diff --git a/_posts/2025-04-02-bybit-safe-report.md b/_posts/2025-04-02-bybit-safe-report.md
index d8b6a7c..3eff44f 100644
--- a/_posts/2025-04-02-bybit-safe-report.md
+++ b/_posts/2025-04-02-bybit-safe-report.md
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Traditional infrastructure has historically lacked mechanisms to distribute trus
## Root cause analysis and mitigation strategies
-In our opinion, the primary causes of this incident stem from two key issues identified in the [Sygnia report](https://www.sygnia.co/blog/sygnia-investigation-bybit-hack/):
+In our opinion, the primary causes of this incident stem from two key issues identified in the Sygnia report.
* > ... a developer’s Mac OS workstation was compromised, likely through social engineering.
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ The idea centers on extracting the **signing** component from the application (w
However, simply making a component offline does not eliminate all single points of failure. To close off supply chain threats stemming from compiler, dependency or environment compromise requires that the application is reproduced on multiple diverse systems (using different chipsets and operating systems), using a fully bootstrapped compiler—a fully hermetic, deterministic and reproducible process.
-We've developed open source tooling for this under **[StageX](https://codeberg.org/stagex/stagex)**. To learn more about the importance of reproducible builds, check out [this video](https://antonlivaja.com/videos/2024-incyber-stagex-talk.mp4), where one of our co-founders explains how the SolarWinds incident unfolded—and how it could have been prevented.
+We've developed open source tooling for this under StageX. To learn more about the importance of reproducible builds, check out this video, where one of our co-founders explains how the SolarWinds incident unfolded—and how it could have been prevented.
##### Reference design
@@ -111,13 +111,13 @@ This reference design was developed for the Safe{Wallet} team, but it can be app
* Signing operations are performed exclusively on the engineer's offline system
- * Distrust has developed open source tooling to drastically simplify PGP key provisioning: **[Trove](https://trove.distrust.co/generated-documents/all-levels/pgp-key-provisioning.html)**
+ * Distrust has developed open source tooling to drastically simplify PGP key provisioning: Trove
3. **Offline signing applications are deterministically compiled, verified, and signed by multiple engineers**
* Includes a full set of tools needed for secure offline key operations
- * Distrust also created **[AirgapOS](https://git.distrust.co/public/airgap)**, a custom Linux distribution designed specifically for offline secret management. It has been independently audited and is used in production by several major digitial asset organizations.
+ * Distrust also created AirgapOS, a custom Linux distribution designed specifically for offline secret management. It has been independently audited and is used in production by several major digitial asset organizations.
4. **All sensitive operations are fully verified offline before any cryptographic action is taken**