1.9 KiB
1.9 KiB
- Hardware decryption with user interaction
- Tools:
- Password Store
- https://www.passwordstore.org/
- Shared git repo
- Yubikey with PGP keychain for each engineer
- Defense:
- Prevent theft of secrets not currently being used
- Usage:
- Encrypt secrets to Yubikey PGP keys of all holders as individual files
- Place secrets in Git repo
- Use "pass" command to sync and decrypt secrets on demand as needed
some-signing-command --key=<(pass Exodus/somesecret)
- Each access requires a Yubikey tap to decrypt
- Hardware decryption with explicit user consent
- Tools:
- Defense:
- Prevent theft of secrets not currently being used
- Prevent operator from being tricked into revealing wrong secret
- Usage:
- All devices use a pin to unlock, and can share encrypted databases
- All devices explicitly ask for consent to release a secret by name
- User reads on external display and approves with a button press
- Shamirs Secret Sharing to tamper evident system
- Tools:
- Remotely attestable TEE or HSM
- Nitro Enclave
- Google Confidential Compute
- osresearch/heads booted server
- Remotely attestable TEE or HSM
- Defense:
- Prevent theft of secrets not currently being used
- Prevent operator from being tricked into revealing wrong secret
- Prevent compromised operator from stealing any secrets
- Usage:
- Public keys of trusted quorum provided to enclave
- Secrets are created in enclave
- Secrets are split into share requiring M-of-N to reconstruct
- Enclave renturns shares encrypted to each quorum member public key
- M-of-N quorum members can submit shares of given secret to servers