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name change, sponsorship, and various readme updates

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Lance Vick 2023-12-07 07:52:12 -08:00
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README.md
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@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
# ImgRep
# Packages
Repository of reproducibly built images of common open source Linux toolchains
and software with reputation anchored signatures.
Minimalism and security first repository of OCI images of common open source
software packages built from source.
## About
These can be used as a secure supply chain for anything from obtaining local
tools, to bootstrapping a Linux distribution.
## Background
We have learned a lot of lessons about supply chain integrity over the years,
and the greatest of them may be that any system that is complex to review and
@ -17,11 +20,11 @@ this, having a central machine somewhere blindly signing all unsigned
contributions from the public.
We will cover an exhaustive comparison of the supply chain strategies of other
linux distros elsewhere, but suffice to say while many are pursuing
reproducible builds, minimalism, or signing... any one distro delivering on all
of these does not seem in the cards any time soon.
package management solutions elsewhere, but suffice to say while many are
pursuing reproducible builds, minimalism, or signing... any one solution
delivering on all of these does not seem in the cards any time soon.
This is generally a human problem. Most distros end up generating a lot of
This is generally a human problem. Most solutions end up generating a lot of
custom tooling for package management, which in turn rapidly grows in
complexity to meet demands ranging from hobby desktop systems production
servers.
@ -31,49 +34,10 @@ lowering the barrier to entry to allow any hobbyist to contribute and maintain
packages with minimal friction and rarely a requirement of signing keys or
mandatory reproducible builds, let alone multiple signed reproduction proofs.
Suffice to say, we feel every current Linux distribution has single points of
human failure, or review complexity, that makes it undesirable for threat
models that assume any single human can be hacked or coerced.
## Building
### Requirements
* An OCI building runtime
* Currently Docker supported, but will support buildah and podman
* Gnu Make
### Examples
#### Compile all packages
```
make
```
#### Compile specific package
```
make out/rust.tgz
```
#### Reproduce all changed packages
```
make reproduce
```
#### Reproduce all packages without cache
```
make clean reproduce
```
#### Sign current manifest of package hashes
```
make sign
```
Suffice to say, we feel every current Linux package management solution and
container supply chain has single points of human failure, or review
complexity, that makes it undesirable for threat models that assume any single
human can be hacked or coerced.
## Goals
@ -116,3 +80,48 @@ the future.
* Make (for dependency management)
* Prove hashes of bootstrap layer builds match before proceeding
* Keep package definitions lean and readable with simple CLI and no magic
## Building
### Requirements
* An OCI building runtime
* Currently Docker supported, but will support buildah and podman
* Gnu Make
### Examples
#### Compile all packages
```
make
```
#### Compile specific package
```
make out/rust.tgz
```
#### Reproduce all changed packages
```
make reproduce
```
#### Reproduce all packages without cache
```
make clean reproduce
```
#### Sign current manifest of package hashes
```
make sign
```
## Sponsors
- Turnkey
- Mysten Labs