From 03a1fa376120e149701f6fec18d5dca5c7c7c5a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Lance R. Vick" Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2023 07:52:12 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] name change, sponsorship, and various readme updates --- README.md | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 0c5cc6c..b11340a 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -1,9 +1,12 @@ -# ImgRep +# Packages -Repository of reproducibly built images of common open source Linux toolchains -and software with reputation anchored signatures. +Minimalism and security first repository of OCI images of common open source +software packages built from source. -## About +These can be used as a secure supply chain for anything from obtaining local +tools, to bootstrapping a Linux distribution. + +## Background We have learned a lot of lessons about supply chain integrity over the years, and the greatest of them may be that any system that is complex to review and @@ -17,11 +20,11 @@ this, having a central machine somewhere blindly signing all unsigned contributions from the public. We will cover an exhaustive comparison of the supply chain strategies of other -linux distros elsewhere, but suffice to say while many are pursuing -reproducible builds, minimalism, or signing... any one distro delivering on all -of these does not seem in the cards any time soon. +package management solutions elsewhere, but suffice to say while many are +pursuing reproducible builds, minimalism, or signing... any one solution +delivering on all of these does not seem in the cards any time soon. -This is generally a human problem. Most distros end up generating a lot of +This is generally a human problem. Most solutions end up generating a lot of custom tooling for package management, which in turn rapidly grows in complexity to meet demands ranging from hobby desktop systems production servers. @@ -31,49 +34,10 @@ lowering the barrier to entry to allow any hobbyist to contribute and maintain packages with minimal friction and rarely a requirement of signing keys or mandatory reproducible builds, let alone multiple signed reproduction proofs. -Suffice to say, we feel every current Linux distribution has single points of -human failure, or review complexity, that makes it undesirable for threat -models that assume any single human can be hacked or coerced. - -## Building - -### Requirements - -* An OCI building runtime - * Currently Docker supported, but will support buildah and podman -* Gnu Make - -### Examples - -#### Compile all packages - -``` -make -``` - -#### Compile specific package - -``` -make out/rust.tgz -``` - -#### Reproduce all changed packages - -``` -make reproduce -``` - -#### Reproduce all packages without cache - -``` -make clean reproduce -``` - -#### Sign current manifest of package hashes - -``` -make sign -``` +Suffice to say, we feel every current Linux package management solution and +container supply chain has single points of human failure, or review +complexity, that makes it undesirable for threat models that assume any single +human can be hacked or coerced. ## Goals @@ -116,3 +80,48 @@ the future. * Make (for dependency management) * Prove hashes of bootstrap layer builds match before proceeding * Keep package definitions lean and readable with simple CLI and no magic + +## Building + +### Requirements + +* An OCI building runtime + * Currently Docker supported, but will support buildah and podman +* Gnu Make + +### Examples + +#### Compile all packages + +``` +make +``` + +#### Compile specific package + +``` +make out/rust.tgz +``` + +#### Reproduce all changed packages + +``` +make reproduce +``` + +#### Reproduce all packages without cache + +``` +make clean reproduce +``` + +#### Sign current manifest of package hashes + +``` +make sign +``` + +## Sponsors + +- Turnkey +- Mysten Labs