Unlike conventional frameworks (e.g., STRIDE, PASTA) that focus on identifying and mitigating specific risks, the Distrust Threat Model, rather than modeling threats as potential risks, assumes that systems are already compromised. This pessimistic, assumption-driven approach focuses on building systems that can survive and remain secure even when critical components fail or are actively under attack by sophisticated threat actors at all levels.
-Unlike conventional frameworks (e.g., STRIDE, PASTA) that focus on identifying and mitigating specific risks, the Distrust Threat Model assumes that at some level systems are already compromised. This pessimistic, assumption-driven approach focuses on building systems that can remain secure even when up against the worst case adversary that have reason to target an organization.
While the end-goal is to adequately address the risks which stem from the assumptions, organizations are at varying levels of maturity and often need a path towards mitigating threats in a phased approach. To this end, the threat model defines 4 levels, each corresponding to increasingly more sophisticated threat actors as the levels increase. Each threat actor is assumed to have access to specific methods of attack limited by factors such as cost to execute, sophistication, time required etc.
-It is a reasonable approach to apply different threat model levels to different parts of systems. It's also worth noting that essentially no companies, to our knowledge meet adequate controls for Level 4 adversaries except for select nation states organizations and militaries.
+It is a reasonable approach to apply different threat model levels to different parts of systems relative to the amount of value they protect.
Defense against remote adversaries with limited resources.
An unskilled or lightly skilled individual leveraging widely available tools and publicly known vulnerabilities. Their attacks are largely opportunistic and automated, rather than targeted.
-An unskilled or lightly skilled individual leveraging widely available tools and publicly known vulnerabilities. Their attacks are largely opportunistic and automated. We do however assume they can be very patient and willing to work across a long time horizon.
+Defense against insiders.
A skilled and resourceful individual specifically targeting a single organization. This adversary employs focused efforts to breach systems, including sophisticated social engineering and exploitation of newly disclosed vulnerabilities.
-We assume the adversary is an individual or system that already has some level of privilige or trust inside the organization. This could be anything from a disgruntled employee to a compromised work station or server.
+Defense against well-funded organizations.
An organized, well-funded group possessing diverse expertise across multiple domains (malware, supply chain, network exploitation, physical access, insider recruitment). Capable of sustained campaigns combining internal and external compromise.
-Defense against nation state actors.
A state-backed or similarly resourced entity capable of executing the most advanced forms of cyber and physical attacks, including full-spectrum operations across the supply chain, hardware, firmware, and human factors..
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