46 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
46 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
1. Hardware decryption with user interaction
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* Tools:
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* Password Store
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* https://www.passwordstore.org/
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* Shared git repo
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* Yubikey with PGP keychain for each engineer
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* Defense:
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* Prevent theft of secrets not currently being used
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* Usage:
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* Encrypt secrets to Yubikey PGP keys of all holders as individual files
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* Place secrets in Git repo
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* Use "pass" command to sync and decrypt secrets on demand as needed
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* ```some-signing-command --key=<(pass Exodus/somesecret)```
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* Each access requires a Yubikey tap to decrypt
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2. Hardware decryption with explicit user consent
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* Tools:
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* Mooltipass
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* https://www.themooltipass.com/
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* Ledger
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* https://support.ledger.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017501380-Passwords?docs=true
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* Trezor
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* https://trezor.io/passwords/
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* Defense:
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* Prevent theft of secrets not currently being used
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* Prevent operator from being tricked into revealing wrong secret
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* Usage:
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* All devices use a pin to unlock, and can share encrypted databases
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* All devices explicitly ask for consent to release a secret by name
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* User reads on external display and approves with a button press
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3. Shamirs Secret Sharing to tamper evident system
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* Tools:
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* Remotely attestable TEE or HSM
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* Nitro Enclave
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* Google Confidential Compute
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* osresearch/heads booted server
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* Defense:
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* Prevent theft of secrets not currently being used
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* Prevent operator from being tricked into revealing wrong secret
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* Prevent compromised operator from stealing any secrets
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* Usage:
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* Public keys of trusted quorum provided to enclave
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* Secrets are created in enclave
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* Secrets are split into share requiring M-of-N to reconstruct
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* Enclave renturns shares encrypted to each quorum member public key
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* M-of-N quorum members can submit shares of given secret to servers
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