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fix typo and date

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Ryan Heywood 2025-07-27 11:46:46 -04:00
parent 1bf06a7364
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GPG Key ID: 8E401478A3FBEF72
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_posts/2025-06-07-package-managers.md
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
layout: post
title: Package managers - malware delivery as a service
date: 2025-04-02
date: 2025-06-07
---
Using third-party code, such as open source libraries has made it much easier to
@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ building while the backdoor is unguarded and wide open. SAST and monitoring
will only reliably detect previously found vulnerabilities, as they are
typically rule or behaviour based, and can often be circumvented because the
attackers design their attacks to evade detection. The [SolarWinds attack](http://web.archive.org/web/20250226000211/https://www.wired.com/story/the-untold-story-of-solarwinds-the-boldest-supply-chain-hack-ever/)
occured despite sophisticated monitoring and SAST systems at one of the leading
occurred despite sophisticated monitoring and SAST systems at one of the leading
cybersecurity firms in the world. The nature of that compromise is such that
full code review likely wouldn't have prevented the attack, reproducible builds
would have (more on that another time), but the point is that there is an
@ -138,5 +138,3 @@ review them rather than assigning them cost of $0 as though they are free to use
* Consider donating to maintainers of your most important third party
dependencies, both for development, and to pay for security assessments.