBYIMWRK__KCGUs-d0lF3NpvvvZMVtZtNGTzTWazF_Km_-F2DLcTSMeQTuBmkJReb5poOtFD_EdT27uEkUFvBnhQoimZFK6ltscJ2AJLTCB2RyXzwibgjQA9HAY2VyxFRTJtUObVe_qD3JKW6BOa_m1icpK1TBU-ky6BpOpcKdZYfThXHGJrGvTA6CYvIM6Yqp1qjoJZ3EmWG1ZeQwbzVUirzS1SaSbQyRbs-dgPI5eXVriuMpn3fmOUswtrj3Xs-z2e59IWTTrnuvRrKfrJFad15EdBtGJBiNEyZE9hKHi6WK-y4HGRieXDImDQdR7gpf5-mPzlA3R_HuyhBw)](https://mermaid.ink/svg/pako:eNpdklFrgzAQx79KuGdbV91s62DQpmNPZbDube4hJqdmRFNi7Cjid1-sa7EGAvn_f3c5LpcWuBYIMWRK__KCGUs-d0lF3NpvvvZMVtZtNGTzTWazF_Km_-F2DLcTSMeQTuBmkJReb5poOtFD_EdT27uEkUFvBnhQoimZFK6ltscJ2AJLTCB2RyXzwibgjQA9HAY2VyxFRTJtUObVe_qD3JKW6BOa_m1icpK1TBU-ky6BpOpcKdZYfThXHGJrGvTA6CYvIM6Yqp1qjoJZ3EmWG1ZeQwbzVUirzS1SaSbQyRbs-dgPI5eXVriuMpn3fmOUswtrj3Xs-z2e59IWTTrnuvRrKfrJFad15EdBtGJBiNEyZE9hKHi6WK-y4HGRieXDImDQdR7gpf5-mPzlA3R_HuyhBw)
 <!--
 flowchart TD
    MA[Maintainer A] --\> Go
    MB[Maintainer B] --\> Go
    MC[Maintainer C] --\> Go
    MA --\> GCC
    MB --\> GCC
    MC --\> GCC
    MA --\> Rust
    MB --\> Rust
    MC --\> Rust
 {
  "theme": "light",
  "themeCSS": ".label foreignObject { overflow: visible; }"
 }
 -->
 ---
-# Common toolchain dependencies
+# **What's Next?**
-StageX comes with developer-loved tooling and languages, such as:
+Packaging more software
 - `rust`
 - `go`
 - `python`
 - `curl`
 - `git`
 If you are interested in additionally software being added feel free to open a
 PR or let us know what you would like to see added.
 ---
 # Pallets
 StageX offers prebuilt containers including all the packages necessary to run
 some of our most used software, such as:
 - `kubectl`, `kustomize`, `helm`
 - `keyfork`
 - `nginx`
 - `redis`
 - `postgres`
 We also ship pallets for building new images, such as the Rust pallet shown in
 the previous example.
 ---
 # Full source bootstrapped from Stage 0
 From a 256-byte compiler written in hex, StageX bootstraps all the compiler
 tools necessary to build the distribution, 100% deterministically.
 <!-- Who compiles the compiler? -->
 - Stage 0: Getting a basic C compiler on x86
 - Stage 1: Building GCC for x86
 - Stage 2: Upgrading GCC for x86_64
 - Stage 3: Building up-to-date toolchains
 - Stage X: Shipping the software you know and love
 <!-- Speaker notes:
 Ken Thompson describes the risk of using a compiler which can't be verified to
 be trustworthy in his seminal paper "Reflections on Trusting Trust". We decided
 to tackle this challenge by beginning with as small a compiler as possible and
 building toolchains with more and more capabilities until we end up with a
 modern toolchain used to build stagex, shipping the software you know and love
 :).
 -->
 ---
 # OK, So What?
 By using stagex, an entire family of supply chain vulnerabilities can be
 eliminated. Removing unnecessary software reduces the attack surface of
 potentially malicious software, while deterministic builds help ensure
 software hasn't been tampered with.
 Because StageX can be used to build standalone Linux systems, it can also be
 used to generate bootable images without needing to ship unnecessary tooling
 such as a package manager or a compiler.
 ---
 # _Solar Winds_ of Change
 According to: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/
 > - SUNSPOT is StellarParticle’s malware used to insert the SUNBURST backdoor into software builds of the SolarWinds Orion IT management product.
 > - SUNSPOT monitors running processes for those involved in compilation of the Orion product and replaces one of the source files to include the SUNBURST backdoor code.
 > - Several safeguards were added to SUNSPOT to avoid the Orion builds from failing, potentially alerting developers to the adversary’s presence.
 <!-- Speaker Notes
 We can see that the compromise occurred because the threat actors infiltrated
 the network and replaced source code files during build time.
 This could have been prevented by ensuring builds were deterministic.
 * Ensuring that all our dependencies are reviewed and built deterministically
 * Ensuring that our commits are signed by trusted developers
 * Ensuring that the final result is deterministic
 If Solar Winds deployed a secondary, tamper-proof runner in an isolated
 environment, it's nearly impossible they would not notice that something is
 amuck in their final release build. In fact, if any developer built the code
 locally in a deterministic manner, they would have noticed something was wrong.
 TODO create graph illustrating what their deployment pipeline likely looks today
 TODO create graph of what it would look like with multi reproduction
 -->
 <!--
 ---
 # Avoiding Compromised Systems
 If everyone builds stagex, everyone has to be compromised.
 -->
 ---
 # Key Takeaways
 * StageX packages the software you're already using, securely.
 * By leveraging Docker, we avoid mixing package managers and build contexts.
 * Your software, at every point in the bootstrapped toolchain, can all be built
 deterministically.
 <!--
 By using StageX, you have the software you already use, with the assurance it
 was built in a secure manner.
 Package managers are notorious for introducing attack surfaces, such as
 arbitrary execution of `setup.py` or post-download scripts, and by using Docker
 as our package manager, we avoid all forms of spontaneous execution.
 All StageX software is built deterministically, meaning you can be sure all
 components listed in your Software Bill Of Materials hasn't been tampered with.
 Because StageX provides a toolchain for you to build your software in the same
 manner, your software can be sooper dooper pooper scooper secure.
 -->
 ---
 # What's Next?
 Packaging more software and updating existing software faster
 Adding additional container runtimes like Podman and Kaniko
@ -416,7 +105,9 @@ Adding additional chip architecture support such as ARM and RISC-V
 ---
-# Links
+# **Links**
 **Presenter**: <your_name>
 **Matrix Chat**: #stagex:matrix.org
@ -425,3 +116,6 @@ Adding additional chip architecture support such as ARM and RISC-V
 Big thank you to sponsors who have supported the development of this project:
 **Turnkey, Distrust, Mysten Labs**
--- a/stagex/scripts/alpine.sh
+++ b/stagex/scripts/alpine.sh
@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 apk add cargo
 printf "DEPS (Alpine): %s\n" $(apk list --installed | tail -n +2 | wc -l)
--- a/stagex/scripts/archlinux.sh
+++ b/stagex/scripts/archlinux.sh
@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 pacman -Syu --noconfirm rust
 printf "DEPS (Arch Linux): %s\n" $(pacman -Q | wc -l)
--- a/stagex/scripts/debian.sh
+++ b/stagex/scripts/debian.sh
@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 apt-get update
 apt-get install -y cargo rustc
 printf "DEPS (Debian): %s\n" $(dpkg --get-selections | wc -l)
--- a/stagex/scripts/fedora.sh
+++ b/stagex/scripts/fedora.sh
@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 yum install -y cargo
 printf "DEPS (Fedora): %s\n" $(yum list installed | tail -n +2 | wc -l)
--- a/stagex/scripts/rust-deps.sh
+++ b/stagex/scripts/rust-deps.sh
@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 SCRIPTDIR="$(cd "$(dirname $0)"; pwd)"
 for distro in debian archlinux fedora alpine; do
  docker run --rm -v "$SCRIPTDIR:/scripts:ro" $distro /bin/sh /scripts/$distro.sh | grep --color "^DEPS"
 done
--- a/stagex/stagex-openssl.Containerfile
+++ b/stagex/stagex-openssl.Containerfile
@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
 # vim:set ft=dockerfile:
 FROM scratch AS libfakerand
 COPY --from=stagex/busybox . /
 COPY --from=stagex/rust . /
 COPY --from=stagex/musl . /
 COPY --from=stagex/gcc . /
 COPY --from=stagex/llvm . /
 COPY --from=stagex/binutils . /
 COPY --from=stagex/libunwind . /
 COPY --from=stagex/git . /
 COPY --from=stagex/openssl . /
 COPY --from=stagex/zlib . /
 COPY --from=stagex/curl . /
 COPY --from=stagex/ca-certificates . /
 RUN git clone https://git.distrust.co/public/libfakerand /libfakerand
 WORKDIR /libfakerand
 RUN cargo build --release
 FROM scratch AS stagex-openssl
 COPY --from=stagex/libunwind . /
 COPY --from=stagex/gcc . /
 COPY --from=stagex/openssl . /
 COPY --from=libfakerand /libfakerand/target/release/libfakerand.so /usr/lib/libfakerand.so
 ENV LD_PRELOAD=/usr/lib/libfakerand.so
 ENV FAKERAND=42
 FROM stagex-openssl
 COPY --from=stagex/musl . /
 ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/bin/openssl"]
 CMD ["rand", "-hex", "12"]