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### Summary
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This report highlights the major single points of failure, which rely on a single individual and/or computer, thus creating an opportunity for compromise. Blockchains benefit from security of the network via strong cryptography and decentralization. More "traditional" parts of the infrastructure historically have not had the ability to distribute trust, but there are tactics that can be leveraged to achieve distribution of trust which help reduce risk from a single individual or computer undermining the integrity of a system.
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This report identifies critical single points of failure—cases where trust is placed in a single individual or computer—creating opportunities for compromise. In contrast, blockchains offer stronger security properties through cryptography and decentralized trust models.
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Traditional infrustructure has historically lacked mechanisms to distribute trust, but this limitation can be addressed. By applying targeted design strategies, it's possible to distribute trust across systems and reduce the risks of a single compromised actor undermining the integrity of the entire system.
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## Root Cause Analysis and Mitigating Controls
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In our opinion, the main reasons this hack occured are these two points found in the [Sygnia report](https://www.sygnia.co/blog/sygnia-investigation-bybit-hack/):
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In our opinion, the primary causes of this incident stem from two key issues identified in the [Sygnia report](https://www.sygnia.co/blog/sygnia-investigation-bybit-hack/):
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* > ... a developer’s Mac OS workstation was compromised, likely through social engineering.
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* > ... the modification of JavaScript resources directly on the S3 bucket serving the domain app.safe[.]global.
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These findings highlight both endpoint compromise and weak controls around cloud infrustructure. The following sections focus on how such risks could be mitigated through architectural decisions and more rigorous threat modeling.
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## Introduction
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The compromise occured due to several key factors which have been summarized in other reports. This report will focus primarily on expounding on how this incident could have been prevented. It is important to address that the naive mitigating controls, while helpful, are not enough to mitigate the risk adequately. The naive security controls which we often observe as recommendations are improving safeguarding measure of the access tokens, access controls to cloud resources, such as the storage used for the JavaScript which is used to serve the web-application front-end, as well as monitoring (the quintessential reactive control, rather than a preventative one, and we strongly believe it's always better to prevent wherever possible). While these are improvements which are important, they are more of a "plugging holes on a sinking ship" exercise, rather than upgrading the hull to titanium. Even if improved controls are introduced around the token and cloud platform management, there are still many different single points of failure in the system.
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